Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Haucke
| Decision Date | 04 May 1954 |
| Citation | 267 Wis. 72,64 N.W.2d 426 |
| Parties | EMPLOYERS MUT. FIRE INS. CO. v. HAUCKE et al. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Action by plaintiff Employers Mutual Fire Insurance Company against defendants Dean Rockwell Haucke and Leon Haucke for the recovery of $1,320 paid by plaintiff to its insured, one S. K. Ferguson, for damage sustained when the defendant Dean Haucke wrecked the Ferguson automobile covered by the plaintiff's policy of theft insurance. Leon Haucke interposed a general demurrer to the complaint and from an order sustaining the demurrer, plaintiff appeals.
In March of 1952 defendant Dean Haucke, then a minor of sixteen years, made application to the Wisconsin Motor Vehicle Department for a temporary Wisconsin motor vehicle instruction permit. His father, the defendant Leon Haucke, executed the sponsor's certificate attached to said application, and temporary instruction permit No. 547070, expiring May 24, 1952, was thereupon issued by the Motor Vehicle Department.
The sponsor's certificate referred to is that provided for by the following statutes:
Sec. 85.08(8)(c). 'The application of any person under the age of 18 years for an instruction permit or license shall be signed and verified before a person duly authorized to administer oaths, by the father of the applicant if he has the custody of such person * * *.'
Sec. 85.08(9)(c). 'Any negligence or wilful misconduct of a person under the age of 18 years when operating a motor vehicle upon the highways shall be imputed to the person who signed the application of such person for a permit or license, which person shall be jointly and severally liable for such operator for any damages caused by such negligent or wilful misconduct.'
On April 7, 1952, Dean Haucke stole the Ferguson automobile in Manitowoc and drove it south on Highway 119. The complaint alleges negligence on the part of the said defendant with respect to speed, control, lookout and driving in a reckless manner; that as a result of such negligence he drove the automobile off the highway, into a ditch, damaging and wrecking it to the extent of $1,320; 'That each of the aforesaid acts of negligence was a proximate cause of said automobile being driven off the highway and being damaged.' Under its policy of theft insurance plaintiff reimbursed Ferguson, who then assigned and subrogated to the plaintiff his claim against the defendants.
The trial court held that plaintiff had no cause of action against defendant Leon Haucke and sustained the demurrer.
Clark, Rankin & Nash, Manitowoc, for appellant.
R. O. Schwartz, Manitowoc, Cashman & Savage, Manitowoc, of counsel, for respondents.
The question presented is: Does the fact that the alleged negligent acts and wilful misconduct happened during the commission of a crime absolve the sponsor from liability under sec. 85.08(9)(c), Stats.?
It is stated in the complaint that Dean Haucke stole the Ferguson automobile and wrecked it while attempting to escape capture. The allegation of theft was necessary to qualify the plaintiff as a proper party to bring this action under the subrogation clause in its policy. But it is clear from the complaint that the action is based, not on the theft, but on the negligent operation which resulted in damage to plaintiff's insured.
In our opinion the language of the statute is so definite and certain that it does not require the application of any rules of construction. The trial court felt that construction was necessary because, although unambiguous in its literal sense, the result to which such meaning leads is so unreasonable and absurd as to involve the legislative purpose in obscurity, citing Rice v. Ashland County, 1900, 108 Wis. 189, 84 N.W. 189, and other cases. Respondent quotes from Whitcomb v. Keator, 1884, 59 Wis. 609, 613, 18 N.W. 469, 470, to the same effect:
"A construction involving a conclusion so unreasonable, and leading to a result which makes the practical operation of the statute so manifestly unequal and unjust, cannot be supported unless required by language too clear to admit of any other interpretation."
We see no unreasonable, absurd or unjust result in applying to the words of sec. 85.08(9)(c), Stats., their ordinary and accepted meaning. There is no imputation of criminal conduct to the father in holding him liable for his son's negligence when the damage results from that negligence while the son is driving a stolen car. The...
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Swanigan v. State Farm Ins. Co.
...who could pay for damages caused by a negligent minor driver. We recognized this legislative purpose in Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Haucke, 267 Wis. 72, 64 N.W.2d 426 (1954), a case in which a minor stole a car and negligently damaged it. The sponsor argued that he should not be liable ......
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...To "protect the public from damage caused by the negligent operation of vehicles by youthful drivers," Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Haucke, 267 Wis. 72, 75, 64 N.W.2d 426 (1954), the legislature thought it was important to look for security in persons other than the minor. Ynocenio v. Fe......
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