Emrit v. Oliver
Decision Date | 22 May 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 18-2019,18-2019 |
Parties | RONALD SATISH EMRIT, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MAGGIE TOULOUSE OLIVER, Secretary of State of New Mexico; DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF NEW MEXICO, Defendants - Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
(D. N. M.)
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court's dismissal of his second amended complaint. We AFFIRM.
Reading Emrit's pro se pleadings liberally, as we must, Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002), we construe his second amended complaint asbringing claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due process and equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. McCarthy v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 2011) (); App., at 69. Emrit also brings a claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Emrit alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights "by refusing to place him on the ballot for the primary and general presidential election in 2016." App., at 41. Emrit claims he "was told by several secretaries of state that in order to get placed on the ballot in the primary or general election, he would have had to get a minimum number of petitions signed from the constituents of each jurisdiction in which he wanted to run for president in the general election." Id. at 58. Emrit contends "there is no compelling government objective in requiring him to obtain a minimum number of petitions/signatures such that he can be placed on the ballot in" the State of New Mexico "for the primary and general elections in 2016" and 2020. Id. at 60. Emrit seeks $250,000 in damages, as well as "the equitable remedy of an injunction or specific performance mandating that the plaintiff Ronald Emrit be allowed to be placed on the ballot for the primary and general presidential election in this state in the year 2020." Id. at 63-64.
The district court dismissed Emrit's second amended complaint for failure to state a claim and held that, under the Eleventh Amendment, the New Mexico Secretary of State is immune from damages claims in her official capacity. Emritnow seeks review of the district court's decision. Emrit argues that he should "be placed on [the] ballot in [the] [S]tate of New Mexico as an independent candidate for both the primary and general elections in 2020 without having to obtain a minimum number of petitions and/or signatures." Aplt. Op. Br., at 2.
We first address whether we have jurisdiction over Emrit's appeal which challenges action that barred his placement on the 2016 ballot. "Our jurisdiction under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution extends only to actual cases and controversies." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976). We may also review cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 148 (1975). This doctrine applies when: "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [i]s a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again." Id. at 149. Parker v. Winter, 645 F. App'x 632, 634 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished).
Because we read Emrit's allegations as challenging requirements imposed on individual candidates by New Mexico election laws, we conclude we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See id. at 635 () quoting Lawrence v. Blackwell, 430 F.3d 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2005)); Libertarian Party of N.M. v. Herrera, 506 F.3d 1303, 1306 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) ().1
Turning to the merits of Emrit's appeal, we affirm the district court's judgment.2 Emrit alleges, "there is no compelling government objective in requiring him to obtain a minimum number of petitions/signatures such that he can be placed on the ballot in" the State of New Mexico "for the primary and general elections in . . . 2020 . . . as an independent candidate or a Democratic candidate." App., at 60. Because he was allegedly subjected to a signature requirement, and will presumably be subjected to the same prerequisite in the future, Emrit claims, "defendants haveviolated" his constitutional rights. Id. That is, Emrit contends a signature requirement in the State of New Mexico, in and of itself, is unconstitutional.
However, signature requirements have been upheld as constitutional. See, e.g., Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) ( ); Rainbow Coal. of Okla. v. Okla. State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 744 (10th Cir. 1988) ( ); Dillon v. Evans, 549 F.2d 183, 184 (10th Cir. 1977) () (analyzing New Mexico Primary Election Law).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that states have an "important interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization's candidate on the ballot—the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic process at the general election." Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 193-94 (1986) (quotation omitted); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 965 (1982) ().
Thus, contrary to Emrit's allegations, a signature requirement is not a per se constitutional violation. Of course, not every signature obligation will be constitutional, but on the record presented Emrit only raises a general challenge to the signature requirement imposed by the State of New Mexico. On this record, we cannot conclude that New Mexico's signature condition or ballot-access scheme is unconstitutional as a matter of law. "[T]he election laws of a given state" must be "viewed in their totality," Arutunoff v. Okla. State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375, 1379 (10th Cir. 1982), which consists of a "highly fact specific inquiry," Libertarian Party, 506 F.3d at 1308; see also Utah Republican Party v. Cox, 885 F.3d 1219, 1238 (10th Cir. 2018) (). However, Emrit has...
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