Epping v. City of Columbus
| Decision Date | 12 March 1903 |
| Citation | 43 S.E. 803,117 Ga. 263 |
| Parties | EPPING v. CITY OF COLUMBUS et al. ROFF v. MAYOR, ETC., OF TOWN OF CALHOUN et al. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. In interpreting the provisions of a constitution, it is to be presumed that the words therein used were employed in their natural and ordinary meaning; and, where a word has a technical as well as a popular meaning, the courts will generally accord to it its popular signification, unless the nature of the subject indicates or the context suggests that it is used in a technical sense.
2. Constitutions are the result of popular will, and their words are to be understood ordinarily in the sense they convey to the popular mind.
3. The presumption is that the same meaning attaches to a given word or phrase wherever it occurs in a constitution; and, where a word or phrase is used in one part of a constitution in a plain and manifest sense, it is to receive the same interpretation when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears from the context or otherwise that a different meaning should be applied to it.
4. The proceedings and debates of a constitutional convention, while powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution, are nevertheless valuable aids in determining the purpose and consequent meaning of a doubtful provision.
5. The debt of an individual, corporation, state, etc., when the word is taken in the sense that it ordinarily conveys to the popular mind, is the principal and accrued interest on a given date. Unearned interest is not, in such a sense, a part of the debt.
6. The debt of a municipal corporation, within the meaning of that provision of the Constitution which prohibits such a corporation from incurring a debt which exceeds 7 per centum of the assessed valuation of all the taxable property within the municipality, is to be ascertained by adding to the principal of all outstanding indebtedness the amount of all accrued interest that may be past due and payable on the day the amount of the debt is to be fixed. In ascertaining the amount of such debt, future interest which is not due on the day it becomes necessary to fix the sum of indebtedness is not to be counted. Unearned interest is not, within the true intent and meaning of the Constitution, a part of the debt of the municipality.
7. A long-continued and unquestioned interpretation of a paragraph of the constitution by the General Assembly or the Executive or the officers whose duty it is to obey and carry into effect the provisions of the paragraph, is a weighty argument in favor of such interpretation, especially where any language of the paragraph is equivocal, doubtful, or ambiguous.
8. The ruling made in the present case does not conflict with that made by the majority of the court in Park v Candler, 40 S.E. 523, 114 Ga. 466, nor with the views entertained by the dissenting justices in that case. The question there involved was whether the public property fund could lawfully be appropriated to the payment of accrued interest, when at the time of such payment no part of the principal of the public debt was extinguished; the majority of the court holding that accrued interest could be discharged in this manner, without reference to whether any part of the principal was paid off at the same time, while the minority were of opinion that the public property fund could not be used for the payment of accrued interest, except as a mere incident to the retirement of a part of the principal.
9. The Dawson Waterworks Case, 32 S.E. 907, 106 Ga. 696, did not involve the question as to whether interest, either accrued or unearned, was a part of the debt of the municipal corporation, within the meaning of the provision of the Constitution above referred to. The contract sought to be enforced in that case related to a principal liability payable in annual installments; and this was held to be a debt, within the meaning of the Constitution.
10. If a final judgment of a court from which a writ of error lies is, from a defect appearing on the face of the record erroneous, this defect may be taken advantage of in a direct bill of exceptions containing a specific assignment of error setting forth the defect, even though no such objection was raised in the court below prior to the rendition of the judgment.
11. A provision by a municipal corporation for the assessment and collection of an annual tax sufficient in amount to pay the principal and interest of a bonded debt within the time prescribed by the Constitution is a sufficient compliance with the Constitution, although the ordinance making the provision provides that the interest and a portion of the principal may be from year to year paid from other sources, if funds from such sources are available at the time the interest and principal are due.
12. The Constitution does not require that provision shall be made by a municipal corporation desiring to incur a debt for the payment of such debt until "at or before" the liability is created. It is not necessary that the provision for payment should be made before the application to validate. If on the hearing of such an application nothing appears to the contrary, the presumption is that provision will be made at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. If, however, it does distinctly appear that the municipal corporation does not intend to make such provision, a judgment of validation should not be entered. In the case of Wilkins v. Waynesboro, 42 S.E. 767, 116 Ga. 359, it distinctly appeared that the city authorities did not, in any event, intend to make provision for the payment of the debt in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.
13.
When the charter of a town provides that the books for registration of voters for an election shall be closed 10 days before the election, and the ordinance, following the charter, makes the same provision, a published notice of an election which is capable of a construction that the books will be closed earlier than 10 days will not have the effect of invalidating an election held in pursuance thereto, when it does not appear that the books were in fact illegally closed, and that persons qualified to vote were for this reason prevented from registering.
14. When the charter of a town authorizes the town authorities "to provide for the registration of voters," and "to make all needful laws and regulations for the same," an ordinance providing that two members of the town council shall be registrars, whose duty it shall be to ascertain who are the qualified voters of the town and entitled to register, and that, in case of disagreement between such registrars in reference to whether any person offering to register is a qualified voter, they may call in a citizen of the town to act as umpire, whose decision shall be final, is a reasonable regulation, and one authorized by the provisions of the charter.
15. When, in an application for the validation of an issue of bonds, a citizen appears and is made a party to the proceeding, and interposes objections to the validation, based upon facts which do not appear in the pleadings of the parties, it is incumbent upon him to establish by proof the truth of the facts thus set up, and unless this is done the objections should be overruled.
16. A ground of objection to the validation of an issue of bonds that a specified number of voters, who had voted in favor of the issuance of bonds, were not qualified voters, is properly stricken on demurrer when it does not appear that, with this number eliminated, two-thirds of the qualified voters had not voted in favor of the issuance.
17. An election held to determine the question whether a town will incur an indebtedness will not be invalidated by reason of the fact that voters were improperly influenced to cast their votes in favor of incurring the debt--certainly not when it does not appear that any voter was actually coerced to cast a vote contrary to his wishes.
18. The fact that the authorities of a municipal corporation have entered into a contract to sell bonds, which it is seeking to have validated, at a sum which is less than the bonds are really worth, is no reason for refusing to enter a judgment validating the issue of bonds.
Error from Superior Court, Gordon County; Geo. F. Gober, Judge.
Error from Superior Court, Muscogee County; W. B. Butt, Judge.
Actions by the city of Columbus and others against H. H. Epping, and by the mayor and aldermen of Calhoun and others against Aaron Roff. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Affirmed.
Harkins & Lang, R. J. & J. McCamy, L. F. Garrard, Little & Battle, Salem Dutcher, and Chas. J. Swift, for plaintiffs in error.
W. R. Rankin, Sam. P. Maddox, Sol. Gen., S. P. Gilbert, Sol. Gen., T. T. Miller, Saml. H. Myers, J. L. Mayson, W. P. Hill, and W. W. Lambdin, for defendants in error.
1-7. Each of these cases involves questions arising upon an application to validate an issue of bonds by a municipal corporation. In the first case, which will be hereafter referred to as the "Columbus Case," the city of Columbus seeks to have validated an issue of bonds for $250,000 principal; the proceeds to be used for the purpose of erecting a system of waterworks. In the second case, which will be hereafter called the "Calhoun Case," the town of Calhoun seeks to have validated an issue of bonds for $5,000; the proceeds to be used for the purpose of erecting and equipping a school-house. There is one question which is common to both cases, and that will be first disposed of.
The Constitution declares:
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