Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. Holt
Decision Date | 07 December 1966 |
Docket Number | No. A--10959,A--10959 |
Citation | 410 S.W.2d 633 |
Parties | EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. Jesse J. HOLT, Respondent. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
R. H. Whilden and N. E. Nadeau, Houston, for petitioner.
Dixie & Schulman, Robert E. Hall, with above firm, Houston, for respondent.
This is a Workmen's Compensation case and the controlling question is whether the order of the Board was a final ruling and decision as required by Section 5, Article 8307, Vernon's Ann.Tex.St. before an order on a claim may be appealed. The trial court held that the Board order was not final and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Civil Appeals held that the order was final and appealable. 393 S.W.2d 329. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.
Jesse J. Holt injured his finger on March 8, 1955. He timely filed his notice and claim with the Industrial Accident Board. In May 1955, the Board wrote Holt that it required a medical report in support of the claim, and that it would await further advice from him. Nothing was done for a period of more than eight years. In November 1963, Holt wrote the Board and asked that the claim be set for a hearing. On November 26, 1963 the Board wrote the following letter which Holt treated as a final appealable order:
'This will acknowledge your letter dated November 6, 1963, in which you requested this case along with another case for the claimant to be scheduled for a hearing.
The order was erroneous in that it stated the Board was powerless to act on a claim after a period of 401 weeks following the date of injury. In Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n v. Guidry, 128 Tex. 433, 99 S.W.2d 900 (1937) it was held that the Board may not allow compensation for incapacity which extends beyond the end of the compensation period. Holt's claim was for compensation for disability which occurred within the statutory compensation period, but it was not acted upon until after that time had expired. The Board's jurisdiction over a claim for compensation for disability which occurred within the compensable period is not lost because the claim is not acted upon until after the end of the compensable period.
The real point in this case, however, is whether the order of the Board was a final ruling. The order shows that the Board, though for an erroneous reason, intended it as its final order. It reserved nothing for further decision. So far as the Board was concerned, it was through with all phases of the claim. Texas State Highway Department v. Fillmon, Tex.Civ.App., 236 S.W.2d 635, affirmed 150 Tex. 460, 242 S.W.2d 172 (1951); Southern Casualty Co. v. Todd, 29 S.W.2d 973 (Tex.Com.App.1930, judg. adopted); Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Civ.App.1957, writ ref. n.r.e.); Brown v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 276 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Civ.App.1955, writ ref. n.r.e.); Verrett v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 223 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Civ.App.1949, no writ).
Prior to 1930 there was some confusion in the law with respect to the finality of Board orders which determined it lacked jurisdiction over a claim. This court granted a writ in Southern Casualty Co. v. Todd, supra, because on this issue, there was a conflict between on opinion of the intermediate court and Jones v. Texas Indemnity Ins. Co., 15 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex.Civ.App.1929, writ ref.). While the Board letter in Todd comes close to being one in which the Board simply stated it would not proceed, the court in overruling Jones held that a Board order which declares that the Board lacks jurisdiction is nevertheless a final and appealable order. From that time until the recent decisions in Thompson v. Midwestern Ins. Co., 361 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Civ.App.1962, no writ) and Hart v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 387 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.Civ.App.1965, writ ref. n.r.e.) the Board and the courts have proceeded upon the rule that a Board order that it lacked the power to act was a final decision. In Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Harris, 116 Tex. 247, 288 S.W. 809 (1926), holding an order of the Board was final though there had been no hearing on the merits, the Supreme Court wrote: 'It is not required, to be final, that the adjudication actually be upon the merits of the case, provided the decision does, in effect, preclude the court from a further consideration of the rights of the parties and puts an end to the then controversy.' This common-sense construction has been consistently followed.
The Supreme Court later expressed itself again in Tex.Civ.App., Texas State Highway Department v. Fillmon, 236 S.W.2d 635, affirmed 150 Tex. 460, 242 S.W.2d 172 (1951). The Board dismissed Fillmon's claim because he
(Emphasis added).
One of the questions on appeal was whether the order was final and appealable. The Court of Civil Appeals held that 236 S.W.2d 635 (1951). The Supreme Court affirmed, using substantially the same language.
In Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Marshall, 308 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Civ.App.1957, writ ref. n.r.e.) a claimant had filed a claim first with the Board and then later with the Federal Bureau of Employee's Compensation. Some time later the Board wrote the claimant that it had no jurisdiction over his claim. There was no mention of the Board's granting or denying the claim on the merits. The order which held that the Board lacked jurisdiction was a final and appealable ruling or decision. The order was:
'The hearing for this claim is canceled because:
'(3) This claim is one coming under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Workmen's Compensation.
Brown v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 276 S.W.2d 314 (Tex.Civ.App.1955, writ ref. n.r.e.) is another example of a final Board order which was grounded on the absence of jurisdiction. Claimant sustained one injury on May 18, 1952 and another on December 13, 1952. He filed only one claim and it was on the first injury. Claimant settled the first claim six months after he sustained the second injury and then filed a claim with the Board on the second injury. He said that the second injury increased the disability sustained by him in the first injury. The Board followed Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Harris, supra, and held that it had no jurisdiction over the second claim but did not directly pass upon the merits. The intermediate court held that this order 'was a final and appealable order of the Industrial Accident Board, from which the claimant was privileged to perfect an appeal to the District Court * * *:'
In Verrett v. Texas Emp. Ins. Ass'n, 223 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Civ.App.1949, no writ), claimant filed an application...
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