Engle v. State

• Decision Date: 31 May 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-123,88-123
• Citation: 774 P.2d 1303
• Parties: Mark ENGLE, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1303

774 P.2d 1303

Mark ENGLE, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 88-123.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 31, 1989.

Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender and Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick M. Anderson, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

Mark E. Engle (appellant), an unemployed twenty-four year old transient, was sentenced for felony auto theft, and his appeal now presents procedural and documentary sufficiency for judicial determination of either his competency to stand trial or to be convicted.

I. FACTS

On September 11, 1987, Nick Stovall parked at a store in Casper to purchase an ice cream cone. On return to the parking lot, his 1979 GMC Suburban was gone. A witness in the vicinity saw the vehicle being driven around a corner at a fast speed and skid into an adjacent tree. The driver got out, appeared to be drunk, looked at witnesses at the scene and vehicle damage, got back in the vehicle and drove away. An hour or so later, at a point about thirty miles east of town toward Douglas, a highway patrolman stopped the vehicle because of a REDDI report (Report Every Drunk Driver Immediately) and his observation of swerving and general erratic driving. The arresting officer drew his weapon and called for backup. Circumstances of the resulting arrest indicated strangeness of behavior, if not intoxication.

Appellant, as the driver, was arrested upon confirmation of vehicle theft and charged with felony auto theft and not the joyriding misdemeanor. When thereafter arraigned in district court, appellant, as an indigent, was provided appointed counsel and first pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, on November 2, 1987, a stipulated order approved and entered by the district court provided:

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his court appointed attorney, Jack Vreeland, and hereby moves the Court to enter his pleas of not guilty by reason of mental illness and not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency, and upon the stipulation by the State of Wyoming by and through Patrick Crank, Assistant District Attorney, and the Court being duly apprised in the premises FINDS that it would be in the best interest of justice that the Defendant be transported to the Wyoming State [H]ospital at Evanston for an evaluation to determine whether or not the Defendant is fit to proceed and to determine whether or not the Defendant had a mental illness or deficiency at the time of the commission of the offense.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant shall be transported by the Natrona County Sheriff's Department to the State Hospital at Evanston for an evaluation pursuant to Wyoming Stat[ut]e 7-11-303 and 7-11-304.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendant shall remain at the Wyoming State Hospital on an in-patient basis for a period no longer than thirty days (30) for the study of the mental condition of the accused.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that written reports of the pre-trial examination shall be filed with the Clerk of Court and including those matters as set forth with Wyoming Statute 7-11-303 and 7-11-304.

II. INSANITY DEFENSE PROCEDURE

Responsive to the district court order, a letter dated November 24, 1987, as filed November 30, 1987, was furnished and signed in behalf of Frank L. Rundle, M.D. and approved by the state hospital superintendent, which stated in full text:

Mr. Engle was admitted to the Wyoming State Hospital on 12 Nov 87 in accordance with your order for evaluation.

He was interviewed by the undersigned on 13 Nov 87 at which time he declared that he had had no prior knowledge of his coming to the hospital for evaluation, that he had not been informed of this by his attorney, that he objected to being here and would not undergo evaluation.

His attorney, Mr. Vreeland, was contacted, and he stated that indeed he had discussed the evaluation with his client and that he did, in fact, know that he was being sent to the hospital. He further explained that one of the difficulties he has had in working with the client is that he presents different stories at different times about the same set of circumstances and it has been impossible to know which was accurate.

I met with Mr. Engle again on 16 Nov 87 at which time he again stated that he had no knowledge of coming to the hospital for evaluation and declared again that he would not participate in the procedure. It was therefore decided that he would be returned to jail.

In the two brief interviews which were held with Mr. Engle at this hospital, he did provide some limited information. He stated that he had been in the Arizona State Hospital in Phoenix at some time in the past, that having been also for a court ordered evaluation, and he was found to be competent. He had also been treated in a private psychiatric hospital in Phoenix as a result of an accidental overdose of Methamphetamine, a drug which he had used regularly over a period of several years.

In these two interviews, Mr. Engle manifested no obvious signs of mental illness or deficiency. There was no associational thought disorder, no disturbance of mood or affect, and no evidence for hallucinations or delusions or other major psychopathology. He was well oriented, there was no impairment of attention or concentration, memory was intact, and intellectual level was estimated to be high average.

III. INTENT AS AN ISSUE OF THE OFFENSE

It is the statutory sufficiency of this correspondence which was not even signed by the author from which we are called to consider effectiveness to deny and nullify a pleaded defense of non-responsibility and mental illness or deficiency. The state of appellant's intent and his degree of intoxication were peculiarly significant because, dependent upon the character of intent in regard to displacement of rights of ownership, the undenied offense was either a felony auto theft or misdemeanor joyriding.

The felony auto theft, as provided by W.S. 6-3-402(a), states:

A person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny.

The maximum punishment is ten years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine or both if the property value is $500 or more. The joyriding statute, W.S. 31-11-102, provides:

Any person who without specific authority of the owner or his authorized and accredited agent willfully, wantonly, or maliciously takes possession of, or drives, propels or takes away, or attempts to take possession of, drive, propel, or take away a vehicle, the property of another, for the purpose of temporarily making use of the vehicle, or who knowingly aids, abets or assists another in so doing, upon conviction, is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both.

Consequently, in defense theory as now presented and since the obvious unauthorized taking did occur, the appellate issue becomes whether permanent intent to deprive was refuted either by intoxication or lack of mental competency. Facts singularly applied to these potential defenses were the characterization of the arresting officer to his supervisor that, upon arrest, it looked like he had a "fruitcake" as well as the corollary circumstance that appellant had checked into a transient facility in Casper where his belongings were found and was driving down the road toward Douglas having abandoned both his belongings and his arranged residence for the day. ¹

IV. COMPETENCY HEARING

Following the filing of the letter from the Wyoming State Hospital, procedurally a "competency hearing" was convened on January 7, 1988 to consider the stipulated pleas of "not guilty by reason of mental illness and not triable by reason of mental illness or deficiency." The choices presented by counsel for appellant were:

[A]sking Mr. Engle to be sent down to the Hospital to try for an evaluation on him. I anticipate in the alternative asking the Court for a continuance for us to get a psychiatrist for us to look at him, and as a third option we would ask the Court to withdraw because I don't think we can be effective, if there is not in fact the cooperation that the evidence will show the Court between Mr. Engle and myself.

The State responded to the alternative choices requested by standing on the sufficiency of the state hospital letter and by objection to a further psychiatric examination:

MR. CRANK: Your Honor, the State doesn't intend on calling any witnesses in this matter, and we would stand on the report that we have received from the State Hospital as to Mr. Engle's competency to proceed at the stated proceedings.

THE COURT: Are you opposed to the notion of the Defense obtaining their own psychiatrist to examine him?

MR. CRANK: I am, Your Honor, for a couple of reasons. Mr. Engle has been incarcerated since the time of his arrest for this offense. I think we will be running into speedy trial problems if we get another evaluation. Secondly, you know, we did receive a report back on November 30th, of 1987, from the State Hospital, where--the Court has a copy of this, where Mr. Engle refused to cooperate with the authorities at the State Hospital in performing an evaluation. Once we received that report, then there was certainty pursuant to that statute and the rules, the Defendant certainly had the opportunity at that point in time to request a second evaluation. We haven't done that. And, I believe, the time has run for that type of relief. Mr. Engle had every opportunity when he went to the State Hospital the first time to cooperate and have a report, and he just didn't do so. I think the evidence today will show Your Honor Mr. Engle has been...