Ephraim v. State
Decision Date | 26 March 1993 |
Docket Number | CR-91-592 |
Citation | 627 So.2d 1102 |
Parties | Sylvester EPHRAIM v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Oliver Loewy and Hillary Hochman, Montgomery, for appellant.
James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Sandra Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Sylvester Ephraim, was convicted of murder made capital because the murders occurred during the course of a robbery. § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975. The jury, by a vote of 11 to 1, recommended that the appellant be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced the appellant to death by electrocution.
The state's evidence tended to show that the bodies of Napoleon and Lena Bell Goodson were discovered in their house on June 11, 1990. Mr. Goodson died as a result of a shotgun wound to his leg. Mrs. Goodson was shot in the right side of the neck with a .22 caliber rifle and died as a result of the injury.
The appellant initially argues that his constitutional rights were violated by the court's refusal to allow him to testify in his own behalf at the guilt phase of the proceedings. The record reflects that prior to the presentation of the defense's case, the court asked the appellant whether he wished to take the stand and to testify in his own behalf. At this time the appellant stated that he did not wish to testify. The defense then called one witness and rested its case. It appears from the record that the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor were present at a charge conference when the trial court was notified that the appellant had changed his mind and wished to testify. He told the court that he wanted to tell his side of the story. At this time, closing arguments of counsel had not been made and nothing had occurred in the presence of the jury after the defense rested its case. The court refused to allow the appellant to testify, stating that the appellant had had his chance to testify, that he had waived that right and that the court was not now going to allow the appellant to disrupt the proceedings.
The right of an accused to testify in his own behalf is firmly rooted in our legal system. The Alabama Constitution of 1901, Art. I, § 6, grants to an accused the following rights, among others:
"That in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, or either; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; and to have a copy thereof; to be confronted by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; to testify in all cases, in his own behalf, if he elects so to do ...."
(Emphasis added.)
The right to testify is derived from Amendments V and VI of the United States Constitution. "The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). (Emphasis added.) The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that an accused has a right to testify. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). 1"At common law the defendant in a criminal case was not a competent witness in his own behalf.
Turner v. State, 238 Ala. 352, 191 So. 396, 397-98 (1939). An accused's right to testify in his own behalf has evolved full circle from the common law days.
As early as 1896, the Supreme Court of Alabama had two occasions to interpret the phase in the Alabama Constitution, "the right to be heard." The Court stated:
Peagler v. State, 110 Ala. 11, 20 So. 363, 364 (1896). (Emphasis added.) The Alabama Supreme Court has further stated:
Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. 1, 21 So. 214, 220 (1896). " 'The term "right to be heard by himself" is to be construed in its broadest sense in favor of an accused.' " Woods v. State, 38 Ala.App. 581, 90 So.2d 91, 92 (1956). See also Carter v. State, 424 So.2d 1336, 1340 (Ala.Cr.App.1982). Marjorie L. Rifkin, The Criminal Defendant's Right to Testify: The Right to Be Seen but Not Heard, 21 Colum.Hum.Rts.L.Rev. 253 (1989-90).
The following occurred when the appellant made known to the court that he had changed his mind and that he wished to testify in his own behalf:
The appellant argues in his brief that he wanted to testify because, he says, he was the only one who could tell the jury his version of the facts and his state of mind at the time of the killings. The state argues that it was within the discretion of the trial court whether to reopen the case. Rule 19.1, A.R.Crim.P. We realize that the trial court has discretion in scheduling and in determining courtroom procedure; however, when the exercise of that discretion results in the denial of a basic constitutional right, we must find that that discretion has been abused. Here, the appellant faced the ultimate penalty--death. The appellant in this case was denied the most basic of constitutional rights, the right to be heard and to present his own defense. Ala. Const. of 1901, Art. I, § 6.
In situations where closing arguments had been made before the defendant reasserted his right to testify, a court's reluctance to reopen the case would perhaps be more excusable. We do not have that situation here. In this case nothing had been presented to the jury when the appellant asked to take the stand. No closing arguments had been made and the only action that had been taken was a charge conference, which occurred off the record and outside the presence of the jury. We are compelled to reverse the trial court's judgment. The appellant was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. Though we conclude that the court's judgment is due to be reversed in this issue, we have chosen to address other issues that may be raised in subsequent proceedings.
The appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the following statement by the appellant's co-defendant, Nathaniel Gilder, to be received into evidence at the appellant's trial. The following occurred during the questioning of Officer Howard Rogers of the Prattville Police Department:
We agree with the appellant that this statement should not have been received into evidence. The statement was hearsay; clearly, it was a statement not made in the presence of the court that was offered "to prove the truth of the matter stated" therein. C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 242.01(1) ( 4th ed. 1991).
The state contends that even though this statement is...
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