Marchetti v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 21 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-523-M,92-523-M
• Citation: 638 A.2d 1047
• Parties: John MARCHETTI, Jr., et al. v. Roy PARSONS. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 1047

638 A.2d 1047

John MARCHETTI, Jr., et al. v. Roy PARSONS.

No. 92-523-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 21, 1994.

Mark S. Mandell, Yvette Boisclair, Mandell, DeLuca & Schwartz, Lauren Jones, Jones Associates, Providence, for plaintiffs.

Jeffrey F. Finan, Pawtucket, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Acting Chief Justice.

This case comes before us on a petition for certiorari filed by the defendant, Roy Parsons (defendant), to review an order of the Superior Court denying his motion for partial summary judgment. The defendant argues that the Superior Court misapplied Rhode Island law by allowing the plaintiffs, John Marchetti, Jr., and Linda Marchetti (plaintiffs or John and Linda), to proceed with a claim against the defendant for negligent infliction of emotional distress since they were not present at the accident scene when the defendant struck their daughter and caused her severe injuries. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments of the parties, we hereby grant the petition and quash the order of the trial justice. The facts, insofar as they are pertinent to this petition, are as follows.

I

On September 20, 1990, twelve-year-old Alicia Marchetti (Alicia) was crossing Frenchtown Road in East Greenwich with her bicycle when she was struck by a car driven by defendant. The East Greenwich police and an ambulance responded to a call to the scene and transported Alicia to Kent County Memorial Hospital (hospital) in Warwick. Approximately twenty-five minutes after the accident, John, who worked in an office located approximately seven or eight miles from the scene of the accident, received a telephone call from the East Greenwich police. An officer told John that Alicia had been in the accident and that she had a broken leg and was being transported to the hospital. The officer was either unwilling or unable to tell John about any other injuries suffered by Alicia. When John completed the telephone call, he informed Linda, who worked in the same office, of the accident. They proceeded to the hospital, which was located a short distance from their workplace.

John and Linda reached the hospital just after the ambulance carrying Alicia had arrived. Although they did not see Alicia at that time, they did see Alicia's shoes in the back of the empty ambulance. Upon entering the emergency room, John and Linda were not allowed to see Alicia immediately. They were brought to a small waiting room and informed by the director of emergency room services at the hospital that Alicia suffered from much more serious injuries than a broken leg.

Soon thereafter they saw Alicia on a stretcher in the hallway of the emergency room. She had not yet been treated. Both John and Linda stated that Alicia appeared lifeless, that she was immobile and bloodied, and that she had a tube in her throat. They also stated that they thought that Alicia was dead.

Upon seeing Alicia, Linda experienced nausea and later in the evening needed to be treated with a sedative to sleep. Both John and Linda received cold packs to prevent them from losing consciousness.

Alicia remained in a coma for six weeks and was hospitalized for almost three months. She currently requires special education and continues to suffer from a myriad of ailments relating to her accident in September 1990.

Since Alicia's accident, John has been treated for major depression, panic disorder, and post-traumatic-stress disorder. He has also experienced periods of chest pain, tachycardia, migraine headaches, and nausea. Linda has been treated for depression, chronic anxiety, and panic attacks and also has suffered from episodes of tachycardia and dizziness.

In March of 1991 John and Linda brought an action as individuals and on behalf of Alicia, seeking damages for Alicia's injuries and medical expenses; for John and Linda's lost wages and lost earning capacities; for their loss of services, companionship, comfort, and consortium of Alicia; and for Alicia's loss of relationship with her parents. John and Linda also sought recovery for the emotional distress they have suffered as the result of defendant's actions. The current petition involves only the action seeking recovery for the parents' emotional distress.

In his motion for partial summary judgment, defendant argued that Rhode Island law precludes recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress when the parents of an accident victim do not "actually witness" the accident. Citing prior decisions from both Rhode Island and other jurisdictions, plaintiffs contended that physical proximity to the accident site is not a determinative factor concerning whether a viable action lies for negligent infliction of emotional distress. After hearing arguments, the trial justice held that plaintiffs did not need actually to witness the accident in order to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, and he denied defendant's motion. The defendant then filed the current petition with this court.

II

In reviewing a trial justice's decision to deny a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard as the lower court. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Vierra, 619 A.2d 436, 437 (R.I.1993). After reviewing the pleadings, affidavits, admissions, answers to interrogatories, and other admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must conclude whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

We first recognized liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress in D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). D'Ambra, which came to us as a certified question from the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, involved a mother who suffered emotional and physical injuries after witnessing her four-year-old son being struck and killed by a United States mail truck. Although the mother had witnessed the accident, she had not been subject to any physical danger from the collision.

In determining whether the plaintiff in D'Ambra could recover for her injuries, we held that a party did not need to be within the zone of physical danger created by the defendant in order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We found that the concept of recovery for mental distress resulting from the shock or fright of being the potential victim of an accident had its origins in Rhode Island in Simone v. The Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 A. 202 (1907). In Simone a woman in a street-car accident was allowed to recover for emotional distress she suffered, even though she received no physical injury from the accident, because she was physically endangered by the acts of the defendant, which caused her emotional distress. Under this zone-of-danger standard, the potential for physical injury must be present in order for a plaintiff to recover for the mental distress suffered.

In D'Ambra we expanded Simone and moved beyond its zone-of-danger limitation. In so doing, we adopted the reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 (1968), and identified a number of factors to be considered in determining the scope of a defendant's liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress to an accident bystander. These factors included "physical proximity [to the accident], the actual witnessing of the accident, and the personal relationship existing between the bystander-plaintiff and the victim." 114 R.I. at 656, 338 A.2d at 531. We went on to state, however, that there are "other factors which, given the right circumstances, may be of major importance in determining whether an adequate relation exists between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury." Id. After analyzing the facts in relation to the factors enumerated, we concluded and held that

"a nonnegligent mother, who although suffering no physical impact suffers serious mental and emotional harm accompanied by physical symptoms from actually witnessing the death of her nonnegligent minor child as a direct result of the defendant's negligence, may maintain an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, despite the fact that she herself was never in physical danger." Id. at 657-58, 338 A.2d at 531.

We have had two occasions since D'Ambra to address claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress to an accident bystander. In 1979, in a per curiam opinion, we upheld a trial justice's dismissal of a claim for emotional distress when a mother did not witness the defendant's vehicle roll over her daughter's leg. Caparco v. Lambert, 121 R.I. 710, 402 A.2d 1180 (1979). We stated that the plaintiff/mother "did not witness [the] accident. As a result, the trial justice refused to extend our holding in D'Ambra, to allow recovery for emotional distress to the present situation. On this record we find no error in that decision." Id. at 712, 402 A.2d at 1181-82. Although we held that because the plaintiff did not witness the accident she could not recover for her emotional distress, this holding is limited in that we did not explore the factors underlying the trial justice's decision, nor did we specifically state whether the "actual witnessing" requirement was a prerequisite or a determining factor that would preclude recovery in all cases.

Finally, in 1988 we answered a certified question from the Federal District Court and held that in an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a party "must suffer physical symptomatology to recover damages." Reilly v. United States, 547 A.2d 894, 899 (R.I.1988). ¹ In Reilly we explained that absent physical manifestations, a court could not be certain of the genuine nature of the injuries because such injuries could be, to a great extent, merely speculative. Id. at 897. Moreover, we examined the nature of a defendant's acts in a negligence action and held that a negligent defendant should not be held responsible for a "purely...