Epperson v. Gen. Motors
| Docket Number | 3:23-cv-01554-W-AHG |
| Decision Date | 28 November 2023 |
| Parties | JAMES EPPERSON Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, a limited liability company; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO REMAND [DOCS. 10 AND 11]
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff James Epperson's motion ([Docs. 10 and 11[1] “Motion”) to remand this case to the San Diego Superior Court. Defendant opposes ([Doc. 15] “Opposition”). Plaintiff has failed to reply.
The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES the Motion.
This case arises from Plaintiff James Epperson's alleged purchase[2] of a 2020 Chevrolet Bolt (the “Vehicle”) from one of General Motors, LLC's (“Defendant”) “authorized dealer[‘s]” for an unspecified amount. (Complaint at ¶ 7-9.[3]) According to Plaintiff, the vehicle was covered by: (1) an express warranty, under which Defendant promised that the Vehicle “would be free from defects in materials, nonconformities, or workmanship during the applicable warranty period and to the extent the [Vehicle] had defects, [Defendant] would repair the defects”; as well as (2) an implied warranty that the “[Vehicle] would be of the same quality as similar vehicles . . . [and] would be fit for the ordinary purposes for which similar vehicles are used.” (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11.) The Complaint alleges, however, that during the warranty period, the Vehicle “exhibited defects” and that when Plaintiff notified Defendant of such “defects” and “attempted to invoke the applicable warranties,” Defendant “represented to PLAINTIFF that they could and would make the [Vehicle] conform to the applicable warranties ....” (Id. ¶ 13-14.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “issued a recall notice for the [Vehicle]” warning Plaintiff not to charge the Vehicle's battery above “90%”; not to let the battery's mileage “fall below seventy (70) miles remaining”; and not to “park[] [the Vehicle] indoors overnight” because the Vehicle's battery “may ignite.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) Yet Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has since failed to “make the [Vehicle] conform to the applicable warranties.” (Id. at ¶ 15.)
On July 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in the San Diego Superior Court, entitled James Epperson v. General Motors LLC, et al., No.37-2023-00031140-CU-BC-CT. The Complaint asserts three causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 1790, et seq.) (the “Song-Beverly Act”); one cause of action alleging fraud; and another alleging violations of the California Business & Professions Code § 17200. (Complaint at ¶¶ 35-120.) Plaintiff seeks, among other things, general, special, and actual damages; rescission of the purchase contract and restitution of all monies expended; compensatory damages for the diminution in value of the Vehicle; a civil penalty of two times Plaintiff's actual, incidental, and consequential damages; consequential and incidental damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs, and prejudgment interest at the legal rate. (Id. Prayer ¶¶ a-j.)
On August 23, 2023, Defendant removed the case to this Court based on diversity jurisdiction. (Notice of Removal [Doc. 1].) Plaintiff now moves to remand, arguing that Defendant has not met its burden of overcoming the presumption against removal. (Motion for Remand [Doc. 11] 6:19-26.) While Plaintiff does not actually contest any of Defendant's allegations regarding the existence of diversity jurisdiction, Plaintiff contends that Defendant must presently prove the existence of diversity jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence and complains that Defendant has not yet produced such evidence. (Motion for Remand at 7:16-11:2.) Defendant responds that it is not required to prove the existence of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at this stage. (Opposition [Doc. 15] at 1:12-25.) Plaintiff has not filed a reply.
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between- (1) citizens of different States ....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by Constitution or a statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Id. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id.
In this vein, Plaintiff's Motion argues that Defendant has the “burden to prove, by preponderance of the evidence, that removal is proper.” (Motion for Remand at 7:5-8.) However, for purposes of the amount in controversy requirement, “the notice of removal must include only ‘a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.'” Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 756 Fed.Appx. 699, 700 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014)); Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (). Courts only move to Plaintiff's desired preponderance of the evidence standard “after ‘the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's allegation' and ‘both sides submit proof.'” Schneider, 756 Fed.Appx. at 700. The same is true for the diversity of citizenship requirement. Acad. of Country Music v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 991 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2021) ().
Here, Defendant's Notice of Removal plainly alleges that the diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy requirements are met and does so in detail. (Notice of Removal at 3-5; see infra Section III.) Specifically, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a citizen of California while Defendant is a citizen of Michigan and Detroit. (Complaint at ¶ 1; Notice of Removal at ¶ 12-14.) The Complaint also alleges that the amount in controversy in this case is: (1) approximately $14,466.70[4] in actual damages; plus (2) roughly $50,000 in potential attorney's fees; along with (3) a civil penalty up to twice the amount of actual damages (~$28,933.40). (Notice of Removal at ¶¶ 17-19; see infra Section III.) Thus, Defendant has plausibly alleged that both the diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy requirements are met.
From there, Plaintiff could require Defendant prove these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence if he actually contested any of these allegations in his Motion. However, Plaintiff's Motion does not actually contest any of Defendant's allegations. Instead, the Motion simply asserts that Defendant has the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a “preponderance of the evidence” without ever identifying which of Defendant's allegations Plaintiff contests. (See Motion for Remand at 9:22-24; see generally Notice of Removal at 9:20-22.) If Plaintiff cannot or will not identify which of Defendant's diversity of citizenship or amount in controversy allegations he contests, the preponderance of the evidence standard is not triggered.
Regardless, even if Plaintiff had identified allegations in the Notice of Removal that he contests, or if the Court questioned such allegations, Defendant has also satisfied the more stringent preponderance of the evidence standard by attaching a declaration to the Notice of Removal containing evidence supporting its contention that the parties are diverse and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (See Notice of Removal at Exs. A-C; infra Section III.) Plaintiff, meanwhile, failed to present the Court with any contradictory evidence.
As outlined above, the Court will not require Defendant to prove its allegations of diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence (although Defendant has also satisfied that burden). From here, the Court turns to evaluating whether Defendant has met its burden of plausibly alleging that the parties are diverse and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00.
To establish citizenship for diversity purposes, a natural born person must be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled in a particular state. Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983). Persons are domiciled in the place they reside with the intent to remain or to which they intend to return. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). A corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). LLCs are citizens of the states in which its members are citizens. See Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (...
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