Enertech Electrical, Inc. v. West Geauga Board of Education

• Decision Date: 03 September 1996
• Docket Number: 96APE03-370,96-LW-4260
• Parties: Enertech Electrical, Inc., Appellant-Appellee, v. West Geauga Board of Education, Appellee-Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Enertech Electrical, Inc. Appellant-Appellee, v. West Geauga Board of Education Appellee-Appellant.

No. 96APE03-370

96-LW-4260 (10th)

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District Franklin.

September 3, 1996

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Arter &amp Hadden and Peter D. Welin, for appellee.

David P. Joyce, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, Matthew J. Dolan and Donald B. Bagley, III, for appellant.

OPINION

TYACK J.

On August 1, 1995, Enertech Electrical, Inc., ("Enertech") submitted a bid to the West Geauga Board of Education ("board") for the electrical work on a middle school construction project. On August 3, 1995, Enertech made a request to the board to withdraw the bid, stating Enertech made an error in the calculation of the labor rates. Specifically, Enertech completely omitted fringe benefits in its computation of the wage package. Pursuant to R.C. 9.31, the board held a hearing on August 4, 1995. The sole testimony came from Enertech's president and vice president. After this brief testimony and a discussion between board members, the board voted to reject Enertech's request to withdraw its bid.

Pursuant to R.C. 9.31 and 119.12, Enertech appealed the board's decision to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. The trial court reversed the board's decision, finding the decision was not supported by reliable, substantial and probative evidence and was not in accordance with law. The board has appealed to this court, assigning one error for our consideration:

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF O.R.C. §9.31 TO THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, THUS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW."

Before we can reach the merits of the board's arguments, we must address Enertech's contention that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Enertech contends the board may not appeal to this court because the trial court's decision was based solely on the facts and record and not on a question of law as contemplated by R.C. 119.12. R.C. 119.12 states, in pertinent part:

"The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and such additional evidence as the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the absence of such a finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. ***

"The judgment of the court shall be final and conclusive unless reversed, vacated, or modified on appeal. Such appeals may be taken either by the party or the agency ***. Such appeal by the agency shall be taken on questions of law relating to the constitutionality, construction, or interpretation of statutes and rules of the agency, and in such appeal the court may also review and determine the correctness of the judgment of the court of common pleas that the order of the agency is not supported by any reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the entire record." (Emphasis added.)

In Miller v. Dept. of Indus. Relations (1985), 17 Ohio St.3d 226, 227, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that the clear language of R.C. 119.12 allows an agency the right to appeal only on questions of law that pertain to state statutes and agency rules or regulations. Only after the appeal is perfected on those grounds can the court of appeals have jurisdiction to review the lower court's decision on the particular question of law and whether such decision is supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence. Id. at 227, citing Katz v. Dept. of Liquor Control (1957), 166 Ohio St. 229.

The key is that the trial court actually rule on a question of law that pertains to the constitutionality, construction or interpretation of a statute or agency rule. See Ramey v. Ohio St. Bd. of Chiropractic Examiners (Aug. 3, 1995), Franklin App. No. 94APE10-1512, unreported (1995 Opinions 3337, 3338). Thus, any question of law is not sufficient. It must relate to the constitutionality, construction or interpretation of a statute or rule.

The constitutionality of R.C. 9.31 was never an issue in the court below. Thus, the issue here is whether the trial court ruled on a question of law relating to the interpretation or construction of R.C. 9.31. In Mentor Marinas v. Bd. of Liquor Control (1964), 1 Ohio App.2d 219, 223, this court noted that any judicial decision involves application of the law to the facts. However, the mere application of the law to the facts does not constitute "interpretation" within the meaning of R.C. 119.12. Id. There must be a genuine question presented and a specific finding by the trial court as to the meaning of the statute or rule. Id. See, also, Williams v. The Ohio Board of Nursing (Mar. 9, 1993), Franklin App. No. 92AP-1535, unreported (1993 Opinions 746) and In the Matter of: Blackmon v. Ohio State Medical Board of Ohio (June 16, 1992), Franklin App. No. 92AP-349, unreported (1992 Opinions 2539).

In the case at bar, the trial court held that the board based its decision on factors outside of R.C. 9.31. R.C. 9.31 states, in pertinent part:

"A bidder for a contract *** may withdraw his bid from consideration if the price bid was substantially lower than the other bids, providing the bid was submitted in good faith, and the reason for the price bid being substantially lower was a clerical mistake as opposed to a judgment mistake, and was actually due to an unintentional and substantial arithmetic error or an unintentional omission of a substantial quantity of work, labor, or material made directly in the compilation of the bid."

At the hearing, the board focused its concern on how withdrawing Enertech's bid would affect the budget, the schedule and public perception. In addition, a board member noted that the board did not cause the mistake and that holding Enertech to its bid would not put Enertech out of business. The trial court found that while the board's concerns were commendable, these factors were "not the key issues in the statutory test" and that R.C. 9.31 does not allow such discretion with the board.

In so holding, the trial court was interpreting R.C. 9.31. In so interpreting, the court listed R.C. 9.31's requirements and found the board exceeded its authority in considering factors not listed in the statute. Hence, the trial court's decision involved a question of law relating to the interpretation and/or construction of R.C. 9.31. Therefore, the board could properly appeal to this court.

Having found this court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we now turn to the merits of the board's (hereinafter "appellant") appeal. Appellant contends the trial court's decision reversing the board's decision is contrary to law because the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof to the board. In so arguing, appellant also contends there was reliable, substantial and probative evidence supporting the board's decision.

In reviewing a trial court's determination as to factual issues, this court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Ford v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources (1990), 67 Ohio App.3d 755. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of judgment, but implies a decision without a reasonable basis, one that is clearly wrong. Angelkovski v. Buckeye Potato Chips Co. (1983), 11 Ohio App.3d 159 161-162. Our review of questions of law is...