Emerson v. Wembley Usa Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 03-cv-01793-EWN-BNB. |
| Citation | 433 F.Supp.2d 1200 |
| Parties | Patricia EMERSON, Plaintiff, v. WEMBLEY USA INC.; Wembley Inc.; Robert Ty Howard, in his personal capacity; and Jeffrey Goergen, in his personal capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Bradley N. Shefrin, Melissa A. Clack, Robert A. Zupkus, Zupkus & Angell, P.C., Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
Kristen L. Mix, Snell & Wilmer, LLP., David H. Stacy, Ducker, Montgomery, Aronstein & Bess, P.C., Denver, CO, for Defendants.
This is a defamation and Title VII case. Plaintiff Patricia Emerson alleges that Defendants Wembley Inc., ("Wembley") Wembley USA, Inc., ("Wembley USA"), and Robert Ty Howard (collectively, "Defendants"): (1) discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006), (2) published defamatory statements about her, and (3) committed various state law violations.1 Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive, and non-economic damages. This matter is before the court on Defendants "Wembley Inc.'s Second Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and Wembley USA, Inc.'s Second Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment," filed on December 9, 2005. Jurisdiction is premised upon federal question and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367 (2006).
Plaintiff worked for Defendant Wembley USA from approximately January 1999 through December 2002. (Br. in Supp. of Wembley Inc.'s Second Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. and Wembley USA, Inc.'s Second Renewed Mot. for Summ. J., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1 [filed Dec. 9, 2005] [hereinafter ]; admitted at Pl.'s Resp. to Wembley [sic] Inc.'s Second Renewed Mot. for Summ. J. and Wembley [sic] USA Inc.'s Second Renewed Mot. for Partial Summ. J., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1 [filed Dec. 22, 2005] [hereinafter "Pl.'s Resp."].)2 Defendant Wembley USA is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Defendant Wembley. (Id., Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 2; admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 2.) Plaintiff worked as a controller in Defendant Wembley USA's accounting department and performed accounting and other financial functions for all of the Wembley-affiliated companies, including Defendant Wembley and its subsidiaries. (Id., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 3; admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 3.)
From January 1999 through April 2001, Plaintiff reported directly to David Brents, who served as Defendant Wembley USA's chief financial officer ("CFO"), and Skip Sherman, who served as its president and chief executive officer ("CEO"). (Id., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4; admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 4.) On or about January 1, 1999, Brents presented Plaintiff with a letter that stated in relevant part: "[i]n the event that the Company chooses to terminate [Plaintiffs] employment for any reason, [Plaintiff] will be entitled to payment of one year's full pay."3 (Id., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 13, Ex. A-11 [1/1/99 Letter]; deemed admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 9.)
From April 2001 through October 2001, Plaintiff reported directly to Defendant Howard, who served as: (1) Defendant Wembley USA's president, CEO, CFO, and treasurer; and (2) Defendant Wembley's president, CEO, CFO, and treasurer. (Id., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 6; admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 6.) Plaintiff asserts that in April 2001, she became the acting CFO for Defendants Wembley and Wembley USA. Concerning Disputed Facts ¶ 14 [filed Jan. 9, 2006] [hereinafter ].)4 Plaintiff asserts that she did not receive salary or benefits commensurate with her position.
In July and August 2001, Plaintiff complained to Defendants that she was being discriminated against based on her sex. In October 2001, Defendants Wembley and Wembley USA hired former Defendant Goergen as CFO. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Wembley and Wembley USA replaced Plaintiff with Goergen. On October 25, 2001, Plaintiff filed her first charge of discrimination against Defendant Wembley USA with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), in which she alleged Defendant Wembley USA discriminated against her based on her sex. (Defs.' Br., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 10, Ex. A-7 [10/25/01 Charge of Discrimination]; deemed admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.) Plaintiff's EEOC charge was based in part on Defendants' decision to hire former Defendant Goergen as CFO. (Defs.' Br., Ex. A-7 [10/25/01 Charge of Discrimination].) From October 2001 through the end of her employment in December 2002, Plaintiff reported to former Defendant Goergen. (Id., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 7-8; deemed admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 6-7.)
In February 2002, Plaintiff was subpoenaed to testify before a Rhode Island state grand jury in connection with an investigation into Defendants Wembley and Wembley USA's work in that state. Plaintiff asserts that after she gave her testimony, Defendant Howard and former Defendant Goergen ignored her, criticized her abilities and performance, and perpetuated a hostile work environment.
On June 3, 2002, Plaintiff filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC in which she alleged Defendant Wembley USA continued to discriminate and retaliate against her based on her sex and age. (Defs.' Br., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 11, Ex A-8 [6/3/02 Charge of Discrimination]; deemed admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.) In August 2002, Plaintiff informed former Defendant Goergen that the alleged hostile work environment was making her "unable to function in the workplace." From August 8, 2002 through October 12, 2002, Plaintiff took sick leave followed by a leave of absence under the federal Family. Medical Leave Act.
Plaintiffs performance evaluation was postponed due to her leave of absence. (Id., Ex. B-23 [8/8/02 Letter].) On November 5, 2002, Plaintiff received a performance evaluation that was negative in part.
On December 12, 2002, Plaintiff sent former Defendant Goergen an electronic mail message outlining her feelings that he had excluded her in her role at work. (Defs.' Br., Ex. A-15 [12/12/02 Electronic Mail Message].) On December 13, 2002, former Defendant Goergen responded, but sent his electronic message reply to Plaintiff and multiple individuals, including some who worked for Defendants Wembley and Wembley USA. .) Plaintiff asserts that as a result of former Defendant Goergen's reply, she was "humiliated, distraught, embarrassed[,] and stupefied to such great extent that she was forced to immediately [sic] resign" from her employment. None of the Defendants has paid Plaintiff severance pay pursuant to the aforementioned January 1, 1999 severance agreement. (Defs.' Br., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 14; admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 10.)
On January 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed a third charge with the EEOC, in which she alleged continuing retaliation against her based on her sex. (Id., Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 12, Ex A-10 [1/28/03 Charge of Discrimination]; deemed admitted at Pl.'s Resp., Resp. to Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 8.)
On May 30, 2003, Plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the EEOC. (Pl.'s Resp., Ex. B-27 [5/30/03 Notice of Right to Sue].) On August 21, 2003, Plaintiff filed her initial complaint against Defendants in the District Court of Adams County, Colorado. (Notice of Removal of Civil Action from the Adams County District Court, Colorado [filed Sept. 12, 2003], Ex. C [Compl. and Jury Demand].) On August 26, 2003, Pla...
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Table of Cases
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