Engel v. Gosper

• Decision Date: 18 January 1962
• Docket Number: No. L--20257,L--20257
• Citation: 177 A.2d 595,71 N.J.Super. 573
• Parties: Edna G. ENGEL, as Administratrix Ad Prosequendum and as General Administratrix of the Estate of Herbert D. Engel, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Ralph W. GOSPER and William Gosper, a minor, Luther Le Coney, Jr., a minor, Cecilia Weinstein, The Board of Education of the Township of Pennsauken, New Jersey, Morris Hulsizer and The Board of Education of the Town of Merchantville, New Jersey, Defendants.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 573

71 N.J.Super. 573

177 A.2d 595

Edna G. ENGEL, as Administratrix Ad Prosequendum and as General Administratrix of the Estate of Herbert D Engel, Jr., deceased, Plaintiff, v. Ralph W. GOSPER and William Gosper, a minor, Luther Le Coney, Jr., a minor, Cecilia Weinstein, The Board of Education of the Township of Pennsauken, New Jersey, Morris Hulsizer and The Board of Education of the Town of Merchantville, New Jersey, Defendants.

No. L--20257.

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division.

Jan. 18, 1962.

John T. Lynch, Westfield, for plaintiff (Davidson, Buttermore & Lynch, Westfield, attorneys).

John A. Craner, Elizabeth, for defendants Cecilia Weinstein and Board of Education of Pennsauken Tp. (Forman & Forman, Elizabeth, attorneys).

Robert P. McDonough, Elizabeth, for defendants Morris Hulsizer and Board of Education of Town of Merchantville (Lindabury, McCormick & Estabrook, Camden, attorneys).

FULOP, J.C.C.

This is an action for personal injuries to a decedent and for his death by wrongful act of the defendants. Plaintiff sues as general administratrix and as administratrix Ad prosequendum of the estate of her son, who was allegedly injured on October 10, 1959 at Beach Haven in Ocean County, New Jersey, as the result of the explosion of a home-made rocket projectile built and ignited by high school boys. Plaintiff's decedent died on April 4, 1960, at Overlook Hospital in Summit in Union County, New Jersey, allegedly as a result of the explosion.

The original defendants were two boys who made and ignited the projectile. Plaintiff has amended her complaint to add two science teachers of the minor defendants and two boards of education who employed these teachers. The allegation is that the teachers improperly instructed the boys with respect to the rockets, encouraged them to experiment with them, failed to warn of the danger involved, and in other respects negligently contributed to bring about the tragic result.

The boards of education are charged with the acts of the teachers under the doctrine of Respondeat superior and for hiring allegedly unsuitable instructors. Both of the boards are situated in Camden County.

The original defendants have brought in a third-party defendant seeking contribution from him as a joint tortfeasor.

The defendants Cecilia Weinstein and Board of Education of Pennsauken move to dismiss the complaint for failing to set forth a cause of action, and for failing to allege that the action was instituted within two years after the date of death, as required by the Death Act, N.J.S. 2A:31--3, N.J.S.A. The same defendants move in the alternative to change the venue of the action to Ocean County. Defendants Hulsizer and the Board of Education of the Town of Merchantville join in the motion for change of venue.

The motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is denied. The claims against the defendants Weinstein and the Board of Education of Pennsauken seem tenuous. However, defendants have not filed any affidavits. Although it is argued that Mrs. Weinstein terminated her instruction of defendants two years before the accident, that fact does not appear of record. None of the facts alleged in the amended complaint are denied. The allegations of the amended complaint, construed most favorably to the plaintiff, are sufficient.

The failure to allege that the action was instituted within the period permitted by the statute may be corrected by amendment. The statutory period has not yet expired.

The troublesome question in the case is venue.

Defendants argue that an action against a municipal body is a local action. They cite out-of-state authority for the proposition that municipal officials should not be required to go beyond their home county to defend a suit. Oddly enough, this would not support a transfer to Ocean County for which the defendants contend. It would require a transfer to Camden County, which is not sought.

However, the law of this State is that a transitory action does not become local because the defendant is a municipal corporation or like public body, in the absence of a statute or rule so providing. N.J. Imperial Road Co. v. County of Gloucester, 80 N.J.L. 640, 77 A. 1022 (Sup.Ct.1910), review declined, 82 N.J.L. 535, 81 A. 725 (E. & A. 1911); Hesselbrock v. Burlington County, 111 N.J.L. 177, 168 A. 45 (Sup.Ct.1933).

The venue of an action is now governed by the rules of court. R.R. 4:3--2 reads as follows:

'In actions affecting the title to real property or an interest therein, possessory or otherwise, or for damages thereto, appeals from assessments for improvements and actions of attachment of real or personal property, the venue shall be laid by the plaintiff in the county in which any property affected is situate. In actions not affecting property as aforesaid, brought by or against municipal corporations, counties or public agencies or officials, the venue shall be laid by the plaintiff in the county in which the cause of action arose. In all other actions except as provided in Rule 4:116 as to certain probate and other actions, and Rule 4:68--2 as to receivership actions, the venue shall be laid in the county in which the cause of action arose or in which any party to the action was resident at the time of the commencement of the action, or if any defendant was then resident outside the State, then in the county in which the summons was served upon him. For the purposes of this rule, a domestic or foreign corporation shall be deemed to be resident in any county in which it is actually doing business, or if it is not actually doing business in the State, but has a registered office in the State, then the county in which that office is located.'

The rule fixes the venue in real property actions at the place where the real property is situated. In transitory actions against private individuals and corporations, the plaintiff may choose the county in which the cause of action arose or the county in which any party to the action was resident at the time of the commencement of the action. However, in transitory actions against public bodies, the venue must be laid in the county in which the cause of action arose.

In the present case some of the defendants are private individuals, some are public bodies. With respect to the individual defendants, plaintiff was free to lay the venue in Union County where she resides and where decedent died, or in Ocean County where the accident occurred, or in Camden County where most of the defendants reside. With respect to the claims against the boards of education, plaintiff was required to lay the venue in the county in which the cause of action arose.

It is conceded by all counsel and seems well established that a cause of action for damages for personal injuries caused by negligent acts arises where the injuries are inflicted. Greenspan Bros. Co. v. Collins, 122 N.J.L. 234, 5 A.2d 52 (Sup.Ct.1939).

Plaintiff contends that since the death of decedent occurred in Union County, the cause of action for wrongful death arose there. The death claim constitutes a separate cause of action. Kotkin v. Caprio, 65 N.J.Super. 453, 168 A.2d 69 (App.Div.1961); Turon v. J. & L. Construction Co., 8 N.J. 543, 86 A.2d 192 (1952); Soden v. Trenton, etc., Trenton Corp., 101 N.J.L. 393, 127 A. 558 (E. & A. 1925). The action is for 'pecuniary injuries resulting from such death.' N.J.S. 2A:31--5, N.J.S.A.; Soden v. Trenton, supra.

'A cause of action is said to accrue to any person when that person first comes to a right to bring an action.' Bouvier's Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1914).

'No entirely satisfactory definition of a cause of action has as yet been enunciated but a generally accepted definition is that a cause of action is 'the fact or facts which...