Morris v. Lone Star Chapter No. 6, R. A. M.

• Decision Date: 01 November 1887
• Citation: 5 S.W. 519
• Parties: MORRIS v. LONE STAR CHAPTER NO. 6, ROYAL ARCH MASONS.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

5 S.W. 519

MORRIS v. LONE STAR CHAPTER NO. 6, ROYAL ARCH MASONS.

Supreme Court of Texas.

November 1, 1887.

Appeal from Travis county; A. S. WALKER, Judge.

J. S. Hogg, Atty. Gen., and H. B. Barnhart, Co. Atty. of Travis Co., for appellant. D. W. Doom, for appellee.

GAINES, J.

Appellee, a corporation organized, as alleged, for purposes of purely public charity, brought this suit to restrain the appellant, as tax collector for Travis county, from proceeding to enforce the collection of taxes assessed upon its property in the city of Austin. The property assessed consists of a parcel of land in the city upon which is erected a three-story brick building, known as the "Masonic Temple." The record shows "that the third or upper story of said building is divided into convenient rooms, which are occupied and used by plaintiff and other Masonic bodies to hold their meetings in, and is used for no other purpose, the other Masonic bodies mentioned paying to plaintiff rents for the use of said rooms, amounting in all to about twenty-five dollars per month; and that the first and second stories of said building are divided into rooms which are rented to different persons, and plaintiff receives a monthly rental for each of said rooms, amounting in the aggregate to about one hundred and fifty dollars per month for all of the rooms in said first and second stories." The court below found that the plaintiff corporation was an "institution of purely public charity," and that the property was exempt from taxation under the constitution and laws of our state, although the greater part of the building was leased at a monthly rental to sundry persons to be used for purposes wholly unconnected with the objects of the order. The findings of the court are assigned as error.

If it can be shown that property belonging to a charitable association, not directly and exclusively used by it in furtherance of its charitable purposes, but partly rented for profit, though its resources be exclusively devoted to the objects of the charity, is not exempt from taxation in our state, it will be unnecessary to determine whether or not the appellee can be deemed an "institution of purely public charity," as those words are used in our constitution. Article 8 of that instrument, which regulates the power of taxation, exempts nothing except $250 dollars' worth of household and kitchen furniture. Section 2 of that article gives the legislature power to make certain exemptions, but provides that all laws exempting property from taxation other than the property therein mentioned shall be void. It is clear, therefore, that, in order to escape the charges of government, the property must appear to be embraced both within some one of the classes named in the section mentioned, and also in the exemptions actually provided for in the statute made in pursuance thereof. Red v. Johnson, 53 Tex. 284.

So much of the section as is pertinent to this discussion reads as follows: "But the legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes; actual places of religious worship; places of burial not held for private or corporate profit; all buildings used exclusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes, (and the necessary furniture of all schools,) and institutions of purely public charity; and all laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property above mentioned, shall be void."

The grammatical construction of this provision is not clear. The word "institution" properly means an association organized or established for some specific purpose, (see the word in Webster's dictionary,) though it is sometimes used in statutes and in common parlance in the sense of the building or establishment in which the business of such a society is carried on. Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 249. Hence that part of the section under consideration which contains this word may have been intended to read, either "all buildings used exclusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes, * * * and all institutions [meaning establishments with houses, grounds, etc.] of purely public charity," or "all buildings used exclusively and owned by persons or associations of persons for school purposes, * * * and all buildings used exclusively and owned by institutions of purely public charity." In the constitution of Ohio the word seems to have been used in the former sense, (Gerke v. Purcell, supra;) but we are of the opinion that the latter reading gives the more reasonable construction of the language as used in the constitution of our state. This gives to the word its proper meaning, and is in accord with the spirit of the other provisions contained in the section. The legislature is empowered to exempt only "actual places" of religious worship, and actual burial grounds not held for profit, and, for school purposes, merely the buildings (including the grounds on which they are situate) and the necessary furniture. In neither case is property which is not actually used as a place of worship or burial, or for a school-house, exempt, although it may be used for the support of religion or education, or to secure the decent burial of the dead. If it had been intended to exempt all the property of charitable institutions, it would seem that more general terms would have been used. Besides, the omission of the word "all" before the word "institutions" would indicate that the former construction was not intended. It was used before the word "buildings" and the word "schools" in the same sentence, when the meaning in both instances would have been clear without it. It would seem, therefore, to have been omitted before the word "institutions" because its insertion there would have changed the meaning which was intended to be conveyed.

Assuming, then, that the intention was merely to authorize the exemption of real estate used exclusively by charitable institutions, we are next to inquire whether the property in controversy is embraced within that designation, or within the description contained in subdivision 6, art. 4673, Rev. St., to which we shall hereafter refer. The burden of showing that an exemption from taxation exists, rests upon the party who claims it, (Redemptorist Fathers v. Boston, 129 Mass. 178;) and when the construction of the law is doubtful, the doubt will be resolved in favor of the state, and against the exemption, (Academy v. Exeter, 58 N. H. 306; Indianapolis v. Grand Masters, 25 Ind. 518; College v. State, 19 Ohio, 110; Academy v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. St. 496; Crawford v. Burrell, 53 Pa. St. 219; Cooley, Tax'n, 54, 147; State v. Board of Assessors, 35 La. Ann. 668.) The reason of these rules would seem to be that it is but just and equitable that the property of all persons and associations of persons should bear the burdens of government in equal proportion; and hence it is to be presumed that the law-makers did not intend to make an exception in favor of any class unless that intention be clearly expressed. Applying these rules, we conclude that the building in question is not...