Epdee Corp. v. Richmond
| Decision Date | 31 October 1947 |
| Citation | 75 N.E.2d 238,321 Mass. 673 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE EPDEE CORPORATION v. SAMUEL RICHMOND & another. |
September 22, 1947.
Present: QUA, C.
J., LUMMUS, DOLAN RONAN, & WILKINS, JJ.
Frauds, Statute of. Contract, For sale of real estate. Equity Jurisdiction Specific performance. Equity Pleading and Practice, Decree.
A memorandum which correctly stated all the terms of an oral contract for sale of real estate was not insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 259, Section 1, Fourth, by reason of the omission from the memorandum of provision for certain details often provided for in such contracts but not provided for in the oral contract in question.
An oral contract for sale of real estate, sufficiently evidenced by a memorandum signed by the prospective seller, was enforceable specifically in a suit in equity by the prospective purchaser where the contract correctly identified the parties and the real estate and fixed the price, although it did not make provision for the type of deed to be given, whether warranty or quitclaim, or for apportionment of taxes, water rates insurance premiums and the like, or with respect to restrictions, easements, possible leases or the prospective purchaser's assuming an existing mortgage.
It was not necessary to include, in a final decree to be entered after rescript from this court granting a plaintiff in a suit in equity relief by ordering specific performance of a contract for sale of real estate, a provision for continued occupancy of the premises by the defendant to conform to a provision of the contract that, if the defendant could not find other quarters, he should be allowed to occupy the premises at a rental "for a reasonable length of time," where it appeared that, by the time of entry of the decree after rescript, the defendant would have remained in possession of the premises for at least fourteen months after the date fixed in the contract for conveyance.
It was improper to include, in a final decree for the plaintiff in a suit in equity for specific performance of a contract for sale of real estate, a requirement that conveyance should be made by a warranty deed where the contract made no provision as to the kind of deed to be given.
BILL IN EQUITY, filed in the Superior Court on December 19, 1946. The case was heard by O'Brien, J.
In this court the case was submitted on briefs. Nicholas Fusaro, Nunziato Fusaro, & J. Y. Young, for the defendants.
J. W. Ceaty & L.
Seder, for the plaintiff.
The defendants appeal from a final decree granting to the plaintiff specific performance of an oral contract to convey to the plaintiff land and buildings on Einhorn Road in Worcester, including an oil burner and kitchen range. The evidence is reported.
On January 9, 1946 the defendants signed and delivered to an agent of the plaintiff a memorandum in writing wherein they stated that they agreed to sell to the plaintiff "the premises at 28 Einhorn Road including oil burner and kitchen range for $12,500 under the following conditions . . .." The conditions stated were, in substance, that the plaintiff should have title and possession by September 1, 1946; that if the defendants could not find other quarters, they be allowed to occupy the first floor at $50 a month rent "for a reasonable length of time"; and that if a commission should be "charged" the deal would be "off."
At the hearing in the Superior Court the defendants' principal contention seems to have been that by the true terms of the oral agreement the plaintiff was to assume a mortgage of $6,000 already on the property and to pay $12,500 in addition. This would make the total purchase price $18,500. The trial judge on ample evidence found against this contention. He also justifiably found that the plaintiff was able, willing, and ready to perform its obligation under the contract, but was prevented from doing so by the defendants' refusal to perform, and that no commission has been "charged" and no one intends to charge any.
The defendants' principal contention before us is that the memorandum is insufficient to satisfy the...
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