Eppright v. Kauffman

• Citation: 90 Mo. 25
• Parties: EPPRIGHT v. KAUFFMAN, Adm'r, etc.
• Decision Date: 15 November 1886
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

90 Mo. 25

EPPRIGHT

v.KAUFFMAN, Adm'r, etc.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

November 15, 1886.

Appeal from Johnson circuit court.

John C. Cockrell and W. H. Brinker, for respondent, Eppright. Comings & Slover, for appellant, Kauffman, Adm'r, etc.

SHERWOOD, J.

Defendant is the administrator of the estate of Joseph Brown, deceased, formerly assignee of the Warrensburg Savings Bank. In March, 1880, plaintiff, a creditor of said bank, presented his claim to the assignee, and it was by him duly allowed. In June, 1880, after his claim had been allowed, plaintiff recovered a judgment in said circuit court against said bank, and afterwards attempted, by motions for executions, to subject unpaid stock subscriptions to the satisfaction of his judgment. In March, 1881, defendant, as such assignee, duly declared a dividend of 25 per cent. on all claims, and duly gave notice thereof. Sometime afterwards plaintiff demanded his dividend, which defendant refused to pay. Upon this refusal plaintiff, having previously given notice, filed his motion for a 5 per cent. per month penalty, under section 387, Rev. St. 1879. The court below sustained this motion. The defendant appealed, and, having died, the suit is revived against his administrator.

The only question in the record is whether the plaintiff was entitled to a dividend. Section 376, Rev. St. 1879, provides and declares that “the decision of the assignee in relation to all claims presented to him for allowance shall be final, unless a creditor of some other person interested shall, after a decision is made on any such claim, ask an appeal therefrom; and all appeals so asked shall be allowed by the assignee to the circuit court” etc. Section 377 makes provision, in general, that such “appeals shall be taken, certified, and proceeded with in the same manner as appeals from judgments of justices of the peace.” Section 378 provides that when the cause goes to the circuit court that such court “shall become possessed of the case, and shall proceed to hear and determine the same in the same manner as if such case were in said court by appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace,” etc. And section 379 provides that “all judgments rendered in favor of any claimant in the circuit court, by virtue of the provisions of this chapter, shall be certified by the clerk to the assignee, who shall allow the same, and class it as if such judgment had been rendered by him on the original hearing thereof.”

These statutory provisions are too plain to require extended comment. When the assignee passes on a claim, and allows it, the question involved therein becomes res judicata, and the decision of the assignee becomes final. In a word, a judgment has all the force, effect, and conclusive attributes of any other judgment. If the statute is not meaningless, then its provisions bring the allowed claim of the plaintiff fully within the definition of a “judgment” given by Mr. Freeman. He says: “A 'judgment' * * * is defined as being the decision or sentence of the law, pronounced by a court or other competent tribunal, upon the matter contained in record.” “Every definitive sentence or decision by which the merits of a cause are determined, although it be not technically a judgment, and although the proceedings are not capable of being technically enrolled so as to constitute what is technically called a record, is a judgment within the meaning of the law.” “A large number of persons and tribunals not ordinarily spoken of as 'judges,' nor as 'courts,' are nevertheless authorized to investigate and determine certain questions. Their authority in this respect is judicial, and their determinations are conclusive, unless set aside by some competent authority.” Freem. Judgm. §§ 2, 16, 531.

The adjudication of the assignee was on the question whether the plaintiff was entitled to participate in the benefits of the assignment, and that adjudication was in affirmation of plaintiff's right. This adjudication was a judgment in rem, definitely fixing the status of plaintiff towards the property assigned. Freem. Judgm. § 606. This being the case, the right of the plaintiff to prevail on his motion made against the assignee, under the provisions of section 387, is incontestable, unless upon the ground to be now stated. It is urged for the defendant that plaintiff should not be permitted to recover, for that after his claim was allowed...