Engelhart v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs

• Citation: 2016 Ohio 4935,69 N.E.3d 137
• Decision Date: 13 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. C–150639.,C–150639.
• Parties: Joseph M. ENGELHART, Gayle O. Lunken, and KB Partners, Inc., Appellants, v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and Wayne Coats, Appellees.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Ohio)

69 N.E.3d 137
2016 Ohio 4935

Joseph M. ENGELHART, Gayle O. Lunken, and KB Partners, Inc., Appellants,
v.
HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, and Wayne Coats, Appellees.

No. C–150639.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton County.

July 13, 2016.

69 N.E.3d 138

The Law Firm of Curt C. Hartman and Curt C. Hartman, Amelia, and Finney Law Firm, LLC, and Christopher P. Finney, Cincinnati, for Appellants.

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, David T. Stevenson and Jeremiah Seebohm, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for Appellees.

69 N.E.3d 139

OPINION

MOCK, Judge.

{¶ 1} Appellants Joseph M. Englehart, Gayle O. Lunken, and KB Partners, Inc., (collectively "the landowners") are registered landowners in Hamilton County. They sought to appeal a decision of appellee Hamilton County Board of Commissioners abolishing registered land. They also named Wayne Coats, Hamilton County Recorder, as an appellee. (We refer to the appellees collectively as "the board.") The Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas granted the board's motion to dismiss the appeal. The landowners have filed a timely appeal from that dismissal. We find no merit in their sole assignment of error, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

{¶ 2} In 1991, the Ohio legislature enacted R.C. 5310.32, which states that "a board of county commissioners may adopt a resolution to consider the merits of abolishing land registration in the county." R.C. 5310.33 through 5310.36 provide a procedure for the board to follow in determining whether to abolish registered land. If, after following that procedure, the board determines that "the costs exceed the benefits of maintaining a land registration system in the county," it may "adopt a resolution of abolition that makes specific findings with regard to the costs and benefits and requires abolition of land registration in the county." R.C. 5310.36.

{¶ 3} Following a public hearing, the board adopted Resolution 25, in which it stated that because the costs of the registered-land system exceeded the benefits, "the Board hereby abolishes land registration in Hamilton County, Ohio[.]" The landowners filed a "Notice of Appeal from Administrative Proceedings," in which they contended that the board's decision to abolish registered land "was not supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was not made in accordance with law." They contended that the board did not follow the procedures set forth in R.C. 5310.33 through 5310.36 in adopting Resolution 25.

{¶ 4} The board filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, in which it argued that the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear any appeal from Resolution 25. The court found that the board's adoption of the resolution was a legislative action, and therefore, no statutory provision allowed for an appeal of the resolution. This appeal followed.

{¶ 5} In their sole assignment of error, the landowners contend that the trial court erred in granting the board's motion to dismiss their appeal. They argue that the board's adoption of the resolution was the result of a quasi-judicial proceeding, and therefore, it was subject to review under R.C. 2506.01. This assignment of error is not well taken.

{¶ 6} Subject-matter jurisdiction denotes the power of a court to hear and decide a case on its merits and to render an enforceable judgment in the action. Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 290 N.E.2d 841 (1972) ; In re T.J.B., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–130725, 2014-Ohio-2028, 2014 WL 1999332, ¶ 6. A defect in subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or forfeited and may, therefore, be raised at any time. State v. Mbodji, 129 Ohio St.3d 325, 2011-Ohio-2880, 951 N.E.2d 1025, ¶ 10 ; T.J.B. at ¶ 6. A trial court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. T.J.B. at ¶ 7.

{¶ 7} The landowners argue that the board's decision was reviewable under R.C. 307.56 and 2506.01. R.C. 307.56 provides that "[a] person aggrieved by the decision of the board of county commissioners may appeal to the court of common

69 N.E.3d 140

pleas, as provided by and under the authority of Chapter 2506 of the Revised Code." R.C. 2506.01 provides that except for certain enumerated exceptions, "every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department, or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the court of common pleas * * *."

{¶ 8} Despite this broad language, the jurisdiction granted by the statute does not include jurisdiction to review actions of a legislative body that occur as a result of the exercise of legislative authority. Berg v. Struthers, 176 Ohio St. 146, 146–147, 198 N.E.2d 48 (1964) ; Osburn Towing v. Akron, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26633, 2013-Ohio-5409, 2013 WL 6536177, ¶ 6. But a public body that is essentially legislative in character may act in an administrative capacity. Donnelly v. Fairview Park, 13 Ohio St.2d 1, 233 N.E.2d 500 (1968), paragraph one of the syllabus; Osburn Towing at ¶ 6. The question of whether an action by a legislative body is appealable under R.C. 2506.01 depends on whether it acted legislatively or administratively. Shaheen v. Cuyahoga Falls City Council, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24472, 2010-Ohio-640, 2010 WL 625828, ¶ 16.

{¶ 9} A legislative body acts administratively when it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. Id. at ¶ 17. Thus, an administrative decision rendered in a quasi-judicial proceeding is appealable under R.C. 2506.01. M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio St.2d 150, 290 N.E.2d 562 (1972), paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Fern v. Cincinnati, 161 Ohio App.3d 804, 2005-Ohio-3168, 832 N.E.2d 106, ¶ 51 (1st Dist.).

{¶ 10} The earmarks of a quasi-judicial proceeding include requirements of notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to introduce evidence. M.J. Kelley Co. at paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex rel. Fern at ¶ 51.

Whether there is an adjudication depends not on what the administrative agency actually did, but rather upon what the administrative agency should have done. Where the administrative agency should have given notice, conducted a hearing and afforded the parties an opportunity to be heard and to introduce evidence, the order is a result of an adjudication even if the administration fails to afford such notice and hearing.

State ex rel. Fern at ¶ 51.

{¶ 11} The landowners argue that the...