Emrit v. Sec'y Hawai`i
Decision Date | 02 January 2018 |
Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 17-00504 DKW-RLP |
Parties | RONALD SATISH EMRIT, Plaintiff, v. SECRETARY OF STATE OF HAWAII, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
On December 11, 2017, Ronald Satish Emrit, proceeding pro se, filed a Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 30) that again attempts to assert federal civil rights claims against the Secretary of State of Hawaii and the Democratic Party of Hawaii, alleging that he was unlawfully denied placement on the ballot for the presidential election in 2016. This action is one of numerous, identical lawsuits Emrit filed in October 2017 in federal courts across the United States. The Third Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiencies as its predecessors, previously identified in the Court's October 17, 2017 and November 20, 2017 Orders dismissing with leave to amend both his initial Complaint and First Amended Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 4 (10/17/17 F&R), 6 (11/6/17 Order Adopting F&R), and 23 (11/20/17 Order).1 Because Emrit once more fails to state a claim for relief, and because the Court determines that further leave to amend would be futile, the Third Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
The Court subjects each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and can order the dismissal of any claims it finds "frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Dismissal is proper when there is either a "'lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'" UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). A plaintiff must allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausibleon its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet—that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint—"is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual allegations that only permit the Court to infer "the mere possibility of misconduct" do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Id. at 679.
Because Emrit is appearing pro se, the Court liberally construes his filings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) () (citing Boag v.MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)). The Court recognizes that "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action." Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2013).
A court may, however, deny leave to amend where further amendment would be futile. See, e.g., Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) ( ). As noted in this Court's prior Order, although he is proceeding pro se, Emrit is more than familiar with his federal court filing and pleading responsibilities, given his numerous prior actions.2
The TAC, in other words, repeats the very same deficiencies previously discussed in the 11/20/17 Order. First, as before, and despite the Court's guidance, Emrit again fails to include any relevant facts or legal authority in support of hisclaim, such as the applicable Hawai'i regulation or party rule requiring petitions or signatures, whether he even attempted to comply with the requirements previously, and who excluded him from participation.4 Second, Emrit's vague constitutional claims fail as a matter of law. See Lawson, 2017 WL 4699279, at *2 () (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In fact, as noted by several courts, notwithstanding Emrit's claims, signature and petition requirements are "not only constitutional but [also] make[] common sense that the government must put in place a structure for elections." Lawson, 2017 WL 4699279, at *2. In short, "Emrit's allegation that there is no compelling governmental justification for the requirement that prospective candidates must file a certain number of petitions signed by voters of the state along with a declaration of candidacy is frivolous." Id.
Beyond these core deficiencies, the TAC suffers from several additional...
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