Engle v. State

• Decision Date: 20 March 1888
• Citation: 13 A. 604,50 N.J.L. 272
• Parties: ENGLE v. STATE.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

13 A. 604

50 N.J.L. 272

ENGLE

v. STATE.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

March 20, 1888.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to court of quarter sessions, Camden county; WESTCOTT, WOOLSTON, and GAUNT, Judges.

Indictment against Annie Engle for causing abortion. Defendant having been convicted, brings error.

Argued November term, 1887, before BEASLEY, C. J., and REED, MAGIE, and DIXON, JJ.

Scovel & Harris, for plaintiff in error. W. H. Jenkins, for defendant in error.

DIXON, J. The plaintiff in error was indicted in Camden for causing an abortion. Upon her trial before the general quarter sessions she interposed the following challenge to the array of jurors: "Because the general panel of jurors was not drawn in the presence of the court of common pleas, inasmuch as John W. Westcott, the law or president judge of the court of common pleas, was not present as a member of said court at the drawing of said panel." The overruling of this challenge is the first reason urged for the reversal of her conviction. With regard to this alleged error, it suffices to say that there is no statute requiring the presence of the law judge to constitute a legal court of common pleas in Camden county, and in Gray v. Bastedo, 46 N. J. Law, 453, this court decided that his presence was not essential.

The second error assigned is upon an exception taken at the trial to the following paragraph in the charge of the court: "This is a case where, perhaps, the manner of witnesses upon the stand, their style, their temperament, the way they appear and act, may weigh as much as words themselves. There is nothing more impressive in the case than the apparent heartlessness of the defendant in taking the way she did about this unfortunate affair; there is nothing more impressive than her absence of solicitude about the girl's condition, and her absence of effort in helping the state detect the crime when she became possessed of the knowledge that such a crime, at least apparently, had been committed. Such facts as these are important for your consideration, and from them you can draw strong inferences one way or the other." It was conceded by the plaintiff in error at the trial that the person upon whom she was charged with having procured the abortion had died at her house from the effects of a criminal abortion. The denial of the plaintiff in error was solely to the charge that the abortion had been caused in her house with her aid or collusion. The comments of the court upon the conduct of the accused in view of this admitted fact, and upon the credibility of witnesses, were calculated merely to direct the attention of the jury to matters which were proper for their consideration, and, when taken in connection with the rest of the charge, cannot be believed to have been understood by the jury as at all deciding any question of fact. The charge plainly instructed the jury that it was their province to ascertain the facts, either by such direct evidence as they believed, or by such inferences as they themselves drew....