England v. Garner

• Decision Date: 28 February 1884
• Citation: 90 N.C. 197
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: J. G. L. ENGLAND and others v. EDMUND GARNER and others.

90 N.C. 197

J. G. L. ENGLAND and others

v.EDMUND GARNER and others.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

February Term, 1884.

CIVIL ACTION tried at December Special Term, 1883, of MOORE Superior Court, before MacRae, J.

The plaintiffs instituted this action on August 7, 1880, and ask that the orders and decrees in an ex-parte proceeding, in the late court of equity of Moore county, for the sale of land for partition, be set aside and declared void, and that they be decreed owners of the land and entitled to the possession thereof.

The facts alleged in the complaint and material to the case are, that in the year 1835, J. W. England removed with his family to the state of Alabama, and died in 1849 seized of certain lands in Moore county in this state, and the plaintiffs are his heirs-at-law, and residents of Alabama.

At spring term, 1860, an ex-parte petition was filed by A. R. Kelly, attorney at law, on behalf of the heirs of said England (the plaintiffs in this action), to sell the land for partition. Order of sale was granted, and a sale made on September 27, 1860, and confirmed at fall term, 1861. But the plaintiffs allege they knew nothing of this proceeding until 1874, when they were informed that the land was sold for partition among them as tenants in common, and that they have received none of the proceeds of said sale. They were also informed that their attorney instituted proceedings in August, 1878, to set aside the decree. See 84 N. C., 212, and 86 N. C., 366.

In 1867, A. R. McDonald, attorney at law, appeared for the petitioners, and rules were served upon the defendants in this action, who were the purchasers at said sale or their grantees, to show cause why the purchase money should not be paid, which rules were discharged. These proceedings were also had without the knowledge of the plaintiffs, one of whom (J. G. L. England) was a minor when the said ex-parte petition was filed.

The defendants demurred to the complaint upon the grounds:

1. It does not allege that the purchasers had any knowledge of any fraud or irregularity in the proceedings, or want of anything in the attorneys.

2. It does not state that the purchasers had notice that the plaintiff J. G. L. England was a minor.

3. It is not stated that said Kelly was insolvent or ever had been, or that said McDonald was insolvent until 1878.

His Honor sustained the demurrer and the plaintiffs appealed.

Messrs. John Manning and R. P. Buxton, for plaintiffs .

Messrs. Hinsdale & Devereux, McIver & Black, W. E. Murchison and W. A. Guthrie, for defendants .

MERRIMON, J.

It is well settled upon principle and authority, that where it appears by the record that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of an action, the judgment therein is valid, however irregular it may be, until it shall be reversed by competent authority; and although it be reversed, a purchaser of the real estate or other property at a sale made under and in pursuance of such judgment while it was in force, and which it authorized, will be protected. All that the purchaser in such case is required to know, is, that the court had jurisdiction, and made the judgment upon the faith of which he purchased, and that such judgment authorized the sale. If this were not so, courts of justice would be worse than mockeries--their judgments and decrees would be s??ares and pitfalls for honest people--respect for and confidence in them would justly to a great extent be destroyed, and the effect upon society would be ruinous in a high degree. No one, whether he purchased immediately or mediately at such a sale, could be sure that he had purchased anything, much less a good title to the property sold, as against parties to the record.

It is a rule of law founded in sound policy as well as justice, that persons who purchase at judicial sales in good faith, shall be protected against the errors and irregularities of the court, and the laches of parties which they cannot see, and about which they have no opportunity to inform themselves. Jennings v. Stafford, 1 Ired., 404; Williams v. Harrington, 11 Ired., 616; University v. Lassiter, 83 N. C., 38; Ivey v. McKinnon, 84 N. C., 651; Sutton v. Schonwald, 86 N. C., 198; Gilbert v. James, Ib., 244; Morris v. Gentry, 89 N. C., 248; Gray v. Brignardello, 1 Wall., 627; Freeman on Judgments, §§509, 510.

According to the allegations in the complaint, the defendants, or those under whom they claim, purchased the land in controversy, at a judicial sale, under an apparently regular decree of the court of equity of Moore county authorizing it, granted in a suit wherein it appears by the record that the court had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, and the parties to that suit are the present plaintiffs, or parties under whom they claim. It thus appears that the defendants, in respect to the purchase of the land mentioned in the complaint, are within the rule of law above stated, and they are therefore entitled to the protection of the court.

It is urged with much earnestness by the counsel for the plaintiffs, that the plaintiffs did not in fact personally appear in the court of equity in...