Emrick v. Unemployment Compensation Commission

• Decision Date: 09 August 1961
• Citation: 53 Del. 561,173 A.2d 743,3 Storey 561
• Parties: , 53 Del. 561 Cletis E. EMRICK, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Appellee.
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 743

173 A.2d 743

3 Storey 561, 53 Del. 561

Cletis E. EMRICK, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Appellee.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County.

Aug. 9, 1961.

Joseph Donald Craven, Wilmington, for appellant.

Donald W. Booker, Wilmington, for appellee.

CAREY, Judge.

The facts are not in dispute. Appellant, an engineer, was hired by American Bridge Company to work on the erection of a building. His employer was a subcontractor on that job. The employees of another subcontractor went on strike, with the result that American Bridge could do no more work until the strike was ended because its work depended upon the progress of the work being done by the other subcontractor. Appellant's supervisor called him on the telephone and told him there would be no more work until the strike was settled. His employer offered him no other work. The striking employees were members of a union entirely unconnected with appellant's union. His union was not on strike and had no dispute with American Bridge or the general contractor or any other subcontractor. The Unemployment Compensation Commission denied his application for benefits because of Title 19 Del.C. § 3315(4) which reads as follows:

'For any week with respect to which the Commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed;'

On this appeal, the question is whether the quoted provision disqualifies an individual from receiving benefits when neither he or his union is on strike, no labor dispute exists between him or his union and his employer or any other contractor on the job, neither he nor his union has any connection with the striking union, and his unemployment is due to lack of work resulting from the strike of the employees of another subcontractor at the location where he had been working. This question was answered in affirmative by the Commission under the literal language of Sec. 3315(4) upon its finding that his employment was due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a labor dispute at the premises where he was last employed.

Must the statute be read so literally? Situations can be imagined where a strictly literal application of this language could result in a denial of benefits even though everyone would agree that no such result was ever intended. For example, take the case of an office building occupied by several tenants. The maintenance staff of that building goes on strike in the dead of winter with the result that the building is unheated. Employees of the tenants cannot work because of the lack of heat. In a literal sense, their unemployment could be blamed upon a labor dispute at the premises where they are employed, although their plight is the same as if it were due to a breakdown of the heating system. It would certainly not be within the true spirit and meaning of the Act to hold that those office workers are not covered simply because of the difference in the reason for the lack of heat.

It seems obvious, therefore, that the Legislature did not intend its language to be applied strictly literally to all cases without reference to the facts of the particular situation and without consideration of the basic aims and objects of the Act. Determination of the applicability of Sec. 3315(4) to a given...