Englehart v. Serena
| Decision Date | 02 December 1927 |
| Docket Number | 25570 |
| Parties | George D. Englehart, Appellant, v. Joseph A. Serena and Vernon Chapman |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Cape Girardeau Circuit Court; Hon. Frank Kelly Judge.
Affirmed.
Spradling & Dalton for appellant.
(1) The petition stated a cause of action against both respondents for wrongfully, wilfully and maliciously interfering with the personal and property rights of appellant. Haycraft v Grigsby, 88 Mo.App. 354; Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485; McCutchen v. Windsor, 55 Mo. 149; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286; Fertich v. Michener, 11 N.E. 611. (2) Within reasonable limits the proper college authorities may make reasonable rules and regulations for the government and discipline of students, but they do not have the right to make arbitrary or oppressive rules or regulations which interfere with some positive right, or conflict with the primary purposes of the school or with the laws of the land. Wright v. Board of Education, 246 S.W. 47; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286; State ex rel. v. Randall, 79 Mo.App. 226; King v. School Board, 71 Mo. 628; In Matter of Rebenak, 62 Mo.App. 8; State ex rel. v. Hamilton, 42 Mo.App. 24; Fertich v. Michener, 11 N. E. (Ind.) 605; 11 C. J 997, sec. 31. (3) Whether the rule or regulation was reasonable and proper and within the discretion of the school authorities, or whether it was unreasonable, illegal and oppressive, is always a question for the court. Wright v. Board of Education, 246 S.W. 43; State ex rel. v. Osborne, 24 Mo.App. 309; Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485; State ex rel. v. Randall, 79 Mo.App. 226; State v. Vanderbilt, 18 N.E. 267; Fertich v. Michener, 11 N.E. 611; State v. Board of Education, 63 Wis. 234; 25 Am. & Eng. Cyc. 29. (4) Whether the punishment was reasonable and proper, and whether it was reasonably and properly inflicted, including the question of whether or not defendant acted maliciously and without justification is a question of fact for the jury. Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo.App. 362; State v. Boyer, 70 Mo.App. 159; Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 487; Fertich v. Michener, 11 N.E. 611; 25 Am. & Eng. Cyc. 25; Danzell v. Dean, 186 S.W. 48; Kennard v. State, 33 S.W. 235; Taylor v. State, 43 S.W. 1019. (5) If the rule was palpably unreasonable and oppressive and beyond the exercise of a reasonable discretion, then respondent Serena was not protected by the mere fact that he was president of the college, nor was Chapman protected merely because he was enforcing the order of the president. State v. Vanderbilt, 18 N.E. 266; Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286; Kinzer v. Toms, 105 N.W. 686. (6) If the punishment prescribed and the manner in which it was imposed was excessive, unreasonable and oppressive, then the defendants are liable to respond in damages. Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo.App. 354; State v. Boyer, 70 Mo.App. 156; 25 Am. & Eng. Cyc. 25. (7) If the punishment imposed, to-wit, the ejectment of appellant from Albert Hall by threats of force and in the heat of anger, was wilful, intentional and malicious and without reasonable cause, for the purpose of humiliating and injuring the appellant, then the respondents are liable no matter how mild or reasonable the punishment that was imposed on plaintiff. Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo.App. 361. (8) The rule or order closing Albert Hall at six P. M. to all students who failed to sign the paper by three P. M. was unreasonable, unlawful and oppressive and beyond the discretionary powers of the respondent Serena, as president, because: (a) It was announced and promulgated in the heat of anger and with threats of forcible and rough ejection if it was not complied with. (b) The rule applied equally to the innocent and to the guilty; all must sign regardless of whether they had participated in any disturbances or not. (c) It applied equally to the old and young, including men up to sixty-three years of age, and many superintendents and principals of schools from all Southeast Missouri. (d) It was intended primarily for the oppression and humiliation of the innocent, as those guilty of participating in the disturbances which had preceded the adoption of the rule were asked not to sign. (e) It deprived the appellant of his property, his room and meals without due process of law and excluded him from the privileges of the dormitory without a hearing. The question of refunding board and room paid in advance was merely an afterthought for the purpose of avoiding additional difficulties that were encountered in the enforcement of the original order. (f) Students known to be guilty of participating in prior disturbances were permitted to sign the paper and remain in the hall while those known to be innocent were thrown out by force. (g) The guilty ones did not hesitate to sign the pledge in order to escape punishment and did so, and the shooting of firecrackers continued in the hall until school closed and after the innocent were thrown out. (h) A reasonable time was not given the appellant within which to secure another room and to move his personal property before forcefully ejecting him. (i) The enforcement of the rule violated the contract rights between the appellant and the school with reference to board and room and without reasonable cause, provocation or justification. Wright v. Board of Education, 246 S.W. 43; State ex rel. v. Osborne, 32 Mo.App. 540; State ex rel. Crain v. Hamilton, 42 Mo.App. 24; State v. Board of Education, 63 Wis. 234; 28 Cyc. 368-370; American Tobacco Co. v. St. Louis, 247 Mo. 374; Salem ex rel. v. Young, 142 Mo.App. 171; City of Carthage v. Block, 139 Mo.App. 393; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541. (9) The respondent is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his own wilful, intentional and malicious acts and he is liable therefor even though there was no intent to do an injury to the particular individual. Bouillon v. Gaslight Co., 148 Mo.App. 462; State v. Noland, 111 Mo. 496; State v. Lenz, 184 Mo. 223. (10) Malice means the intentional doing of a wrongful act without justification or excuse, and in reckless disregard of the rights of others, "When one intentionally commits a wrong, he does it from an evil spirit and bad motive." Trauerman v. Lippincott, 39 Mo.App. 488; Davis v. Railroad, 192 Mo.App. 426; Goetz v. Ambs, 27 Mo. 28. (11) Malice, being a condition of the mind, may be proven by inference from words spoken or acts committed, and is a question for the jury. Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 53; Stubbs v. Mullholland, 168 Mo. 47; Danzell v. Dean, 186 S.W. 48; State v. Prather, 130 Mo.App. 355; State v. Weiner, 66 Mo. 20.
Gallivan & Finch and Ward & Reeves for respondents.
(1) Plaintiff's petition states no cause of action; neither does the evidence show any. Dritt v. Snodgrass, 66 Mo. 286; Alfers v. Merchant's Exchange, 138 Mo 164; Edwards v. Ferguson, 73 Mo. 686; Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 22; Hausgen v. Elsberry Drain. Dist., 245 S.W. 404; Sharp v. Kurth, 245 S.W. 638. (2) The teacher (or as here the president) has the same power to make needful rules as the board, with respect to matters not acted on by the board. The board of regents have full power and authority to adopt all needful rules and regulations for the guidance and supervision of the conduct of all students while enrolled as such. Sec. 11498, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. v. Hamilton, 42 Mo.App. 24; State ex rel. v. Randall, 79 Mo.App. 226; State ex rel. v. Osborne, 32 Mo.App. 540; Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485. (a) School authorities act in a quasi-judicial capacity and have large discretionary powers in the making of rules and regulations and are not liable personally for damages unless they act without the scope of authority or act maliciously and wilfully. Alfers v. Merchants Exchange, 138 Mo. 140; Williams v. Elliot, 76 Mo.App. 12; Knox Co. v. Hunolt, 110 Mo. 67; Washington Co. v. Boyd, 64 Mo. 179; Edwards v. Ferguson, 73 Mo. 636; State ex rel. v. Randall, 79 Mo.App. 226. (b) Wilfully, as used above, means acting contrary to one's own conviction as to what is right and proper. Reed v. Conway, 20 Mo. 54; Pike v. McGoun, 44 Mo. 497; Edwards v. Ferguson, 73 Mo. 686; Knox Co. v. Hunolt, 110 Mo. 75; City of St. Joseph v. McCabe, 58 Mo.App. 549; Sharp v. Kurth, 245 S.W. 638; Cook v. Hecht, 64 Mo.App. 279. (c) Malicious, as used, means "without just provocation." Haycraft v. Grigsby, 88 Mo.App. 354. (d) Whether the rules or regulations are wise or their aims worthy is a matter left to the discretion of the authorities, and with the exercise of that discretion the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the rules and aims are unlawful or against public policy. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376; 11 C. J. 998. (e) The control of conduct of students after admission rests largely in the discretion of the officers in charge, the regulations prescribed for that purpose being subject to modification or change from time to time as supposed emergencies may arise. State v. White, 82 Ind. 278; 11 C. J. 997-98. (f) The rule in question was promulgated to meet an emergency and was reasonable and necessary. Arnold v. School Dist., 78 Mo. 233; State ex rel. v. Cole, 220 Mo. 697; In re Rebenack, 62 Mo.App. 8; North v. State University, 137 Ill. 296; King v. School Board, 71 Mo. 628; State ex rel. v. Randall, 79 Mo.App. 226; Deskins v. Gose, 85 Mo. 485. (g) The defendants are not liable for error of judgment and if the court should think the rule in question unreasonable, still defendants would not be liable for the enforcement of same unless accompanied with malice, wilfulness and oppression, as these terms are defined in the law. (3) In emergencies the school authorities may lock the doors of the school building against both teachers and scholars, and by the same reasoning defendants had the right to close the...
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