Emeritus Senior Living v. Lepore
Decision Date | 26 June 2018 |
Docket Number | AC 40078 |
Citation | 183 Conn.App. 23,191 A.3d 212 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | EMERITUS SENIOR LIVING v. Denise LEPORE |
K. Scott Griggs, with whom, on the brief, was Gerardo Schiano, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Sheldon, Keller and Elgo, Js.
The plaintiff, Emeritus Senior Living a/k/a Brookdale Woodbridge,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, Denise Lepore, in this action filed by the plaintiff to collect the unpaid balance due for assisted living services it had provided to the defendant's now deceased mother, Louise Rolla. The plaintiff claims that the court erred by finding that the residency agreement, to the extent it holds the defendant personally liable, as Rolla's representative, for unpaid amounts owed by Rolla to the plaintiff, is void and unenforceable because it is (1) unconscionable and (2) against public policy.2 We agree and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.3
The following factual allegations and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff operates an assisted living facility in Woodbridge. On December 21, 2014, the defendant executed a residency agreement (agreement) with the plaintiff for the residence and care of her mother, Rolla.4 The defendant signed the agreement on behalf of her mother as a representative and with power of attorney for her mother. The agreement provides in relevant part:
Initially, the defendant made regular payments to the plaintiff for her mother's care and residence. After March 11, 2016, however, the defendant stopped making payments to the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff served Rolla and the defendant, in her capacity as Rolla's representative, with a notice to quit possession for nonpayment of rent on July 28, 2016. The plaintiff commenced an eviction summary process action against Rolla and the defendant on August 8, 2016, in the New Haven Superior Court, Housing Session. Rolla and the defendant did not appear in that action or file responsive pleadings therein. On August 31, 2016, the court rendered a judgment of possession for the plaintiff and on September 8, 2016, the court issued an execution to enforce that judgment. The plaintiff, however, did not execute on its right to possession because Rolla suffered from severe dementia and the plaintiff lacked the authority to place her in a different facility. As the defendant had power of attorney, she was the person with the authority to move her mother to a different facility. The plaintiff attempted to contact the defendant to discuss Rolla's relocation, but the defendant did not respond.
On October 24, 2016, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the present action, seeking to recover "all sums payable and due" under the residency agreement, which the plaintiff claimed to amount to $47,310.02 at the time. The defendant, appearing without counsel, filed an answer on November 15, 2016, in which she referred to purported defects in the service of process. On December 9, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant must pay all unpaid sums owed for the residence and care services provided to her mother. The defendant did not file a memorandum in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or a countermotion for summary judgment in her favor.
The court, Avallone, J. , held a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on January 17, 2017.
At the hearing, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and, sua sponte, rendered judgment for the defendant, finding that the agreement was unenforceable because it was unconscionable and against public policy. The court, ruling from the bench, stated in relevant part: The court reiterated: On January 27, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to reargue and to open or set aside the judgment, which the court denied on January 30, 2017. This appeal followed.
The plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding that the residency agreement is unenforceable due to unconscionability.
We first set forth our standard of review of a claim that a contract is unenforceable due to unconscionability. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes , 223 Conn. 80, 87–89, 612 A.2d 1130 (1992).
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Smith v. Mitsubishi Motors Credit of America, Inc ., 247 Conn. 342, 349, 721 A.2d 1187 (1998). "A determination of unconscionability generally requires a showing that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable when made—i.e., some showing of an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hottle v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 268 Conn. 694, 719, 846 A.2d 862 (2004).
On the basis of the limited record in the present appeal, in which the defendant did not present any evidence in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, we are not persuaded that the agreement is unenforceable due to procedural or substantive flaws. With respect to the formation of the agreement, the record does not reveal that the defendant had no meaningful choice whether to select the plaintiff as the provider of assisted living services for her mother. The agreement is sufficiently clear, as written, to provide reasonable notice to the defendant, as her mother's representative, that she would be obliged to pay all sums due for services rendered to her mother if her mother did not pay for them. See Sturman v. Socha , 191 Conn. 1, 9, 12, 463 A.2d 527 (1983) ( ). The portion of the agreement at issue plainly and unambiguously imposes personal liability on persons signing in a representative capacity for amounts owed to the plaintiff.5
Additionally, for the reasons identified by the plaintiff, the agreement is not substantively unconscionable. The plaintiff argues that the agreement is not substantively unconscionable because "[t]he language of [the representative clause] is akin to having a [cosigner] to an agreement, which is a common business practice." The plaintiff also argues that the agreement is not substantively unconscionable because, as it is common for residents in assisted living homes to entrust the management of their finances to others, personal liability is typically imposed on the individual entrusted to incentivize that person to pay the facility for its services. Thus, a guarantee agreement to ensure payment for services rendered is not so unreasonable as to be unconscionable and lead us to conclude that it is unenforceable.
The plaintiff also claims that the court erred by finding that the residency agreement is unenforceable as a matter of public policy. We agree with the plaintiff.
We begin our analysis of this claim by setting forth the standard of review governing a claim that a contract is unenforceable as a matter of public policy. "Although it is well established that parties are free to contract for whatever terms on which they may agree ... it is equally well established that contracts that violate public policy are unenforceable.... [T]he question [of] whether a contract is against public policy is [a] question of law dependent on the circumstances of the particular case, over which an appellate court has unlimited review....
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