Ensey v. Culhane

• Citation: 727 A.2d 687
• Decision Date: 30 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-642-M.P.,97-642-M.P.
• Parties: Keith ENSEY v. Edmond S. CULHANE, Jr., Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police, and Paul J. Tavares, Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

727 A.2d 687

Keith ENSEY v. Edmond S. CULHANE, Jr., Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police, and Paul J. Tavares¹, Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island.

No. 97-642-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 30, 1999.

Alan M. Barnes, Cumberland, Robert D. Watt, Providence, for plaintiff.

Thomas A. Palombo, Elizabeth A. Wallace, Providence, for defendant.

Before WEISBERGER, C.J., and LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS, and GOLDBERG, JJ.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Chief Justice.

This case comes before the Court on the defendants' petition for certiorari seeking review of a trial justice's denial of their motion for summary judgment. The trial justice stayed the proceedings pending our action on the petition. We issued the writ. For the reasons stated below, we quash the order denying summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Sharon M. Albino (Albino), a University of Rhode Island (URI) student, reported that the plaintiff, Keith Ensey (plaintiff), kidnapped and raped her at gun point. Albino repeated her story at least six times to various persons, including her friends, medical personnel at the URI Health Services, a rape crisis counselor, and Rhode Island State Police Troopers and Detectives. Albino consistently identified her ex-boyfriend, the plaintiff, as the person who kidnapped and raped her. Additionally, Albino informed the Rhode Island State Police that a few days prior to the rape and kidnapping, her dormitory room had been vandalized and she believed the plaintiff to be responsible. Albino explained that she had previously engaged in a relationship with the plaintiff and that he continued to pursue her. A subsequent check on the plaintiff revealed that he possessed an active Rhode Island driver's license and that an outstanding arrest warrant had been issued for his apprehension on an unrelated charge.

After Albino made her report, the police visited the home of plaintiff's mother. She informed the police that her son lived in Chicago and had not been in Rhode Island when the crimes against Albino occurred. She supplied the police with plaintiff's home and work phone numbers. The police called plaintiff several times at these numbers but never reached him. Further, plaintiffs mother explained that the automobile which the police suspected the plaintiff utilized incident to accomplishment of the rape and kidnapping had been repossessed two years earlier and that plaintiff currently drove a different automobile.

Accepting Albino's accusations over this contrary information, state police officers applied for an arrest warrant for plaintiff on these charges of kidnapping and rape. In applying for the arrest warrant, however, the officers did not inform the judge about the conversation with plaintiffs mother. Based on the information presented to him, a District Court judge issued the arrest warrant. Thereafter, the police released a verbal press statement which revealed plaintiffs identity, the charges, and the basic facts surrounding the investigation. Later, Ensey contacted an officer and stated that he had not left Chicago at any time, making it impossible for him to have committed the crimes against Albino. This information caused the police to engage in further interrogation of the complaining witness.

In the course of this interrogation of Albino, the police discovered that she fabricated the story against plaintiff to cloak a sexual affair in which she had been involved at a URI fraternity house. The police later charged Albino with filing a false police report. Upon learning of the fabrication of the charges, the police immediately applied to rescind the warrant for kidnapping and rape. The warrant had been outstanding for approximately ten hours. During that period of time, no law enforcement agency, local or otherwise, arrested or contacted plaintiff. The police never required plaintiff to return to Rhode Island.

The plaintiff subsequently filed suit against the Superintendent of the State Police, the General Treasurer of the State, ten unnamed officers of the State Police (all referred to as John Doe defendants), and Albino² in Providence County Superior Court. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and comparable rights under article 1, sections 6 and 10 of the Rhode Island Constitution, his privacy rights under G.L.1956 § 9-1-28.1, and negligence in the police investigation. The defendants made a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the doctrine of qualified immunity barred plaintiffs constitutional claims. The trial justice rejected defendants' qualified immunity argument and denied summary judgment on all claims, holding that defendants made a "rush to judgment" in obtaining the warrant and releasing information to the media. The trial justice reasoned that the police chose to believe "the hysterical young woman" rather than "the mother" and "ignored something that was shoved under their noses." Therefore, the trial justice stated, whether the police acted in "good faith" or with "reckless disregard" "[is] a factual dispute to be determined by a fact-finder." The trial justice, however, agreed to stay the proceedings pending review by this Court. We issued the writ of certiorari in order to review the interlocutory order of the trial justice.

Standard of Review

When reviewing the denial of a motion for summary judgment, "we apply the same standard as the lower court." Marchetti v. Parsons, 638 A.2d 1047, 1049 (R.I. 1994). "After reviewing the pleadings, affidavits * * * and other [relevant documents] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must conclude whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Vierra, 619 A.2d 436, 437 (R.I.1993)). For the reasons set forth below, we quash the trial justice's denial of summary judgment.

The Pleadings

In this case, there are only two named defendants. One defendant, the General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island, is a nominal party who took no part in the activities upon which this action is based. The other defendant is the Superintendent of the Rhode Island State Police. The pleadings do not allege that the Superintendent made any decisions regarding the procurement of the arrest warrant or the issuance of the press release. Moreover, the pleadings do not accuse him of negligence in supervising or directing the police officers under his command.

The body of the complaint indicates that certain unidentified state police officers, ranging in number from one to ten, obtained an arrest warrant after receiving a detailed report from a purported victim of sexual assault who claimed to have been raped at gun point. The complaint further indicates that one or more of those officers did communicate with the suspect's mother. It is the actions of these individual police officers upon which the complaint is based. However, none of these individual police officers is named as a defendant.

The complaint does refer to a number of unnamed state police officers who are characterized as John Does. Nevertheless, unless these John Doe defendants are named and served with process within a reasonable time after their identities become known, they may not be considered parties to the case. Hall v. Insurance Company of North America, 727 A.2d 667 (1999); see also Wilson v. United States Government, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir.1994)

. Also, the naming of John Doe defendants will not toll the statute of limitations unless they are served with process within a reasonable time after they are identified or in the exercise of reasonable diligence could be identified. Hall, 727 A.2d at 670. The identities of the police officers who investigated the case and obtained the arrest warrant became known to plaintiff by reason of the defendants' answer to plaintiffs' interrogatories in March of 1994. Despite a three-year opportunity before the hearing on summary judgment, at no time did plaintiff attempt to amend his complaint to join the identified officers as parties defendant.

Allegations that non-party members of the state police may have violated either Fourth Amendment or privacy rights of plaintiff do not give rise to respondeat superior liability on the part of supervisors. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611, 636 (1978)

(municipality cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior theory). An employer, whether a municipality or an officer of the government, is only responsible for the acts of a subordinate if the action that is alleged to be unlawful implements or executes a policy promulgated by the superior or the governing body of the entity against whom the complaint is made. Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2036-37, 56 L.Ed.2d at 635. Mere allegations, whether supported by affidavits or other pleadings, that officers who are not parties to the action may have violated plaintiff's rights cannot support the instant action against the Superintendent or the Treasurer. In respect to the non-party officers, the statute of limitations has long passed and, in absence of timely service of process, those unnamed officers cannot now be named as parties. Hall, 727 A.2d at 670; see also Ricci v. Ricci, 689 A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I.1997) (delay of seven and a half months between filing complaint and service of process upon defendant held unreasonable); Catone v. Multimedia Concepts, Inc., 483 A.2d 1081, 1084 (R.I.1984) (delay of thirteen months held unreasonable); Simmons v. State, 462 A.2d 974, 975 (R.I.1983) (delay of three years held unreasonable); Curtis v. Diversified Chemicals and Propellants Co., 440 A.2d 747, 749 (R.I.1982) (delays of four to seven months in serving various defendants held unreasonable); Caprio v. Fanning &...