English v. Cowell, 91-1079

• Decision Date: 29 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-1079,91-1079
• Parties: 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2935, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,291 Forrest G. ENGLISH And Robert M. Owens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William J. COWELL, Donald Siddens, Charles J. Connor, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 465

969 F.2d 465

140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2935, 122 Lab.Cas. P 10,291

Forrest G. ENGLISH And Robert M. Owens, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. William J. COWELL, Donald Siddens, Charles J. Connor, et

al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-1079.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 6, 1991.

Decided July 29, 1992.

Paul A. Levy (argued), Alan B. Morrison, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Michael W. O'Hara (argued), Cavanagh & O'Hara, Springfield, Ill., for defendants-appellees.

Before CUMMINGS and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and WILL, Senior District Judge. ^*

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Forrest G. English and Robert M. Owens ¹ appeal from an order dismissing their claim that Mr. English was discharged from his union without proper procedural protections, in violation of section 101(a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). They contend, first, that the district court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, Mr. English's 1983 "termination" from the union comported with the procedural requirements of section 101(a)(5). They also contend that the district court erred in dismissing their claim, on an alternative ground, for failing to pay several sanctions assessed against them. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and vacate in part the decision of the district court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Forrest English was a member of Local 46 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers ("Local 46" or "the local union") located in Springfield, Illinois. In 1983, Mr. English was in prison in Illinois, after having been convicted of a felony.

English's conviction and incarceration jeopardized his membership in the local union. Article XIX, section 10(2), of the Iron Workers' constitution states that charges may be brought against a union member who violates any of the union constitution's provisions. Article XXVI, section 14, paragraph 6a, directs that a member who is found guilty of the charges preferred against him may be disciplined, or expelled. Mr. English's conviction suggests that he may have violated at least two distinct provisions of the union constitution. First, Article II, section 2 states that a union member must be "of good moral character and competent to demand standard wages." Also, Article XIX, section 14, requires all union members who are not working, seeking work, or on layoff status, to take out a "withdrawal card," or be expelled. This provision may be enforced or waived by the union's General Secretary.

On December 27, 1983, Local 46's president, defendant William Cowell, and its business agent, defendant Donald Siddens, sent Mr. English, then in prison, a brief letter informing him that his membership was "terminated." ² This letter did not state the precise basis for the action against Mr. English, nor did it offer him a hearing in which he could contest this decision. Article XXVI, section 14 of the Iron

                Workers' constitution sets forth an elaborate procedure to be followed when a local union seeks to discipline a member.   Under this provision, the accused has a right to receive a detailed statement of the charges against him.   The accused then may elect to be tried on the charges by a jury of members of the local union or by the executive committee.   The accused also has a right to representation by another member during any proceeding, and an adverse decision from a trial may be appealed to the General Executive Board
                

B. District Court Proceedings

In 1984, Mr. English and Mr. Owens, another member of Local 46, filed suit pro se in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois against the local union's leadership and certain unknown persons, alleging that Mr. English's termination was in violation of the procedural rights guaranteed by section 101(a)(5) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). ³ This section 101(a)(5) claim was docketed in the district court as Case No. 84-3299. In 1985, the court ordered that that case be consolidated with four other suits that Mr. English, sometimes with the assistance of Mr. Owens, had brought against the union and its officers, Nos. 78-3116, 79-3022, 79-3036, and 84-3271. English v. Cowell, 117 F.R.D. 128, 129 (C.D.Ill.1987); English v. Siddens, 751 F.Supp. 1343, 1344 (C.D.Ill.1990). These other suits were terminated by the district court on a variety of grounds and are not at issue here. The tortuous history of this litigation is set forth in the margin. ⁴

In Case No. 84-3299, the section 101(a)(5) claim, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It determined that the termination of Mr. English's union membership did not violate his procedural rights under the statute. The court first held that the termination was not "discipline" that triggered the protections of section 101(a)(5). Instead, the court found that Mr. English had been reclassified as a person not eligible for union membership because he was a felon in prison and therefore presumably did not meet the constitution's requirement that a union member be of good character and competent to demand union wages. Id. at 1348. In support of its holding, the district court cited the First Circuit's holding in Macaulay v. Boston Typographical Union No. 13, 692 F.2d 201, 204-05 (1st Cir.1982), that a union's reclassification of a member as "not at the trade" did not implicate section As an alternative ground to support its disposition, the district court noted that, during the course of their litigation, Mr. English and Mr. Owens had been sanctioned for misconduct several times. The court further noted that they had not paid any of the attorneys' fees or costs that the court had imposed as sanctions, that they had failed to reply satisfactorily to the court's order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to pay sanctions, and that they continued to file frivolous motions. Because of these facts, the court concluded that it was appropriate to dismiss these cases for failure to comply with its orders. English v. Siddens, 751 F.Supp. at 1349.

                101(a)(5), even though it adversely affected the member's ability to obtain work.   In addition, the court held that even if Mr. English's termination was "discipline," the defendants still were entitled to summary judgment under section 101(a)(5) because they needed only to point to "some evidence" to support the disciplinary decision, which the conviction provided.  English v. Siddens, 751 F.Supp. at 1348 (citing Gustafson v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 788 F.2d 1284, 1287 (7th Cir.1986))
                

II ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. English and Mr. Owens challenge only the court's dismissal of their claim that Mr. English was expelled without the procedural protections mandated by section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA. ⁵ As we have just noted, the district court relied on alternate grounds to justify its dismissal of this claim. Consequently, to prevail in this appeal, the plaintiffs must establish that the district court committed two errors. First, they must show that the court mistakenly concluded that, as a matter of law, Mr. English's termination from the local union comported with the standards of section 101(a)(5). In addition, they must show that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed their claims based on their failure to comply with the court's sanctions orders. We shall deal with each of these issues separately. ⁶

A. The Section 101(a)(5) Issue

1.

Section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA provides that:

No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.

This provision is part of the "Bill of Rights" provided to union members by Title I of the LMRDA. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture Store Drivers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 536, 104 S.Ct. 2557, 2563, 81 L.Ed.2d 457 (1984). As Judge Wood, writing for this court, has noted, section 101(a)(5)'s purpose is to protect union members from improper discipline by ensuring that the standards of due process apply to union disciplinary proceedings. Curtis v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 687 F.2d 1024, 1028 (7th Cir.1982); see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 194, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2014, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). Indeed, by its plain terms, the statute entitles a union member to notice of charges, time to prepare a defense, and a full and fair hearing whenever he is fined, suspended, expelled or otherwise disciplined. Local No. 48, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 920 F.2d 1047, 1056 (1st Cir.1990); Chapa v. Local 18, 737 F.2d 929, 933 (11th Cir.1984). ⁷

These cases establish, then, that, once a member is subject to discipline, section 101(a)(5) requires that he receive written charges that are specific enough to inform him of the offense he allegedly committed. International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 245, 91 S.Ct. 609, 616, 28 L.Ed.2d 10 (1971); Frye v. United Steelworkers, 767 F.2d 1216, 1222 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007, 106 S.Ct. 530, 88 L.Ed.2d 461 (1985); Curtis, 687 F.2d at 1027. In addition, the member must have available a "full and fair" disciplinary hearing in which he can contest the charges. Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 245-46, 91 S.Ct. at 617; see also Myers v. Affiliated Property Craftsmen Local No. 40, 667 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir.1982); Ritz v. O'Donnell, 566 F.2d 731, 735 (D.C.Cir.1977). While this hearing need not contain "the full panoply of procedural safeguards found in criminal proceedings, the...