Emma v. Schenectady City School Dist.
| Decision Date | 17 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-CV-0774.,97-CV-0774. |
| Citation | 28 F.Supp.2d 711 |
| Parties | Joseph A. EMMA, Jr., Plaintiff, v. SCHENECTADY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; School Board of the City of Schenectady; Warren Snyder, individually and as President and a member of the Schenectady City School Board; Ben Wiles, individually and as Vice-President and a member of the Schenectady City School Board; Frederick Griesback, individually and as a member of the Schenectady City School Board; Thomas Kiesow, individually and as a member of the Schenectady City School Board; Stephen Russell, individually and as a member of the Schenectady City School Board; Armando Tebano, individually and as a member of the Schenectady City School Board; Elizabeth Varno, individually and as a member of the Schenectady City School Board; Jeffrey Jazinzewski, individually and as Past President and member of the Schenectady City School Board; Raymond Colucciello, individually and as Superintendent of Schools for the Schenectady City School District; John Falco, individually and as Assistant Superintendent of the Schenectady City School District; Suomi Amodeo, individually and as an employee for the Schenectady City School District, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Galvin & Morgan, Delmar, NY, for Plaintiff; Madeline Sheila Galvin, of counsel.
Plunkett & Jaffe, P.C., Albany, NY, for Defendants; Patrick E. Brown, of Counsel.
Plaintiff Joseph A. Emma, Jr. ("Emma" or "plaintiff") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 alleging, inter alia, that defendants Schenectady City School District (the "District") and the School Board of the City of Schenectady (the "Board") and its individual members (collectively the "defendants"), violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying him tenure in his position as principal in the District. Defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the Complaint and for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff cross-moves for summary judgment on all claims.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on May 30, 1997. The Complaint contains claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 stating various grounds for alleged violations of plaintiff's due process right to tenure, and claims of harassment and a hostile work environment.1 Plaintiff seeks reinstatement as District principal, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys fees.
Emma was hired by the District on or about August 1990 as Elementary School Assistant Principal, working at Pleasant Valley and Van Corlaer Elementary Schools through June 1991. Notably, for a three month period during his appointment as Assistant Principal, Emma served as interim principal at Van Corlaer due to the illness and subsequent death of then-Principal Anthony Parisi ("Parisi"). Around September 1991, Emma was appointed Elementary School Principal at Pleasant Valley, another school in the District, and received a three-year probationary appointment running from August 1991 through August 1994. During his tenure, Emma was under the direct supervision of Edward Rock ("Rock"), Assistant Superintendent for Elementary Education and Superintendent of Schools Raymond Colucciello ("Colucciello").
As an administrator in the District, Emma was a member of the Schenectady Supervisory Association (the "Union") and covered by the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") between the District and the Union. The CBA provided that each administrator must be evaluated annually by September 1st, or March 1st, in the event there was a question regarding the administrator's continued employment in the District. See Def. Mem. of Law Ex. E, CBA Art. XV. The CBA also provides for a grievance procedure whereby employees can arbitrate alleged violations of the CBA. See id. at Art. IV.2
It is undisputed that Rock, Emma's supervisor, did not prepare an evaluation of the plaintiff by March 1994. While Rock did not complete a written evaluation of the plaintiff prior to his retirement in May 1994, he recommended plaintiff for tenure as District principal. Around April 1994, the Board convened to discuss personnel matters that included, inter alia, a decision regarding plaintiff's tenure. Rock did not attend this meeting. From May 1994 through June 1994, plaintiff was on sick leave due to a back injury that resulted from a fall on school premises. In light of Rock's recommendation that plaintiff receive tenure and that plaintiff did not receive an evaluation by March 1st (required under the CBA if the administrator's continued employment is in question), Union President Charles Smith ("Smith") wrote Superintendent Colucciello in June 1994, requesting that plaintiff be recommended for tenure at the July 1994 Board meeting, or alternatively, that plaintiff's probationary status be extended to no later than March 1995. See Def. Mem. of Law Ex. F. On July 15, 1995, over one-month before the parties believed plaintiff's probationary period was to expire, plaintiff signed an agreement to extend his probationary period ("Extension Agreement") as District principal until August 19, 1995.3 The Extension Agreement was signed by plaintiff, Superintendent Colucciello, and Union President Smith.4 Plaintiff characterizes the Extension Agreement as a "loop hole" that was used to deny him tenure and force him into signing an extension of his probation. See Pl. Mem. of Law at 3.
After accepting a position as principal at another elementary school in the District, plaintiff was appointed Assistant Director of Adult and Continuing Education at Washington Irving Educational Center in November 1994, for a new three-year probationary period ending November 1997. See Def. Mem. of Law Exs. J, K; Pl. Mem. of Law at 5. Because this position was in another school district, the District treated plaintiff's appointment as a resignation of his current position. See Def. Mem. of Law Ex. P. In his new position, plaintiff alleges that his immediate supervisor, Suomi Amodeo ("Amodeo"), and others purposefully harassed the plaintiff and created a hostile work environment, prompting plaintiff to seek alternative employment in other school districts. See Pl. Mem. of Law at 5. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to verbal abuse, not informed of scheduling changes in staff meetings, unfairly accused of taking school files, had his paycheck intentionally withheld, and his W-2 earnings statement overstated. See Compl. at ¶¶ 163-202, 225-257. Concurrently, plaintiff requested, and was granted, a leave of absence "for personal reasons," effective August 1996 through June 1997. See Def. Mem. of Law Exs. L, M.
Plaintiff was informed that an acceptance of a new position during the leave of absence would constitute a resignation from his current position in accordance with CBA Art. XIV (3)(e). See id. at Ex. N. Plaintiff, however, argues that it was common practice to permit administrators to seek temporary alternative employment while on leave and still retain their current position. See Pl. Mem. of Law at 5; Compl. at ¶ 210. Around August 1996, while on leave, plaintiff accepted a position as Vice-Principal at a school in the Kingston City School District ("Kingston District"). Not surprisingly, the District treated plaintiff's actions as a resignation from his current position in the District. See Def. Mem. of Law Ex. P. Plaintiff is currently employed by the Kingston District.
The standard for summary judgment is well-settled. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), if there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law ... where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); see also Chertkova v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 86 (1996). The moving party bears the initial burden of "informing the ... court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). The initial burden is to demonstrate "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348. A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party; that is, whether the non-movant's case, if proved at trial, would be sufficient to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When reasonable minds, however, could not differ as to the import of the evidence, then summary judgment is proper. Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991).
Although the trial court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of that party against whom summary judgment is sought, Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir.1989); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1985) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987), the motion will not be defeated by a non-movant who raises...
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