Emery v. State

Decision Date21 March 1907
Docket Number14,760
Citation111 N.W. 374,78 Neb. 547
PartiesGEORGE E. EMERY v. STATE OF NEBRASKA
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

ERROR to the district court for Gage county: JOHN B. RAPER, JUDGE. Affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

R. W Sabin, Hazlett & Jack and S. Rinaker, for plaintiff in error.

W. T Thompson, Attorney General, contra.

OPINION

BARNES, J.

George E. Emery, hereafter called the accused, prosecutes error from a judgment of the district court for Gage county, by which he was found guilty of a contempt of that court, and adjudged to pay a fine of $ 25 and the costs of the prosecution. The complaint or information on which he was prosecuted charged him with an attempt to influence a member of the jury in a certain civil action which was being tried in the district court for that county on the 13th day of December, 1905. His plea or answer to the charge was: First, not guilty; and second, a general denial.

His first contention is that the complaint or information is void, because the charge contained therein was made upon information and belief only. An examination of the record discloses that in the charging part of the complaint the facts are stated positively, directly and without equivocation, and the verification reads as follows: "S. D. Killen, being first duly sworn, upon his oath says that he is the county attorney in and for Gage county, in the first judicial district of the state of Nebraska, and that the allegations and charges against George E. Emery in the within information are true as he verily believes." It appears that this is the usual manner of verifying criminal informations in this jurisdiction. The accused, however, cites a number of authorities in support of his contention, but they seem to be beside the mark, and apply to cases where the charge in the body of the complaint was made on information and belief only. It appears that the complaint in this case is sufficiently positive and certain in its charging part, and the fault, if any, lies in the verification. But this defect, if it be such, was waived, for we find that the accused made no objection to the complaint, but filed his answer of not guilty, together with a general denial, and immediately announced his readiness to proceed to trial. In fact the record shows that this question was raised for the first time by him in his motion for a new trial. The objection, therefore, comes too late, for one cannot object to the verification of a complaint after he has been arraigned and pleaded not guilty, unless such plea has been withdrawn. Johnson v. State, 53 Neb. 103, 73 N.W. 463.

It is next contended that no offense is charged in the information. The acts of the accused set forth in the complaint are, in substance, as follows: That on the evening of the 13th day of December, 1905, as one of said jurors, namely, Christian Miller, was leaving the court house, George E. Emery approached said juror, and told him that he wanted to see him down town that evening; that the juror, supposing Emery wanted to see him about some trade, asked him where he should see him; and Emery said: "Down town at the hotel"; that about 8 o'clock that evening the juror went to the Paddock hotel, which is in the city of Beatrice, Gage county, Nebraska, and there met the accused, and after talking some time with him about other matters said: "What was it you wanted to see me about?" That Emery, thereupon, said: "Come on, and I will show you." That they left the hotel, went south to Court street, then west on Court street about a block and a half, until they came to a saloon, which they entered, proceeded to the back end of the room, and seated themselves at a table; that Emery called for beer, and two glasses were furnished, one for the juror and one for Emery; that after being seated at the table Emery said to the juror: "It is about the case; some of the parties want a verdict." That Miller said: "What case?" Emery answered: "The case you are juror on." That thereupon the juror refused to hear anything further on the subject, and told the accused to "Cut it out"; that Emery then replied that he liked to see a fellow that way; that he had been told to see another fellow on the jury, but he was not going to say anything to him.

That the foregoing facts, if true, are sufficient to constitute contempt of court seems quite clear. It is a matter of common knowledge that jurors are charged by the trial court, after having been sworn, that they shall not talk with any one in regard to the case on trial, nor suffer any one to talk to them in regard to it, while serving as jurors. The foregoing facts clearly show that the accused was violating such instruction of the court and the...

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