Emanuel Displaced Persons Ass'n 2 v. City of Portland
| Docket Number | 3:22-cv-1896-SI |
| Decision Date | 01 December 2023 |
| Parties | EMANUEL DISPLACED PERSONS ASSOCIATION 2, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF PORTLAND, PROSPER PORTLAND fka PORTLAND DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION, and LEGACY EMANUEL HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
Edward Johnson and Stephen Walters, OREGON LAW CENTER, Rebecca Morgan and Diane D. Nguyen, LEGAL AID SERVICES OF OREGON, and J. Ashlee Albies, ALBIES, STARK & GUERRIERO, Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Clifford S. Davidson, SNELL & WILMER LLP, and J. Scott Moede, Chief Deputy City Attorney, and Elizabeth C. Woodard Deputy City Attorney, PORTLAND CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Of Attorneys for Defendants City of Portland and Prosper Portland fka Portland Development Commission.
Misha Isaak, STOEL RIVES LLP, Peter M. Ellis and Rizwan A. Qureshi REED SMITH LLP, Of Attorneys for Defendant Legacy Emanuel Hospital and Health Center.
Plaintiffs allege intentional, race-based destruction of the once-thriving Black neighborhood of Central Albina (now known as the Eliot neighborhood) in Portland, Oregon. Plaintiffs state that this destruction took place under the pretense of “blight” removal and facilitating a hospital expansion that never happened. Plaintiffs are twenty-six individuals (collectively, the Individual Plaintiffs)[1] and one organization, Emanuel Displaced Persons Association 2 (EDPA2). The Individual Plaintiffs explain that they are all Black survivors and descendants of families whose homes were destroyed by Defendants. Plaintiffs add that EDPA2 was recently formed to help the Individual Plaintiffs and others learn about their history and seek justice and restitution through political advocacy.[2] Plaintiffs name as Defendants the City of Portland (the City); Prosper Portland (Prosper), formerly known as the Portland Development Commission (PDC); and Legacy Emanuel Hospital and Health Center (Emanuel), a nonprofit corporation, formerly known as Emanuel Hospital. Emanuel has been in Central Albina since 1915.
According to Plaintiffs, recently discovered information, allegedly long concealed by Defendants, brings to light the contours of an alleged conspiracy among Defendants to deprive the Individual Plaintiffs of their civil rights. Plaintiffs also allege that this racist chapter from Portland's past continues to cause them harm. Against all three Defendants, Plaintiffs assert a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)[3] and two state claims under Oregon common law, for unjust enrichment and public nuisance. Defendants have moved to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiffs' Complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs lack standing, Plaintiffs' claims are time-barred under the applicable statutes of limitation, and Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition, the City and Prosper argue that Plaintiffs' state-law claims against them are prohibited by discretionary immunity.[4] For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Defendants' motions to dismiss.
The United States Constitution confers limited authority on federal courts to hear only active cases or controversies brought by persons who demonstrate standing. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 335-38 (2016); Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 89-90 (2013). Standing “limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. A plaintiff's standing under Article III of the Constitution is a component of subject matter jurisdiction properly challenged under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2010). On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under that rule, it is the burden of the party asserting jurisdiction to establish the existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1122; see also Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2008).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be either “facial” or “factual.” See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction is based on the assertion that the allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id.[5] When a facial challenge is brought at the pleading stage, “general allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Id. (cleaned up); accord Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (); Mencinas v. Hobbs, 30 F.4th 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2022) (same).
When a defendant contends that a claim is untimely under an applicable statute of limitations, that is an affirmative defense. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c)(1). “Ordinarily, affirmative defenses . . . may not be raised on a motion to dismiss except when the defense raises no disputed issues of fact.” Lusnak v. Bank of Am., N.A., 883 F.3d 1185, 1194 n.6 (9th Cir. 2018); see also U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966, 972 (9th Cir. 2019). In Monex, the Ninth Circuit explained that “we can consider an affirmative defense on a motion to dismiss when there is some obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Monex, 931 F.3d at 973 (quotation marks omitted). “In other words, dismissal based on an affirmative defense is permitted when the complaint establishes the defense.” Id. (emphasis in original).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012); Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). To be entitled to a presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). A court also must draw all reasonable inferences from the factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff. Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Off. Sol., 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). A court need not, however, credit a plaintiff's legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell, 845 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).
BACKGROUND[6]
Beginning in the late 1950s and continuing into the early 1970s, the City, Prosper, and Emanuel allegedly acted in concert to destroy a predominately Black community and displace hundreds of families from their homes and businesses in the Central Albina neighborhood in Portland, Oregon. The destruction and displacement were done in the name of urban renewal, progress, and the removal of blight. Yet for decades, much of the demolished and cleared land languished empty and unused, creating real blight. This vacant land serves as a constant reminder to the survivors and descendants of those displaced families of what they once had, what their families could have had for generations, and what was taken from them. For the Individual Plaintiffs, the loss of their family homes has meant the deprivation of inheritance and the loss of intergenerational wealth, community, and opportunities.
Plaintiffs contend that recently discovered information, concealed by Defendants, shows that urban renewal and blight were mere pretexts for Defendants' real motive-a desire to remove Black people from the economically valuable neighborhood of Central Albina. According to Plaintiffs, the City, PDC, and Emanuel profited from their actions and, rather than removing blight, created a public nuisance that continues to cause harm. As alleged by Plaintiffs, Defendants conspired to destroy the Central Albina neighborhood and displace Plaintiffs' families and implemented Defendants' conspiracy in two phases. Phase One, which took place from the late 1950s until the late 1960s, involved Emanuel, acting with the secret approval of the...
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