Enloe v. Barfield

• Decision Date: 27 December 1967
• Docket Number: No. B--386,B--386
• Citation: 422 S.W.2d 905
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: S. D. ENLOE et al. v. Mrs. Audry BARFIELD et vir.

Page 905

422 S.W.2d 905

S. D. ENLOE et al. v. Mrs. Audry BARFIELD et vir.

No. B--386.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Dec. 27, 1967.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1968.

Benckenstein & Norvell, Lipscomb Norvell, Jr., Beaumont, for petitioners.

Zbranek & Friend, J. C. Zbranek, Liberty, Alvis S. Ellisor, Cleveland, for respondents.

CALVERT, Chief Justice.

In this suit for damages for personal injuries to Mrs. Barfield growing out of an automobile collision, the trial court disregarded answers of the jury to certain special issues and rendered judgment awarding plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Barfield, a recovery of damages from the defendant, Gerald Enloe, a minor. The court of civil appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court because of the failure of the trial court to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, and remanded the cause to the trial court for a new trial. 415 S.W.2d 721. The plaintiffs do not complain of the court of civil appeals' judgment, but the defendant does. We reverse the judgments of both courts and here render judgment that the plaintiffs take nothing.

The collision occurred on Highway 59 in the city of Cleveland. At the place of collision, Highway 59 has six traffic lanes, divided by an esplanade, three for northbound and three for southbound traffic. At various points where the highway is intersected by through streets, there are turning lanes cut into the esplanade for use by motorists who wish to make left or U turns. The clear inference from the evidence is that when the turning lanes are properly used, the operator's vehicle can be stopped before making a turn into the intersecting street, or before attempting a U turn, without protrusion of any part of the vehicle into the regular traffic lanes. The evidence reflects that there are also cuts or openings in the esplanade, through which automobiles can pass, at points where there are no intersecting through streets and no turning lanes. The collision in the instant case occurred in the nighttime at one of the latter type openings.

Mrs. Barfield was driving north on Highway 59 in the inside traffic lane, intending to make a U turn through the opening and into the outside lane of southbound traffic. As she started to enter the opening, she stopped her automobile when she saw five or six vehicles approaching in the southbound traffic lanes. The esplanade was not wide enough for her automobile to be stopped in the opening without the front protruding into the inside southbound traffic lane or the rear protruding into the inside northbound traffic lane. When she stopped her car, according to her testimony, 'most of it was in the (northbound) lane next to the esplanade.' The automobile operated by the defendant Enloe, who was traveling north in the inside lane behind Mrs. Barfield, collided with the stopped car, thereby injuring Mrs. Barfield.

The jury found that Enloe was negligent in operating his automobile at an excessive rate of speed, in failing to keep a proper lookout, and in failing to make a timely application of his brakes, and that each of such negligent acts or omissions was a proximate cause of the collision. The jury refused to find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Barfield failed to keep a proper lookout to the rear, failed to signal her intention to turn, suddenly stopped her automobile, and was making a U turn 'at the time and on the occasion in question.' However, the jury found in answer to special issues 12 and 13 that the stopping by Mrs. Barfield of her automobile in the opening in the esplanade was negligence and a proximate cause of the collision. On motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court disregarded the answers to issues 12 and 13 and rendered judgment for damages as found by the jury.

We treat the plaintiffs' motion to disregard...