Empire Fire & Marine Ins. v. Lang
| Citation | 655 F.Supp.2d 150 |
| Decision Date | 15 September 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:07cv1325.,3:07cv1325. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | EMPIRE FIRE & MARINE INS. CO., Plaintiff, v. Edward LANG, et al., Defendants. |
Daniel P. Scapellati, Steven B. Ryan, Halloran & Sage, Hartford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Calum B. Anderson, Danaher Lagnese & Neal, P.C., Edward W. Mayer, Jr., Danaher, Lagnese & Sacco, P.C., Cesar A. Noble, Jeremiah D. Mahoney, Noble, Spector, Young & O'Connor, Mark Kean Ostrowski, Peter Joseph Murphy, William J. Ronalter, Shipman & Goodwin, Hartford, CT, Stuart C. Johnson, Carmody & Torrance, New Haven, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("Empire") filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend and indemnify defendants Edward Lang ("Edward") and Samantha Lang ("Samantha") in a personal injury action filed against them in Connecticut Superior Court by defendant Stacey Prior ("Prior"). (Amended Complaint ¶¶ 3438.) The underlying lawsuit alleges that Samantha was under the influence of alcohol when her car collided with Prior's car. It further alleges that Edward Lang had rented the car Samantha was operating and had listed her as an additional authorized driver on the rental agreement.
Empire has moved for summary judgment on the issue of its duty to defend and indemnify either of the Langs under the Supplemental Liability Protection Policy (the "Policy") Edward Lang purchased when he entered into the car rental agreement (the "Rental Agreement").1 Empire argues that coverage is barred as a matter of law by two Policy terms: (1) the Policy's "under the influence" provision, and (2) the Policy's "use" provision, read in conjunction with the "use" provision of the Rental Agreement.
The Langs and Prior opposed Empire's motion, and cross-moved for summary judgment at oral argument on Empire's motion. Prior argues that Connecticut's public policy, as evidenced by legislation and case law, requires that I void the above-mentioned provisions that exclude coverage. Prior also argues that the exclusions were "contained in an unenforceable contract of adhesion." (Prior Opp., doc. # 34.) Although Prior does not explicitly argue what legal consequence would flow from a determination that the insurance agreement was contained in a contract of adhesion, I surmise from her answer and briefing that her "contract of adhesion" argument forms the basis of her affirmative defense in estoppel. Her legal theory seems to be that Empire should be estopped from denying coverage on the basis of exclusions contained in a contract of adhesion.2
The Langs join Prior's argument regarding public policy. Additionally, they argue that Edward Lang falls outside the terms of both exclusions, and that Empire has a duty to defend him even if a declaratory judgment enters against Samantha Lang.
After oral argument on the motions, Empire submitted a motion to strike evidentiary submissions by the Langs and Prior. (Doc. # 63.) That motion is denied as moot.
For the reasons described below, I grant the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and deny the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
Most of the facts material to the case are not disputed. (Empire Local R. 56(a)(1) Stmt., doc. # 33; Prior Opp., doc. # 34; Lang Opp., doc. # 43.) On March 12, 2005, Edward Lang signed a rental agreement with Camrac, Inc. d/b/a/ Enterprise 1-800 Rent-A-Car. (Empire Local R. 56(a)(1) Stmt. ¶¶ 1-2.) He listed his daughter, Samantha Lang, as an additional authorized driver. (Id. ¶ 4.) The rental contract reflects that Edward purchased Supplemental Liability Protection ("SLP"), underwritten by Empire, for himself and Samantha. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) On March 24, 2005, Samantha was driving the rental car under the influence of alcohol when she struck Prior's car, injuring Prior. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.) There is no evidence in the record that Edward Lang had knowledge of Samantha's condition at any time on the day in question. Samantha was arrested that same day for driving under the influence. (Id. ¶ 11.) She pleaded guilty and was convicted on February 2, 2007. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Prior sued Edward and Samantha Lang and Camrac in Connecticut Superior Court in a complaint3 dated February 1, 2007, alleging personal injuries and claiming compensatory and punitive damages, under claims of negligence, common law and statutory recklessness, negligent entrustment, and the family car doctrine. (Id. ¶¶ 15-22.)
This insurance coverage dispute turns principally on the terms of the Rental Agreement and the Policy. The second page of the Rental Agreement is labeled "Additional Terms and Conditions." Describing the Supplemental Liability Protection, the Rental Agreement states:
For all exclusions, see the SLP policy issued by Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company. Here are a few key exclusions: (a) Loss arising out of an accident which occurs while Renter or Additional Authorized Driver is under the influence of alcohol or drugs .... (j) Loss arising out of the use of Vehicle when such use is otherwise in violation of the terms and conditions of the Rental Agreement.
(Id. Ex. A; Prior Opp., Ex. E at 2.)
The Policy provides the following exclusions (the "impairment" and "use" exclusions):
In addition to the exclusions contained in the "underlying insurance," this insurance does not apply to the following:
1. Loss arising out of an "accident" which occurs while the "insured" is under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or other substances unless prescribed by a physician.
2. Loss arising out of the use of a "rental vehicle" when such use is in violation of the terms and conditions of the "rental agreement."
(Empire Local R. 56(a)(1) Stmt., Ex. I.) The Rental Agreement further provides that the car "shall not be used ... in any illegal or reckless manner ... [and] shall not be driven by any person impaired by the use of alcohol...." (Id. Ex. A at 5 ¶ 3.)
On December 5, 2008, I held a hearing on the pending motions. I invited the parties to submit additional briefing, especially regarding possible certification of a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court. On January 16, 2009, Empire submitted a motion to strike supplemental documents submitted by Prior (docs.# # 58-60), arguing that the submissions were beyond the scope and time period I had allowed. I have determined that I need not consider evidence submitted after the hearing. Additionally, I have determined that certification is unnecessary because decisions of the Connecticut appellate courts provide sufficient guidance for me to rule on the motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence demonstrates that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ().
When ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see also Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992) (). When a motion for summary judgment is properly supported by documentary and testimonial evidence, however, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but rather must present significant probative evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir.1995).
"Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992). If the nonmoving party submits evidence that is "merely colorable," or is not "significantly probative," summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.
Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To present a "genuine" issue of material fact, there must be contradictory evidence "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
When parties make cross motions for summary judgment, the standard is the same as that for individual motions. See Morales v. Quintel Entm't, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir.2001). The district court "must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits, taking care in each instance to draw all reasonable inferences against the party whose motion is under consideration." Heublein, Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1461 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting Schwabenbauer v. Bd. of Educ. of Olean, 667 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.1981)).
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