Energy v. Dyrdal, No. A08-1863 (Minn. App. 7/28/2009)
| Decision Date | 28 July 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. A08-1863,A08-1863 |
| Parties | Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership, et al., petitioners, Respondents, v. Donovan D. Dyrdal, et al., Appellants, Choice Financial Group-Grand Forks, et al., Respondents Below. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Pennington County, File No. 57-CV-08-834.
Paul B. Kilgore, Fryberger, Buchanan, Smith & Frederick, P.A., Duluth, MN (for respondents)
Jon Erik Kingstad, Oakdale, MN for appellants.
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Connolly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellants challenge the district court's finding that the taking of appellants' land was for a public necessity. Because the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
Respondent Enbridge Energy, Limited Partnership (Enbridge), is a Delaware limited partnership, and respondent Enbridge Pipelines (Southern Lights), L.L.C. (Enbridge Pipelines), is a Delaware limited liability company. Enbridge owns and operates a pipeline system that transports crude petroleum and related products and derivatives across Minnesota and other states. In April 2007, Enbridge applied to the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (MPUC) for a certificate of need and a pipeline routing permit. The applications were filed so that Enbridge could receive authorization to install an approximately 108-mile underground pipeline. The certificate was sought to determine the need for the pipeline in light of state energy needs. See Minn. Stat. § 216B.243 (2008). The routing permit was sought for the purpose of establishing the pipeline's precise location. See Minn. Stat. § 216G.02 (2008).
MPUC directed the certificate application to the Minnesota Department of Commerce's Office of Energy Security. The department conducted six public information meetings before concluding that the certificate should be issued. MPUC also directed the certificate and the application to an administrative-law judge (ALJ) so that a contested-case hearing could be conducted under Minn. Stat. §§ 14.001-14.70 (2008). The ALJ conducted six public hearings prior to holding the contested-case hearing on January 22, 2008. On March 24, the ALJ issued his findings of fact, conclusions, and recommendations (the recommendation), in which he recommended that MPUC grant both the certificate and routing permit applications.1 In an order dated June 19, MPUC accepted, adopted, and clarified the ALJ's recommendation, granted Enbridge's certificate application, and issued the certificate. In a separate order dated June 19, MPUC granted Enbridge's application for a routing permit and issued the routing permit. The routing permit designated that a portion of the pipeline would be installed over, across, or beneath land owned by appellants Donovan and Anna M. Dyrdal.
On June 26, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.48 (2008), respondents initiated the present action in district court in order to acquire a right-of-way easement across a portion of appellants' property to permit the pipeline's installation. Respondents also, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 117.042 (2008), moved the district court for an order granting quick-take title and possession of a pipeline easement. On August 29, the district court issued its order and memorandum, which (1) awarded respondents a pipeline easement over a portion of appellants' property, (2) ordered the court administrator to accept and deposit respondents' statutory condemnation payment, and (3) appointed and instructed three commissioners to ascertain appellants' damages. This appeal follows.
"[T]here are two levels of deference paid to condemnation decisions: the district court gives deference to the legislative determination of public purpose and necessity of the condemning authority and the appellate courts give deference to the findings of the district court, using the clearly erroneous standard." Lundell v. Coop. Power Ass'n, 707 N.W.2d 376, 381 (Minn. 2006). "[T]he standard for overturning a [condemning authority's] decision on public purpose grounds is very strict." City of Minneapolis v. Wurtele, 291 N.W.2d 386, 390 (Minn. 1980). As a consequence, "[j]udicial deference to a legislative determination that land being condemned is for a public use is . . . required until it is shown to involve an impossibility." City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Minn. 1986) (quotation omitted). Generally speaking, "once a public purpose is found to a condemnation action, the only question left for the court is that of adequate and just compensation." Id. at 764.
Before an applicant may exercise the power of eminent domain, it must establish that the proposed taking is for a public purpose. See generally Minn. Stat. § 117.48. In this case, the district court found that the taking was for a public purpose. In doing so, it specifically stated that it was deferring to the findings and expertise of the ALJ and MPUC. Appellants challenge this finding.
The review cited by the district court in this case stretched over 11 months and involved numerous public hearings. The transcripts from these hearing fill 10 volumes, and the evidence received by the ALJ resulted in an ALJ recommendation consisting of 177 specific findings of fact and 59 paragraphs of conclusions. MPUC's order granting the certificate contains an independent analysis with its own findings, conclusions, and modifications to the ALJ recommendation. MPUC's routing permit also engages in a detailed analysis that is reflected in the comprehensive conditions contained within the routing permit. Finally, even appellants agree that the pipeline serves a valuable public purpose. In a letter submitted to the ALJ, appellant Donovan Dyrdal stated,
It is very important to the citizens and security of the United States to accommodate the production and transportation of fuel and make it available for public use. As a farmer and resident of northern Minnesota, I am in complete agreement with having fuel available for agricultural, transportation, home heating needs, and other industrial uses, at a reasonable cost.
Given the thoroughness of the findings, the district court did not clearly err in finding a public necessity for the pipeline. While appellants may desire the district court to complete an entirely independent determination of whether the taking is for a public necessity, this is not the framework our legislature has chosen to adopt. Under the current statutory scheme, it is the regulatory authority that, with its specialized expertise, bears the primary responsibility for determining whether a public necessity exists. See Minn. Stat. § 216B.243; Minn. Stat. § 216G.02.
Minn. Stat. § 117.48 applies to "[a]ny corporation or association qualified to do business in the state of Minnesota engaged in or preparing to engage in the business of transporting crude petroleum[.]" Appellants argue that this section does not apply to respondents because they are, respectively, a limited partnership and a limited liability company rather than a corporation or an association. We disagree.
"Association" is left undefined by chapter 117; however, given the context in which association is used in chapter 117, it would be absurd for us to conclude that the legislature intended to exclude certain types of business entities from the powers granted by Minn. Stat. § 117.48. See Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2008) (). In full, Minn. Stat. § 117.48 provides:
The business of transporting crude petroleum, oil, their related products and derivatives including liquefied hydrocarbons, or natural gas by pipeline as a common carrier, is declared to be in the public interest and necessary to the public welfare, and the taking of private property therefor is declared to be for a public use and purpose. Any corporation or association qualified to do business in the state of Minnesota engaged in or preparing to engage in the business of transporting crude petroleum, oil, their related products and derivatives including liquefied hydrocarbons, or natural gas by pipeline as a common carrier, is authorized to acquire, for the purpose of such business, easements or rights-of-way, over, through, under or across any lands, not owned by the state or devoted to a public...
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