Eoff v. Irvine

• Decision Date: 08 February 1892
• Citation: 18 S.W. 907,108 Mo. 378
• Parties: Eoff, Appellant, v. Irvine et al
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

18 S.W. 907

108 Mo. 378

Eoff, Appellant, v. Irvine et al

Supreme Court of Missouri, First Division

February 8, 1892

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. -- Hon. R. H. Field, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Hayward & Griffin for appellant.

(1) As far as Leigh H. Irvine is concerned, had he made no transfer to his brother, the law is clear that he would hold the property in trust for the plaintiff. Davis v. Kline, 96 Mo. 401-406, and cases cited. (2) And his brother, taking under a quitclaim deed, stands in no better position, for he takes the property subject to all equities. Campbell v Gas Co., 84 Mo. 352, and cases cited; Fox v Hall, 74 Mo. 315. (3) Even though Louis C. Irvine had taken under a conveyance which, in law, would have authorized him to claim to be a purchaser for value, without notice, the facts in evidence show that he was not such a purchaser. (4) The conveyance to Mrs. Annie K. Irvine, being without consideration, cuts no figure in the case. (5) No laches are shown by pleadings or evidence, for no court has ever held eleven months to be laches; and eleven months is all the time that elapsed between date of outstanding title to Leigh H Irvine, October 4, 1887, and filing of plaintiff's bill, September 21, 1888. If laches are relied on, the question is to be raised either by demurrer or answer (Bliss v. Prichard, 67 Mo. 181), which was not done. Moreover, Louis C. Irvine took quitclaim deed from his brother as soon as outstanding title appeared in his brother (that is, within two weeks); consequently, the eleven months that passed from that date, to filing of bill, did him no harm, as he did nothing to change his position. (6) In a case of this kind the better rule is that Leigh H. Irvine, or anyone in his stead, has no title to be reimbursed the money advanced (Moore v. Bracken, 27 Ill. 23; Townsend v. Hadley, 18 N.E. 457), and, clearly, not to pay for legal services. (7) If from the evidence, it appeared to the court that plaintiff was not entitled to the specific relief prayed for, the prayer for general relief authorized such relief as was just and equitable in the premises. Estee's Pleadings [3 Ed.] sec. 332; Amos v. Scudder, 11 Mo.App. 168. (8) If Louis C. Irvine is held to have acted in good faith, then this is a case in which one of two innocent persons must suffer, and it is to be determined not upon considerations of hardship, but on principles long known and well recognized by courts of equity, which leave Louis C. Irvine in another action to recover against his brother for the fraud practiced; if he did not act in good faith, he is entitled to nothing, either in this or any other case.

H. E. Colvin for respondents.

(1) Assuming that the relationship of attorney and client did exist between Leigh H. Irvine and C. W. Eoff, in May, 1887, the relation closed long before either of the quitclaim deeds was procured. While it is a well-known principle of law that, during the confidential relationship of attorney and client, the attorney cannot secure gifts or make purchases from the client, or in any way abuse the confidence thus imposed upon him, it is also true that the disability of an attorney continues only so long as the relation of attorney and client continues, and as much longer as the influence of the relation can be supposed to extend. 1 Perry on Trusts [3 Ed.] sec. 202; Bispham's Equity [3 Ed.] sec. 236. (2) The court's attention is called to the fact that the interest of B. D. Kribben to the property in question, supposed to be an undivided one-half interest, was conveyed directly to Louis C. Irvine. Louis C. Irvine was innocent of any fraud or collusion which appellant imputes to Leigh H. Irvine. Hence, upon appellant's own pleading and evidence, he would, at the most, be entitled only to a decree affecting an undivided one-half interest in the property (formerly owned by Aaron O. Askew) upon a proper accounting.

OPINION

Black, J.

The object of this suit in equity is to have the defendants declared the holders of the title to a lot in Kansas City in trust for the plaintiff, with a further prayer for general relief. The court found for the defendants, and the plaintiff Eoff appealed. The defendants, Leigh H. Irvine and Louis C. Irvine, are brothers, and the sons of the other defendants, Clark Irvine and Annie K. Irvine. All of the above-named parties resided at Kansas City at the time of the various transactions hereafter mentioned.

The pleadings and the undisputed evidence show that the plaintiff purchased the lot in 1886, his grantor having only a tax title. Some doubt arose as to the validity of his title, and his abstract of the title was placed in the hands of Leigh H. Irvine and Mr. Blair for examination. They were attorneys at law and partners doing business under the firm-name of Blair & Irvine. They received the abstract about the first of May, 1887. On June 1, 1887, Hefferman, who was a former half owner of the lot, conveyed his undivided one-half to one Kribben, who resided in the city of St. Louis. Kribben conveyed the same interest to Louis C. Irvine by a quitclaim deed, dated the fourteenth of September, 1887, for $ 100 paid by either Leigh H. Irvine or by Blair & Irvine. On the eighth of October, 1887, Leigh H. Irvine procured a quitclaim deed from Askew for the other undivided one-half for the consideration of $ 100; and, on the eighteenth of the same month, conveyed his interest by quitclaim deed to his brother, Louis C. Irvine; and, in August of that year, the latter conveyed the lot to his mother by a warranty deed.

The first disputed issue of fact is, whether the relation of attorney and client existed between Leigh H. Irvine and the plaintiff. It appears the plaintiff and a Mr. Stevens were neighbors, and in former years Stevens had been a practicing attorney; plaintiff gave Stevens the abstract of title and requested him to examine it, but Stevens being out of the practice advised plaintiff to employ Blair & Irvine. The plaintiff did not know these attorneys, and he requested Stevens to take it to them for examination. The evidence of Stevens is that he left the abstract at the office of the attorneys on a table, but he does not know whether either of them was present. This was probably about the first of May, 1887. In a short time plaintiff received a note from Irvine asking whether he would pay $ 1,000 for a quitclaim deed, with the request to call. He says he called at the office of these attorneys, and Irvine then pointed out the defects in the title and advised him to procure a deed from the owners. Irvine said he thought he could get the deed. There was a like conversation on the streets. He says the price asked for a quitclaim deed was more than he had paid for the property; that after thinking over the matter he concluded Irvine was not acting in his interest, and that he directed Stevens to get the abstract, and that Stevens got it and delivered it to him. This was ten days or two weeks after the abstract had been left at the office of the attorneys. They did not inform the plaintiff from whom they expected to get the proposed deed. The plaintiff paid the attorneys nothing for their services, and they made no demand of him for compensation.

The evidence of Mr. Stevens, in its general tenor, leaves it in doubt as to whether he employed Blair & Irvine to examine the abstract; but he produces this doubt by the erroneous assumption on his part that it required a payment of money by plaintiff to the attorneys to create the relation of attorney and client. He was on friendly terms with Blair & Irvine, and his remembrance is defective as to what he did in the execution of his agency. The proof is clear that plaintiff directed Stevens to employ these attorneys, that Stevens left the abstract at their office, and that Irvine thereafter sent the plaintiff the note before mentioned, and advised the plaintiff to get a quitclaim deed from the owner. Irvine proposed to get it for him. This evidence as a whole shows beyond doubt that Stevens did employ these attorneys, and that they examined the abstract pursuant to that employment. The relation of attorney and client did, therefore, exist between Blair and Leigh H. Irvine on the one hand and the plaintiff on the other.

An attorney who has been consulted about a title to land will not be permitted to...