Engerbretsen v. Engerbretsen

• Decision Date: 19 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92C-07-093,92C-07-093
• Citation: 675 A.2d 13
• Parties: Arden B. ENGERBRETSEN, Eleanor Engerbretsen, and United Services Automobile Association, Plaintiffs, v. Arden A. ENGERBRETSEN, Deborah Engerbretsen, Andrew L. Engerbretsen, a minor, and Arden A. Engerbretsen, Jr., a minor, Defendants. C.A. . Submitted:
• Court: Delaware Superior Court

Page 13

675 A.2d 13

Arden B. ENGERBRETSEN, Eleanor Engerbretsen, and United

Services Automobile Association, Plaintiffs, v. Arden A. ENGERBRETSEN, Deborah Engerbretsen, Andrew L.

Engerbretsen, a minor, and Arden A. Engerbretsen,

Jr., a minor, Defendants.

C.A. No. 92C-07-093.

Superior Court of Delaware,

New Castle County.

Submitted: June 19, 1995.

Decided: July 5, 1995.

Motion for Reargument Decided: Aug. 10, 1995.

Upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Upon Defendants' Motion for Reargument.

Kenneth M. Doss, Wilmington, for plaintiffs.

Lawrence S. Drexler, William D. Sullivan, Lisa B. Borin, Wilmington, for defendants.

OPINION

GOLDSTEIN, Judge.

This is the Court's decision on cross motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs, Arden B. Engergretsen, Eleanor Engergretsen, and United Services Automobile Association (USAA), and Defendants, Arden A. Engergretsen, Deborah Engerbretsen and two minors, Andres L. Engergretsen and Arden A. Engerbretsen, Jr. For the reasons set forth below, USAA's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

USAA filed this declaratory action in July 1992 to determine coverage under a homeowners insurance policy issued by USAA for an accident that occurred on November 2, 1990. The facts, taken from the parties' papers, are as follows. Defendant Andrew L. Engerbretsen, then two years old, was injured when he was run over by a lawn tractor-mower being driven by his father, Arden A. Engergretsen. The accident occurred on the premises of nominal plaintiffs Arden B. and Eleanor Engergretsen, located in Centerville, Delaware (hereinafter referred to as "the premises"). Arden B. and Eleanor Engerbretsen (hereinafter referred to as "the grandparents") are the parents of Arden A. Engergbretsen (hereinafter referred to as "the father") and the grandparents of Andrew and his brother, Arden, Jr. During all relevant time periods, the premises were insured by USAA under a primary homeowners insurance policy and personal umbrella excess policy. Defendants are not named insureds under either policy.

At the time of the accident, Defendants were staying with the grandparents at the premises while the father looked for employment. Defendants previously lived in Holland, Pennsylvania, but when the father lost his job, Defendants sold their Pennsylvania house and moved onto the premises in March 1990. Most of Defendants' belongings, including their furniture, were stored in the garage on the premises. Defendants kept only clothing, day-to-day living essentials, and toys unpacked for use at the premises. Defendants also kept their car at the premises. They were given the entire downstairs of the premises to live in, and no definite time limit was placed on their stay other than until the father found a job. Defendants and the grandparents shared the general living areas of the house and ate their meals together. However, their finances were not integrated.

A brief period of absence interrupted Defendants' stay at the premises. During the last two weeks of July 1990, Andrew's parents vacationed in Norway while Andrew and Arden, Jr. stayed with their maternal grandparents in Utah. Also, during the month of August 1990, the entire Engerbretsen family visited Utah. ¹ Defendants returned to the premises around the end of August 1990.

Arden A. and Deborah Engerbretsen had a separate automobile insurance policy with USAA. On March 3, 1990, Defendants notified USAA that their new mailing address was that of the premises. However, the automobile policy listed the principal location of Defendants' vehicle as the Holland, Pennsylvania address and the policy followed Pennsylvania law. Also, on the date of the accident, Defendants' automobile policy listed their former Pennsylvania home as their principal residence.

The father's employment efforts led him to interviews in New York, Philadelphia, Florida, Houston, Phoenix, and Denver. The interview in New York took place a week before the accident and was the only one that resulted in a serious job prospect. The father was to learn whether he would be offered a position on November 2, 1990, the day of the accident. Regardless of whether the father was offered a job, Defendants decided to leave the premises by November 5, 1990. If the father got the job, Defendants planned to move to New York. If he did not get the job, Defendants planned to move to Arizona to establish residency before the father applied to a business school in Phoenix.

In the week before the accident, the father reserved a moving truck to move Defendants' belongings either to New York or Arizona. On November 1, 1990, the father contacted USAA about a renter's policy to protect Defendants' personal property during the move and at their new address. On November 2, 1990, about three hours before Andrew's accident the father purchased a renter's policy, giving the address of the premises as the family's residence.

The accident giving rise to this dispute occurred while the father used a tractor-mower owned by the grandparents to mow the lawn behind the grandparents' house. The father backed up the riding lawn mower without looking behind him as Andrew approached the tractor-mower from behind. The father did not see Andrew and accidentally knocked the child down and ran over him with the tractor-mower. Immediately before the accident, Andrew had been playing in the grandparents' house, watched by his mother and grandmother. They allowed Andrew to leave the house to join his father and brother outside. However, Andrew's mother and grandmother did not know that the father was using the tractor-mower.

Because of Andrew's injuries, Defendants did not move as planned in early November 1990. Defendants continued to stay at the premises because Andrew required medical treatment, surgery, and therapy. It was not until February 1991 that Andrew's injuries were sufficiently healed so that Defendants could move out of the premises.

On December 7, 1990, the grandparents submitted the first written notice of loss to USAA regarding Andrew's injury. On January 14, 1991, USAA extended coverage to Defendants under the "Medical Payments to Others" ("MPO") ² portion of the grandparent's homeowners policy. On June 18, 1991, after completing an investigation of the accident, USAA denied coverage under the liability portion of the homeowners policy. The parties, having completed discovery, have filed cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56.

ISSUES PRESENTED

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, USAA raises five issues. First, USAA argues that Andrew's injuries are not covered under the "Coverage E-Personal Liability" ("Coverage E") provision of the grandparents' homeowners policy due to Andrew's status as a "resident relative" or a person under the age of 21 in the care of a "resident relative" or the named insured, thus bringing him within a policy exclusion. USAA next claims that the exclusion from Coverage E is "supported by Delaware public policy and existing law." Third, USAA asserts that its payment under the MPO provision of the policy does not constitute waiver of the exclusionary provision of Coverage E. Fourth, USAA claims that, because there is no coverage under the primary homeowners policy, the grandparents' umbrella policy is not triggered. Last, USAA claims that, even assuming that Andrew was not a "resident of the grandparents' household" at the time of the accident, there still would be no coverage owed because Andrew was not an "insured" under the homeowners policy.

Defendants respond in their cross-Motion for Summary Judgment that Andrew is "covered by the homeowners policy unless USAA proves that a policy exclusion forfeits that coverage." Defendants first contend that Andrew's injuries are covered under the policy. Defendants next assert that "USAA cannot, as a matter of law, meet its burden of proving an exclusion to defeat coverage."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 when, in viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the movant has shown that no material issues of fact exist and so that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56(c); Burkhart v. Davies, Del.Supr., 602 A.2d 56, 59 (1991). In this case, the facts are largely undisputed by the parties. Indeed, in cases involving cross motions for summary judgment, such as presented here, the parties implicitly concede the absence of material factual disputes and acknowledge the sufficiency of the record to support their respective motions. Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Rockford Enter., Inc., Del.Super., 642 A.2d 820 (1993); Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., Del.Supr., 606 A.2d 96, 100 (1992), citing Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Fiduciary Trust C., Del.Supr., 445 A.2d 927 (1982). However, on a summary judgment motion, the Court is empowered to make factual determinations where the facts of the case are not in dispute and the inferences to be drawn therefrom point to a single conclusion. Faircloth v. Rash, Del.Supr., 317 A.2d 871 (1974). In this case, the controversy involves the proper interpretation of language contained in an insurance policy. As such, the issue to be resolved by the Court is one of law. Hudson v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., Del.Supr., 569 A.2d 1168 (1990).

Interpreting contract language, while analytically a question of fact, is treated as a question of law by the Court. Klair v. Reese, Del.Supr., 531 A.2d 219, 222 (1987). In construing the language of an integrated agreement, the meaning of the written terms is defined in light of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 223. If the language of an insurance contract is clear and unambiguous, the Court will not destroy or twist the words under the guise of construing them. Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,...