Enoch C. Richards Co. v. Libby.

• Decision Date: 30 July 1943
• Parties: ENOCH C. RICHARDS CO. v. LIBBY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

33 A.2d 537

ENOCH C. RICHARDS CO.

v.LIBBY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 30, 1943.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Cumberland County.

Proceeding by the Enoch C. Richards Company against Harry C. Libby, executor of the will of Julia E. Hodsdon, deceased, for review of a civil action between the parties. The petition was granted, and defendant brings an exception.

Exception overruled.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, and MURCHIE, JJ.

Philip A. Hanson, of Boston, Mass., for petitioner.

Harry C. Libby, of Portland, pro se.

MANSER, Justice.

Review was sought of a civil action between the parties. The petition was based on R. S. 1930, c. 103, § 1, Par. VII, which reads as follows:

“A review may be granted in any case where it appears that through fraud, accident, mistake, or misfortune, justice has not been done, and that a further hearing would be just and equitable, if a petition therefor is presented to the court within six years after judgment.”

The petition was granted. The case was then presented to this Court on exceptions which appeared to be insufficient and the bill of exceptions was returned for corrections and reentry, which has been done. The exception now before the Court makes clear that the defendant filed a general demurrer to the petition, the petitioner joined therein and upon hearing, the demurrer was overruled. It is also clear that the defendant elected to rely upon his exception to this ruling. He filed no further pleading and while the Court allowed the petitioner to proceed to a hearing, the defendant withdrew and did not participate therein.

The legal effect of the defendant's pleading was to admit the truth of all matters of fact set forth in the petition and well pleaded. Such is the long established principle of pleading and not disputed by the defendant. As said in Herrick v. Osborne, 39 Me. 231:

“A general demurrer admits the truth of all facts which are well pleaded. Every substantive fact, therefore, which is distinctly set out in the declaration in the plaintiff's writ, must, for the purposes of this examination, be deemed to be true.”

The effect of a general demurrer is the same, both in legal and equitable proceedings. Traip v. Gould, 15 Me. 82. The defendant relies upon the proposition that, admitting the facts alleged in the petition to be true, the petitioner does not show itself to be entitled to review because he contends the dismissal of the original action occurred by reason of the carelessness and negligence of the petitioner and its attorney.

Dismissing from consideration certain allegations in the petition which are argumentative or expressive of opinion, the well pleaded facts contained therein appear to be as follows:

The original action was once tried before a Justice of the Superior Court without a jury, and judgment for the petitioner rendered for $403.65. Several exceptions to the rulings of the Justice were prosecuted in this Court and one was sustained, the result of which was to return the case for a new trial. See Richards Co. v. Libby, 136 Me. 376, 10 A.2d 609, 126 A.L.R. 1215.

The defendant, by filed specifications and by statements at the original trial, had admitted facts which would create a liability of $53.65, but resisted the additional claim of $350.

It further appears from the recitals of the petition that the attorney for the petitioner was a nonresident of the State and by letter requested information from the Clerk of Courts as to assignment of the case for the second trial. He received reply from the Deputy Clerk which included the statement, “I will protect your interest in having it assigned.” Later, however, the case was dismissed for want of prosecution. The petitioner's attorney was given no notice by the Clerk or the Deputy Clerk, either before or after the dismissal of the action.

A case so dismissed goes to judgment at the same term. S. D. Warren Co. v. Fritz, 138 Me. 279, 25 A.2d 645. It disposes of the pending action by a final judgment against the plaintiff. The parties are out of court and the judicial power over the action has been exhausted. It cannot be restored to the docket. Davis v. Cass, 127 Me. 167, 142 A. 377.

These decisions, however, are not to be interpreted as denying a right of review if the petitioner shows himself entitled thereto under the provisions of the statute creating such right, here R.S. c. 103, § 1, Par. VII. Such review is predicated upon the fact that an adverse judgment has been rendered. In Karrick v. Wetmore, 210 Mass. 578, 97 N.E. 92, the Court held that a judgment of dismissal was a final judgment but adverted to the fact that the plaintiff might have petition for relief through one of the channels...