England v. Astrue

• Decision Date: 26 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-3578.,06-3578.
• Citation: 490 F.3d 1017
• Parties: Leo ENGLAND, Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

490 F.3d 1017

Leo ENGLAND, Appellant, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Appellee.

No. 06-3578.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: April 13, 2007.

Filed: July 26, 2007.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was E. Gregory Wallace, Buies Creek, North Carolina. Also appearing on the brief was Anthony W. Bartels, Jonesboro, Arkansas.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Special AUSA Richard A. Gilbert, Jr., SSA, Dallas, Texas.

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Leo England appeals from the district court's¹ order affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) that denied England's application for benefits. We affirm.

I.

England, who is now twenty-two years old, was born with hydrocephalus, a condition marked by cerebrospinal fluid within the skull. He received childhood social security disability benefits from 1989 to 1997, when his case was reviewed pursuant to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). After this review, the Social Security Administration determined that England was not disabled and was ineligible for benefits effective May 1, 1997. An administrative appeal, as well as a new application for benefits, followed.²

A hearing on England's claims was held in May 2004. Because England had turned eighteen by the time of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) considered both whether England should have received child disability benefits and whether England was eligible for adult disability benefits. The evidence England submitted included reports from his school and evaluations conducted by a consultative psychologist, Dr. Stephen Harris. The ALJ heard testimony from England, his mother, and a medical expert, Dr. Paul Deyoub, who had reviewed England's records. The ALJ determined that England was ineligible for child disability benefits because his impairments did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal any impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. The ALJ also determined that England was not eligible for adult disability benefits because he had the capacity to work in jobs that exist in significant numbers in the local, regional, and/or national economies.

II.

A. Child Disability Benefits

England argues that the ALJ's determination that he was not eligible for child disability benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

"We review de novo a district court decision affirming a denial of social security benefits." Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir.2005) (citing Strongson v. Barnhart, 361 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir.2004)). We will affirm the denial of benefits so long as the Commissioner's decision "conforms to the law and is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Id. (quoting Collins ex rel. Williams v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 726, 729 (8th Cir.2003)). "`Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion.'" Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 805 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir.2000)). "We consider both evidence that detracts from and evidence that supports the Commissioner's decision." Id. (citing Prosch, 201 F.3d at 1012). If substantial evidence supports the decision, we will not reverse, even if substantial evidence could have been marshaled in support of a different outcome. Id. (citation omitted).

In determining whether a claimant under the age of eighteen is disabled, the ALJ undertakes a sequential three-step evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(a). The first step is to inquire whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. The second step is to ascertain whether the impairment or combination of impairments is severe. Id. The third step is to determine whether the claimant has an impairment or impairments that "meet[], medically equal[], or functionally equal[]" a listed impairment. Id. A claimant will not be considered disabled unless he meets the requirements for each of these three steps. Id.

The ALJ determined that because England was not engaged in gainful activity and had severe impairments, he satisfied the requirements of the first two steps. The ALJ rejected England's contention that his impairments were functionally equivalent to a listed impairment, however, and thus determined that England did not meet the requirements of the third step. An impairment is functionally equivalent to a listing when the impairment results in an "extreme" limitation in one domain of functioning or a "marked" limitation in two domains of functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a). There are five domains of functioning, see § 416.926a(b)(1) (listing the domains), but the only domains relevant here are the domains of "interacting and relating with others," "acquiring and using information," and "attending and completing tasks." A marked limitation in a domain is a limitation that seriously interferes with a child's ability to "independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities." § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). A marked limitation is "more than moderate" but "less than extreme." Id. "[I]t is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to find on standardized testing with scores that are at least two, but less than three, standard deviations below the mean." Id. Test scores will be considered along with other evidence. § 416.926a(e)(4).

The ALJ determined that England had a marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, but that he did not have marked limitations in any additional domains. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that England did not meet the requirements for functional equivalency under the third step. England contends that the ALJ's determination is unsupported by substantial evidence.

1. Acquiring and Using Information

The domain of acquiring and using information pertains to how well a child acquires, learns, and uses information. § 416.926a(g). In concluding that England did not suffer from a marked limitation in this domain, the ALJ noted that in 2001, "school personnel reported that while [England's] overall intellectual ability was in the borderline range, his general fund of knowledge and long term verbal memory skills were in the average range with total language skills and oral expression also reported in the average range and with listening skills in the low average range." The ALJ also observed that England had successfully progressed through school and had never been held back in any grade. In addition, the ALJ's decision took note of England's 2000 and 2001 evaluations by Dr. Harris. During the 2001 evaluation, England achieved a verbal IQ score of 77, a performance IQ score of 77, and a full scale IQ score of 75. In 2000, England achieved a verbal IQ of 65, a performance IQ of 82, and a full scale IQ of 71. Moreover, in 2001, Dr. Harris completed a "Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work-Related Activities," in which he reported that England had only moderate (as opposed to marked or extreme) limitations in such work-related activities as carrying out detailed instructions and making judgments on simple work-related decisions.³

England argues that his IQ scores and other evidence indicate that he suffers from borderline to mild mental retardation, which compels the conclusion that he suffers from a marked limitation. England points out that Dr. Harris had determined in 2001 that England's adaptive functioning appeared to fall within the mildly retarded range. He also notes that — with the exception of his 2000 verbal IQ score of 65, which indicates mild retardation —his IQ scores indicate borderline mental retardation.⁴ There was other evidence of low intellectual functioning. During Dr. Harris's 2001 examination, he observed that England could not perform simple arithmetic without errors, could not interpret proverbs, and had difficulty following normal conversation. An examination in 1999 showed that England could not spell his name backwards or perform simple calculations. In 1997, when England was in seventh grade, his resource teacher stated that he was reading at a second grade level and that his math was at a fourth grade level. England also argues that although he had never been kept back in school, he was placed in special education classes in several subjects.

Despite this evidence of low intellectual functioning, we conclude that the ALJ's assessment is supported by substantial evidence. First, England's 2001 IQ scores and two of his three 2000 scores are less than two standard deviations below the mean (two standard deviations below the mean would be 70).⁵ While these numbers are not necessarily dispositive, see § 416.926a(e)(4)(ii) (noting that the disability determination will not be restricted to test scores alone), they constitute meaningful support for the ALJ's determination.

Second, although Dr. Harris characterized England's adaptive functioning as falling within the mildly retarded range, he also described England's "overall level of intellectual functioning" as borderline and remarked that England's limitations in carrying out work-related activities were only moderate, rather than marked. The ALJ's task was to interpret the significance and import of Dr. Harris's assessments and to resolve any pertinent tensions or contradictions. In so doing, the ALJ properly relied upon Dr. Deyoub, a medical expert, for assistance. See Hudson ex rel. Jones v. Barnhart, 345 F.3d 661, 666 (8th Cir.2003) (noting that the role of the medical expert is to "aid the ALJ in evaluating the medical evidence").

Third, the record contains school assessments that place England in the borderline range of overall intellectual functioning, and in an average to low-average range with...