Emamian v. Rockefeller Univ.
| Decision Date | 21 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | 07 Civ. 3919 (DAB) |
| Parties | Effat S. Emamian, Plaintiff, v. Rockefeller University, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Defendant has moved for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Rule 50(a) on Plaintiff's claims for negligence, promissory estoppel, intentional discrimination based on race, religion, national origin and gender, and retaliation. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law is GRANTED with regard to Plaintiff's negligence claim, but DENIED on Plaintiff's claims for promissory estoppel, intentional discrimination, and retaliation.
Rule 50(a) states:
In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000).
"Thus, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if it can conclude that, with credibility assessments made against the moving party and all inferences drawn against the moving party, a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party." Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 370-71 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The "standard for granting summary judgment mirrors the standard for judgment as a matter of law, such that the inquiry under each is the same." Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under New York law, to "establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) a breach thereof, and (3) injury proximately resulting therefrom." Solomon v. City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 1026, 1027 (N.Y. 1985).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant acted negligently by promising to send Dr. Emamian her mouse lines, and then failing to do so. Defendant argues that it owed no duty to send Dr. Emamian the mouse lines because the University owned the mouse lines in question in the first place. Plaintiff does not dispute the fact that the University owned the mouse lines (at least originally), but argues that Mr. Winborn's promise to send Dr. Emamian's mouse lines to her created a duty, which was then breached by the University's failure to do so.
Yet Plaintiff's position confuses a cause of action that lies in tort (negligence) with one that lies in contract (promissory estoppel).
New York courts have long held that a failure to act on a contract or promise cannot give rise to a dereliction of duty in a negligence action: in other words, "nonfeasance" may be the basis for a contract claim, but only "misfeasance" can be the basis for a negligence claim arising out of contract. World Trade Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Lido Knitting Mills, Inc., 154 A.D.2d 99, 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990).1
The First Department Appellate Division summarized this distinction in Rosenbaum:
Negligent conduct becomes actionable only when it violates some specific duty owing to the person complaining. The failure to perform a contract obligation is never a tort unless it is also a violation of a legal duty. Where a person contracts to do certainwork he is charged with the common-law duty of exercising reasonable care and skill in the performance of the work required to be done by the contract. It is the breach of the duty imposed by law and not of the contract obligation which constitutes the tort. While such duty may arise out of contract, it is a separate and distinct undertaking so that a breach of one will not necessarily imply a breach of the other, although the same conduct may at times constitute a tort as well as a breach of contract. In the absence of at least an attempt to perform the contract there can be no violation of the legal duty.
Rosenbaum v. Branster Realty Corp., 276 A.D. 167, 168 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1949) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
The University did not undertake an affirmative act after allegedly agreeing to send Dr. Emamaian's mouse lines to her. Plaintiff has adduced no evidence of an affirmative act, such as negligently mishandling the lines after agreeing to send them, or sending them to the wrong person. Plaintiff has only alleged that the University failed to undertake sending them to her altogether (nonfeasance), which cannot be the basis for a tort claim. "If the only interest at stake is that of holding the defendant to a promise, the courts have said that the plaintiff may not transmogrify the contract claim into one for tort." Hargrave v. Oki Nursery Inc., 636 F.2d 897, 899 (2d Cir. 1980).
Accordingly, Plaintiff's negligence claim must fail as a matter of law.
Plaintiff's promissory estoppel claim is another story. "Duty" (and ownership) is not an element in promissory estoppel.
Promissory estoppel under New York law "requires the plaintiff to prove three elements: 1) a clear and unambiguous promise; 2) reasonable and foreseeable reliance on that promise; and 3) injury to the relying party as a result of the reliance." Kaye v. Grossman, 202 F.3d 611, 615 (2d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff has adduced some evidence that could justify a claim for promissory estoppel: Mr. Winborn's promise to preserve Dr. Emamian's mouse lines (see Plaintiff's Exhibit 189 ("We will cryopreserve the lines for which you have requested preservation."); Dr. Emamian's reasonable reliance on that promise (based on the fact that she had previously obtained two other mouse lines from the University), and Dr. Emamian's alleged resulting injury, could constitute the elements of promissory estoppel. (Though the Court does note the paucity of specific evidence Plaintiff has put forward regarding injury and damages). Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court finds, after a review of the record, that a reasonable jury could have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the Plaintiff on this claim.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claim for promissory estoppel remains, whereas her claim for negligence is dismissed as a matter of law.
According to Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux North America, Inc., 715 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2013), and Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, 61 A.D.3d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009), to "establish a . . . discrimination claim under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff need only demonstrate 'by a preponderance of the evidence that she has been treated less well than other employees because of her gender,'" race, religion, or national origin. Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 (quoting Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 78). "The challenged conduct need not even be 'tangible' (like hiring or firing)." Id. (quoting Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 79).
As counsel conceded in his opening statement, "candidly, some of the claims are stronger than others." (Tr. of Jan. 22, 2018 at 30:20-21).
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledges that separate claims for race, religion or national origin "may substantially overlap." Village of Freeport v. Barrella, 814 F.3d 594, 607 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 2003)); see also Deravin, 335 F.3d at 202 n.5.
The Court also acknowledges that "Middle Eastern" has been recognized as a "race" for the purposes of racial discrimination actionable under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Supreme Court clarified this point in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-14 (1987).2
Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 502 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Based on a review of the record, and without making "credibility determinations" on the weight of the evidence itself, Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, the Court finds it possible fora reasonable jury to find for Plaintiff on her intentional discrimination claims on the basis of gender, race, religion or national origin.
The Court will instruct the jury, however, that they must be unanimous on which basis, if any, they find the Plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence the discrimination.
Mihalik, Williams and Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472 (N.Y. 2011),...
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