Martin v. Studebaker Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 May 1926
• Docket Number: No. 34.,34.
• Parties: MARTIN v. STUDEBAKER CORPORATION.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

133 A. 384

MARTIN

v. STUDEBAKER CORPORATION.

No. 34.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

May 17, 1926.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Action by Dominick Martin, individually and as administrator of his deceased son, against the Studebaker Corporation. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Edward A. Markley, of Jersey City, for appellant.

Augustus C. Studer, Jr., of Newark, for respondent.

PARKER, J. The plaintiff was injured, and his son, of whom he is administrator, was killed by reason of the collapse of a wheel on a motor car manufactured by the defendant respondent, in which car plaintiff appellant and his son were riding. The two claims were combined in one suit, based on alleged negligence in construction of the automobile. At the trial it appeared that the defendant did not itself make the wheels, but purchased them of a well-known concern in good standing, patronized also by a number of other makers of so-called standard cars; that defendant maintained three inspectors at that factory to watch the manufacture, independently of inspection by the manufacturer. The jury found for defendant, and the case is brought here on exceptions to the charge bearing on the duty of care required of the defendant, and on the refusal to charge as requested. The last ground of appeal alleges error in charging defendant's second request. The court did not charge that request. He did charge defendant's request No. 4, but that is not assigned for error.

The grounds of appeal are voluminous, and several are technically faulty, as containing in each several distinct propositions, and as going beyond the scope of the exceptions on which they purport to be respectively based. The first covers two entire printed pages of the charge; the second, a page; the third and fifth, half a page each; the fourth, over half a page. The rule that grounds of appeal like exceptions, must be specific, and limited each to a single ruling, is well settled. Engle v. State, 50 N. J. Law, 272, 13 A. 604; Packard v. Bergen Neck Ry. Co., 54 N. J. Law, 553, 556, 25 A. 506; State v. Spallone, 97 N. J. Law, 221, 117 A. 151; State v. Bove, 98 N. J. Law, 350, 355, 116 A. 766, affirmed 99 N. J. Law, 576, 119 A. 926. Passing this, and examining the exceptions, we find that those to the charge are returned in the loose and inaccurate way which seems to be a result of no longer requiring exceptions to be sealed. As appellant is entitled to review only on his exceptions as actually taken, we examine them from that standpoint. The first is:

"To that part of the charge beginning: There was no contractual relationship between the plaintiff and this defendant, and that the defendant would be relieved if it had made a reasonable testing or inspection of the wheels when it received them."

The second:

"To that part of the charge in which the court said the defendant did not manufacture the wheels, and must merely use reasonable care as to their inspection."

The third:

"To that part of the charge where the court said the defendant did not select the wood and did not turn it to spokes; that was done by another company separate and distinct. If the defendant had no notice of the defect from such an inspection as would be made after the wheels came into their possession and the wheel manufacturer was a reputable wheel manufacturer, then the defendant would not be liable."

The fourth:

"To that part of the charge where your honor said the defendant cannot be held liable for the negligence of the wheel company who manufactured the wheel or for any defects in the wheel that may be due to the negligence of the wheel company, unless the defendant knew or should have known by a reasonable inspection of the defective wheel."

The fifth:

"To that part of your honor's charge where the court said, if there was a defective wheel but you are not satisfied that the defendant did not use reasonable care in its inspection made by it to determine the defects, then the defendant would not be liable, even though the wheel was defective. It is my contention that they are liable irrespective of their own negligence, if the manufacturer of the wheel was negligent."

There were also exceptions to the court's refusal to charge plaintiff's requests numbered 2 and 3, and to charging the fourth request of the defendant (it was not charged); also "to that part of the charge wherein the court said the defendant would not be liable for any defects in the wheel which were not discoverable by the defendant after the wheel came into the defendant's possession."

Appellant summarizes the instructions actually given to the jury as quoted in the brief (and we think not unfairly) as follows:

"To summarize the instructions just quoted, the trial court held that the defendant was not liable for any negligence on the part of the wheel company, even though the wheel was negligently made of defective or improper wood and collapsed by reason of such defects; that the defendant could not be liable for the negligence of the wheel company; that that company would have to be responsible for its own negligence; that all the defendant was liable for was a failure to make a reasonable and proper inspection of the wheel as a finished product; that the defendant had no liability with respect to the purchase of the raw material; that this...