Enes v. Baker
| Decision Date | 02 May 1952 |
| Citation | 58 So.2d 551 |
| Parties | ENES et al. v. BAKER. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Branch & Goff, Tampa, for appellants.
E. W. Monrose and A. O. Stewart, Tampa, for appellee.
Appellee, a real estate broker, filed his complaint in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County seeking to recover commission fom appellants as defendants, for selling a trailer court. There was an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment as authorized by 30 F.S.A. Rule 43, Florida Common Law Rules. Affidavits were filed and on the issues so made the court heard testimony, at the conclusion of which the motion for summary judgment was granted, including a final judgment for the plaintiff. We are confronted with an appeal from the final judgment.
The point for determination is whether or not there was a contract between the parties to procure a purchaser for the trailer court and if so, whether appellants were entitled to have that issue submitted to a jury for determination.
It is admitted that the contract of listing and sale was oral. An inspection of Common Law Rule 16 relating to pre-trial conference and Common Law Rule 43 relating to summary judgments reveals that summary relief should be denied when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions or other evidence show a dispute as to material facts. The trial court found that there was no dispute as to material facts shown by the record. The trial court also found as a matter of law that an implied contract of listing was made, and being so, the question of an express contract became immaterial since appellee was entitled to summary judgment on the implied contract. We find ample support in the record for the finding of the trial court. Finlay v. Union Pac. R. Co., D.C., 6 F.R.D. 284; Lindsey v. Leavy, 9 Cir., 149 F.2d 899; Foley-Carter Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co., 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 718.
Immaterial issues do not bar summary relief hence there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in disposing of the matter on the motion for summary judgment. He was confronted with a question of law and there was no dispute as to a material fact. His judgment is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
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