English v. Siddens, 79-3022
| Decision Date | 30 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | 84-3271 and 84-3299.,No. 79-3022,79-3022 |
| Citation | 751 F. Supp. 1343 |
| Parties | Forrest G. ENGLISH and Robert M. Owens, Plaintiffs, v. Donald SIDDENS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Forrest Gene English, Robert M. Owens, Springfield, Ill., for plaintiffs.
Michael O'Hara, Springfield, Ill., for defendants.
The "English Cases" in this Court have nearly taken on a life of their own. We say nearly because, unless a court of review takes a contrary view, these cases meet their demise with our ruling today.
What we deal with now are the remnants of a litigation campaign by these two pro se Plaintiffs against their former union. Either separately or jointly, these two Plaintiffs have filed a total of ten lawsuits against their former union and its officers.1
Of these ten, the five that remained on December 9, 1985 were consolidated by order of the Court into case 84-3299. Three of those suits, English v. Local Union No. 46, No. 79-3022 (Case I), English v. Siddens, 84-3271 (Case II), and English v. Cowell, No. 84-3299, (Case IV) were dismissed by this Court on statute of limitations grounds. English v. Cowell, 117 F.R.D. 137 (C.D.Ill.1987). Plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed the dismissals to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs then filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.
In the interim, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Reed v. United Transportation Union, 488 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 621, 102 L.Ed.2d 665 (1989). This consolidated case was then remanded to this Court for consideration of the effect Reed has upon our dismissal of these three cases.
These cases allege numerous violations of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA). Case I, No. 79-3022, alleges violations of LMRDA § 101(a)(1)'s guarantee of equal rights, § 101(a)(2)'s guarantee of free speech, and § 101(a)(3)'s mandatory procedures for implementing dues increases. Case II, No. 84-3271, alleges further violations of § 101(a)(3). Case IV, No. 84-3299, alleges that Plaintiff English's right to due process in disciplinary proceedings guaranteed by § 101(a)(5) was violated.2
The LMRDA does not provide a statute of limitations for violations of Title I of that Act. Under the general borrowing rule, the Court must then look to state law and apply the most analogous statute of limitations under state law. The magistrate who first reviewed this question recommended applying Illinois' five-year "catch-all" statute of limitations3. Relying on DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), this Court held that no Illinois statute of limitations was sufficiently analogous and applied instead the six-month statute of limitations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
Following remand from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court attempted to expedite these cases by ordering the parties to submit memoranda on the effect of Reed on the statute of limitations issue. Our order required Plaintiffs to submit their memorandum by a specified date. Defendants then had 14 days to respond, and Plaintiffs had 7 days thereafter to file a reply. Consistent with their prior conduct during this protracted litigation, Plaintiffs filed their memorandum late. Despite having followed their own schedule in preparing their memorandum, Plaintiffs failed to even cursorily address the issue of the applicable statute of limitations after Reed.
Defendants, though deprived of any position to respond to, amply set forth their arguments that Reed should not lead the Court to change its earlier determination that the NLRA's six month statute of limitations should control this case. Defendants also requested and received leave of this Court to file motions to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment in the event that the Court finds these actions not to be time-barred.
Our analysis of the applicable statute of limitations must, of course, begin with Reed v. United Transportation Union, supra. In Reed, the Supreme Court held that action under LMRDA § 101(a)(2) were governed by the state statute of limitations for personal injury cases rather than by the six month statute of limitations provided for in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The general borrowing rule requires the borrowing of a state statute of limitations, except "when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking." Reed, 109 S.Ct. at 625 (quoting DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294-95). DelCostello involved an employee's hybrid § 301/fair representation claim. The six-month limitation of § 10(b) applied in that case was "attuned to ... the proper balance between the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system." Reed, 109 S.Ct. at 628 (quoting DelCostello at 172, 103 S.Ct. at 2294-95).
By contrast, claims under § 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA only tangentially implicate those same interests. Reed, 109 S.Ct. at 618. Rather, Title I of the LMRDA is patterned after the Bill of Rights. A claim under § 101(a)(2) is analogous to a First Amendment claim and thus the state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions should be applied. See Reed at 626. The Reed Court indicated that all § 101(a)(2) suits should be characterized in the same way, since "litigation as to the collateral question of the appropriate statute of limitations for a § 101 claim would likely interfere with Congress' aim that actions to enforce free speech and association rights should in fact enhance union democracy." Reed at 627.
The state statute-of-limitations for personal injury actions was also appropriate because such statutes provided a sufficient period of time for the Plaintiff to identify the injury, make the decision of whether to antagonize union leadership by bringing a lawsuit, and select an attorney once that decision was made. Id.
Reasoning from Reed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Clift v. International Union, UAW, 881 F.2d 408 (7th Cir.1989), that the state statute of limitations for personal injury actions should also govern actions under LMRDA § 101(a)(1). Clift at 411. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), providing for equal rights for members of labor organizations, is analogous to an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. The Clift Court further stated "Title I seeks to protect the political or civil rights of union members. ..." Id. at 412.
Although claims under LMRDA §§ 101(a)(3) and 101(a)(5) are not as analogous to interests protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as are §§ 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2), both are aimed at protecting the political and civil rights of union members and both are supportive of Congress' goal of "union democracy." Considering these facts and the guidance of Reed and Clift, this Court holds that claims under LMRDA §§ 101(a)(3) and 101(a)(5) are governed by the state statute-of-limitations for personal injury actions. Therefore, Illinois' two year statute-of-limitations for personal injury actions4 governs this case.
Claims under §§ 101(a)(1), 101(a)(2)
Plaintiff English, a.k.a. Guy Levine, complains in Case 79-3022 that his guarantee of equal rights under LMRDA § 101(a)(1) was violated by the holding of an irregularly scheduled meeting on December 17, 1976. Plaintiff also complains that his right to free speech under § 101(a)(2) was violated by the entry of "an arbitrary gag order against the Plaintiff forbidding him to speak when Plaintiff attempted to have Trogolo adjourn the illegal meeting and to conduct no official union business at said meeting...."5
As this case (79-3022) was filed on January 31, 1979, these complaints are clearly barred by Illinois' two-year statute of limitations.
Claims under § 101(a)(3)
Plaintiff English complains of several violations of § 101(a)(3)(A). In case 79-3022, English complains of dues increases6 implemented on January 1, 1977 and January 1, 1989. In case 84-3271, filed June 15, 1984, both Plaintiff Owens and Plaintiff English complain of dues increases effective January 1, 1982 and January 1, 19847.
Under Illinois' two-year statute of limitations, complains about the January 1, 1977 dues increase and the January 1, 1982 dues increase are time-barred. Therefore, these claims are dismissed.
The claims in cases 79-3022 and 84-3271 regarding the January 1, 1979 and the January 1, 1984 dues increases are not time barred. We therefor consider Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to these claims. Plaintiffs complain that the union dues were raised without a majority vote by secret ballot as they contend § 101(a)(3)(A) requires. Plaintiffs, however, totally ignore § 101(a)(3)'s alternate means of approving a dues increase. We excerpt from § 101(a)(3):
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English v. Cowell, 91-1079
...its officers, Nos. 78-3116, 79-3022, 79-3036, and 84-3271. English v. Cowell, 117 F.R.D. 128, 129 (C.D.Ill.1987); English v. Siddens, 751 F.Supp. 1343, 1344 (C.D.Ill.1990). These other suits were terminated by the district court on a variety of grounds and are not at issue here. The tortuou......
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English v. Cowell, 92-4032
...trial and his conviction constituted sufficient evidence to support his expulsion under Sec. 101(a)(5) of LMRDA. English v. Siddens, 751 F.Supp. 1343, 1347-48 (C.D.Ill.1990). We reversed and remanded again. English v. Cowell, 969 F.2d 465 (7th Cir.1992). We held that English's expulsion was......
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English v. Cowell, 84-3299.
...entered summary judgment for the Defendants on Plaintiffs claim of termination from the union without due process. English v. Siddens, 751 F.Supp. 1343, 1347-50 (C.D.Ill.1990). This Court held that the conduct of the Defendants did not amount to "discipline" under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5), and......