English v. Grinstead

• Decision Date: 21 October 1895
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: ENGLISH ET AL. v. GRINSTEAD.

42 P. 121

12 Wash. 670

ENGLISH ET AL. v. GRINSTEAD.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 21, 1895

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; James Z. Moore, Judge.

Action by Albert English and others against Rilda Grinstead. There was a judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Reversed.

Richardson & Williams and Blake & Post, for appellant.

L. H. Prather, for respondents.

HOYT C.J.

By this action respondents sought to avoid a purchase by them of a certain note and mortgage held by the appellant. The ground upon which this was sought was that respondents had been induced to purchase said note and mortgage by false representations as to them, and as to the condition of the property covered by the mortgage, and of the corporation by which it was executed. Upon the trial the superior court found the facts to be substantially as contended for by the respondents, and entered a decree as prayed for in the complaint. Such findings of fact were duly excepted to by the appellant, and it is here contended by her that the evidence introduced was not sufficient to warrant the court in finding as it did. There is little or no dispute as to the law governing transactions of the kind involved in this controversy, and the question for our decision is mainly one of fact. It has been our duty to examine the proofs contained in the record for the purpose of ascertaining whether the representations made by the appellant at the time she sold the note and mortgage were of material facts which she stated to be true, or were simply of facts which she believed to be true by reason of certain information which she had obtained, which information was at the time made known to the respondents. If the representations were of the first class, both parties agree that the contract of sale could be avoided. On the other hand, if they were of the second class, it is substantially agreed that they furnished no sufficient reason for avoiding the contract of sale. The proofs show that there were some expressions made use of by the appellant which, if taken alone, would seem to warrant the construction put upon them by the respondents; but when they are construed in connection with other statements made by her at the same time, it seems clear to us that she never at any time intended to represent as an absolute fact anything in connection with the note and morgage, the property covered by the mortgage, or the corporation by...