Engstad v. Grand Forks County
| Decision Date | 22 November 1900 |
| Citation | 84 N.W. 577,10 N.D. 54 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Grand Forks County; Fisk, J.
Action by Mathilda C. Engstad against the County of Grand Forks and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
John A Sorley and B. G. Skulason, for appellant.
This action is brought for the purpose of setting aside and canceling the taxes for the year 1898 upon the St. Luke's Hospital, and the lot upon which the same is situated, on the ground that said property was exempt from taxation. Subd. 6 § 5, chapter 126, Laws 1897; § 176 Const. The fact of private ownership is not material, under the statute, in considering whether or not the property is exempt. The character of the use of the property being given the legislature has no choice but to exempt it. Gerke v Purcell, 29 Ohio St. 229; Sisters of Charity v. City of Detroit, 9 Mich. 93. Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense except when a contrary intention plainly appears. § 5106, Rev. Codes. Under the act "all buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity, and all buildings belonging to public hospitals, shall be exempt." Putting it in another form "all buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity, and with such institutions are included public hospitals." Under this construction no regard need be had to the manner in which the title is held. Our statute is a copy of section 5, chapter 11, General Laws of Minnesota, 1878. Under this statute it has been held that the question of the use of the property, and whether the hospital was a public hospital determines the exemption and not the question of corporate or private ownership. County of Hennepin v. Brotherhood of Gethsemane, 8 N.W. 595. The fact that the hospital receives pecuniary compensation from its beneficiaries does not affect it as a public charity. St. Joseph's Hospital Ass'n v. Ashland County, 72 N.W. 43; City of Philadelphia v. Woman's Christian Ass'n, 17 A. 475; County of Hennepin v. Brotherhood of Gethsemane, 8 N.W. 595; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. 897. The rule is that exemption from taxation is not lost by temporary suspicion of the charity. 12 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. 381.
George A. Bangs and W. L. T. Goodison, for respondents.
Exemptions are strictly construed. The presumption is, that the state has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all. Cooley on Taxation, 205; 1 Destey on Taxation, 108; 25 Am. & Eng. Enc. L. 157. The word "institution" in the exempting statute is used to designate a corporation or other organized body instituted to administer the charity, and that the real estate described as belonging to such institution has reference to property owned by the institution. Humphrey v. Little Sisters of the Poor, 29 Ohio St. 201; St. Monica Church v. New York, 119 N.Y. 91, 23 N.E. 294; Hegaray v. New York, 13 N.Y. 220; Nashville v. Ward, (Tenn.) 16 Lea, 27; State v. Ross, 24 N.J.L. 497; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, 68 Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 519; Dodge v. Williams, 46 Wis. 100; Nobles v. Hamline, 46 Minn. 316, 48 N.W. 1119; People v. Western Seamen Friends Society, 87 Ill. 246. This suit cannot be maintained by the plaintiff because, since the institution of the suit, the property was sold to the Grand Forks Deaconess Hospital. Jurisdiction will be exercised by the court only in behalf of parties interested in the transaction or subject-matter of the proceeding which it is sought to enjoin, and one who has no personal interest in the matter is not entitled to relief. High on Injunctions, 1177; Smith v. Brittenhan, 109 Ill. 540.
The object of this action is to cancel taxes assessed in 1898 against a certain lot, and building thereon used as a hospital, and situated in the city of Grand Forks. Nearly all the facts, and all which we deem to be important, are uncontroverted. It is admitted that in the month of December, 1897, the plaintiff purchased the premises in question, and that the title thereto was conveyed to the plaintiff at that time; that the plaintiff continued to be the sole and individual owner of the property until the month of December, 1899, when she sold the same, and conveyed the title to the purchaser. It is further conceded that during the whole of the year 1898 the plaintiff alone, through an agent, who was her husband, carried on and administered the hospital situated on the premises, and that no other business was done on the premises. The plaintiff furnished and paid for the supplies for the hospital, and she alone bore the financial loss which resulted from operating the hospital during the year 1898. The only fact which seems to be disputed is whether the plaintiff did or did not carry on the hospital during the year in question for charitable purposes and none other. Plaintiff's contention is that she carried on the hospital exclusively for charitable purposes, and that she had no intention to derive any individual emoluments from the hospital, and that she did not in fact do so. She further contends that said hospital, during her administration thereof, was a purely public charity. For the purposes of the case, we shall accept the plaintiff's theory of the facts as above stated, and this will call for a solution of the question--one of pure law--whether any law exempts from taxation a hospital, and the land upon which it is erected, when the same is conducted solely by one individual, who owns the same, and who operates it for public charity exclusively.
It is elementary in the law of taxation that all property situated within the boundaries of a state is subject to taxation by the sovereign authority, and that a party who claims that particular property is exempt from taxation has the burden of pointing out the law which exempts the same. It is also well settled that laws which exempt property from taxation will receive a strict construction. It is the plaintiff's contention that the property is exempt from taxation by the terms of section 1180 of the Revised Codes of 1899. Said section declares that certain property enumerated therein shall be exempt from taxation, and subdivision 6 of the section, upon which plaintiff relies, reads as follows: "All buildings belonging to institutions of purely public charity, including public hospitals, together with the land actually occupied by such institutions, shall be exempt." A careful reading of subdivision 6, in our opinion, plainly shows that the legislature did not intend, in enacting this subdivision, to exempt any and all real property which is or may be used exclusively for charitable purposes. It is evident from the language employed that the lawmakers intended to carefully discriminate as between charities, and to exempt from taxation only such as are (1) of a public character, and (2) such as belong to "institutions of purely public charity." Applying the provisions of subdivision 6 to the conceded facts of this case, it at once becomes apparent that the property involved is not exempt under subdivision 6. Concede that the...
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