Entelman v. Hagood

• Decision Date: 05 February 1895
• Citation: 22 S.E. 545,95 Ga. 390
• Parties: ENTELMAN et al. v. HAGOOD.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

22 S.E. 545

95 Ga. 390

ENTELMAN et al. v. HAGOOD.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 5, 1895

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Whatever may have been, at common law, the right of a landlord, with respect to removing, without resort to legal proceedings, a tenant holding beyond his term, in view of the statutes of this state providing for the summary ejection of tenants under legal process, and the public policy thereby manifested, a landlord who, without such process, forcibly and violently ejects a tenant and his personal goods from the rented premises, is liable to the latter in an action of trespass, although the tenant was holding over beyond this term, was in arrears for rent, and had received legal notice to quit.

2. The verdict, in view of the evidence, being contrary to the law as above announced, and the court having expressly, for this reason, granted a new trial, the judgment will not be disturbed.

Error from city court of Savannah; A. H. MacDonell, Judge.

Action by Mary M. Hagood against A. H. Entelman and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

R. R Richards, for plaintiffs in error.

P. M Russell and A. C. Wright, for defendant in error.

LUMPKIN J.

1. Mary M. Hagood brought an action of trespass against Entelman and another for forcibly ejecting her and removing her goods from certain premises which she had rented from Entelman, and of which she was still in possession. Under the charge of the court, which was adverse to the plaintiff's right to recover, there was a verdict for the defendants. A new trial was granted, the court being of the opinion, after further consideration, that, even if the plaintiff was a tenant holding over after the expiration of her term, and after legal notice to vacate the premises, she could not be forcibly dispossessed by the landlord without subjecting the latter to an action of trespass; he having an appropriate remedy for her summary dispossession, under section 4077 et seq. of the Code. The case therefore turns largely upon the question whether or not a landlord may, without resort to legal proceedings, forcibly eject a tenant holding beyond his term, without becoming liable to the tenant in an action of trespass. It would seem that at common law the landlord had the right, after the expiration of the tenant's term, to immediately re-enter and take possession of the rented premises, and that in so doing a resort to force was legal provided no more force was used than was actually necessary to eject the tenant. It is manifest, however, that proceedings of this kind would have a tendency to cause breaches of the peace; and, in this country especially, it is more than probable that they would frequently result from attempts by landlords to forcibly evict tenants who were unwilling to peaceably and quietly surrender possession of premises. Cases of this kind bear some analogy to those in which owners of personalty, of which others are unlawfully in possession, undertake to repossess themselves of the same without the aid of the law. The act of 1821 (Cobb's Dig. p. 590) provided a remedy, by possessory warrant, for the speedy recovery of personalty; and, as appears from the preamble of that act, one of the purposes of its passage was to prevent violence and quarrels...