English v. Blacher

• Decision Date: 30 March 1937
• Citation: 8 N.E.2d 343,297 Mass. 76
• Parties: PHILIP ENGLISH v. SOLOMON BLACHER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

297 Mass. 76

8 N.E.2d 343

PHILIP ENGLISH v. SOLOMON BLACHER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

March 30, 1937

October 8, 1936.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., CROSBY, PIERCE FIELD, & LUMMUS, JJ.

Motor Vehicle Registration. Words, "Period of thirty days."

Under G. L. (Ter Ed.) c. 90, Section 3, an automobile, owned by a nonresident and not registered in this Commonwealth, was a trespasser on a highway here after it had been operated in this Commonwealth in 1932 for more than thirty days in the aggregate, although not for any continuous period of thirty days.

TORT. Writ in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated July 12, 1935.

The action was heard by Donovan, J., who found for the plaintiff in the sum of $325. Upon report to the Appellate Division judgment was ordered entered for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

P. H. Tenney &amp L.

E. Callahan, for the plaintiff, submitted a brief.

H. W. Hardy, for the defendant.

RUGG, C.J. The plaintiff seeks in this action of tort to recover compensation for damage to his automobile, resulting from collision with an automobile of the defendant on a highway in this Commonwealth on November 17, 1932. The only question to be decided is whether, as matter of law, the automobile of the plaintiff was a trespasser upon the highway. These appear to be the relevant facts: The automobile of the plaintiff was registered in New Hampshire, where he resided, on January 1, 1932, and was not registered in this Commonwealth. It was damaged by collision with the automobile of the defendant on a highway in Acton in this Commonwealth. It was being operated with the consent of the plaintiff by his son, a licensed operator who resided with his father in Manchester, New Hampshire. Neither the plaintiff nor his son ever applied for or obtained the permit for operation in this Commonwealth by nonresidents, referred to in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, Section 3. That section provides that without such permit "no motor vehicle . . . owned by a nonresident shall be so operated [on the ways of this Commonwealth] beyond the expiration of a period of thirty days . . . ." The son was a travelling salesman for a business concern in Portland, Maine, and was operating the automobile on his own business. In the course of his employment from January 1, 1932, to November 17, 1932, the plaintiff's son travelled in New Hampshire, Maine and Massachusetts operating the automobile on at least three days each week in this Commonwealth, and returning with the automobile each week to Manchester. Between those dates he had operated the automobile in this Commonwealth for an aggregate of at least one hundred days, but not for any continuous period of thirty days without leaving the Commonwealth.

Narrowly stated the point to be decided is whether the plaintiff's automobile had on the date of the accident been operated in this Commonwealth "beyond the expiration of a period of thirty days," as those words are used in said Section 3. If it was being operated beyond that period, since the operator had no permit, the automobile was clearly a trespasser on the highway. Dudley v. Northampton Street Railway, 202 Mass. 443.

This particular provision of said Section 3 was designed to afford to a nonresident the protection of the automobile registration of his home State or country during a temporary sojourn within this Commonwealth not exceeding a period of thirty days. Jenkins v. North Shore Dye House, Inc. 277 Mass. 440 , 443. Bellenger v. Monahan, 282 Mass. 523 , 530. It was a transient privilege accorded to nonresidents on considerations of reciprocity. Nothing in the history or the previous interpretation of the statute indicates that it was intended to permit the operation within the Commonwealth of an automobile owned by a nonresident for an aggregate of more than thirty days in a calendar year even though no one visit extended over more than thirty continuous days. To give such an interpretation would permit a nonresident to operate...