Equal Emp. Op. Com'n v. Christiansburg Garment Co., Inc.
Decision Date | 07 May 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 74-18. |
Citation | 376 F. Supp. 1067 |
Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTIANSBURG GARMENT COMPANY, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia |
William A. Carey, Gen. Counsel, William A. Robinson, Associate Gen. Counsel, E.E.O.C., Washington, D. C., Arneda J. Hazell, Asst. Regional Atty., Delores Wilson, Regional Attorney, Frank J. Tuk, Acting Associate Regional Atty., E.E. O.C., Philadelphia Regional Litigation Center, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Woods, Rogers, Muse, Walker & Thornton, Roanoke, Va., Weinstein, Sturges, Odom, Bigger & Jonas, Charlotte, N. C., for defendant.
This is a suit filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter referred to as EEOC or plaintiff) against Christiansburg Garment Company (hereinafter defendant) alleging that defendant has engaged and continues to engage in discriminatory employment practices against black employees in violation of § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Public Law 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (March 24, 1972). Jurisdiction is pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1345. The case is now before the court on the defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
The chronology of facts material to the resolution of the three grounds for summary judgment asserted by defendant are as follows:
Although the court is of the opinion that defendant is entitled to summary judgment with respect to one of the three grounds asserted, thus making unnecessary resolution of the other two, at the request of both parties for purposes of appellate review, the court has agreed to decide all three issues.
The defendant first contends that under § 706(f)(I) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(I), plaintiff is precluded from filing suit more than 180 days after the date the charge was filed or the date the 1972 amendments to the act became effective (March 24, 1972). This section provides in relevant part:
"If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge * * * If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section is dismissed by the Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge or the expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section * * * or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission * * * shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved. * * *"
The precise issue as to the meaning of the 180 day limitation period in the above statute has been decided by several district courts and has produced a clear split in authority. The following decisions have held that the 180 day period does not have the effect of a statute of limitations on the right of the EEOC to bring suit: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 371 F.Supp. 848 (S.D.1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. U. S. Industries, Inc., No. 73-283 (W.D.Tenn. Jan. 2, 1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. 817 (D.Iowa 1973); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Duff Brothers, Inc., 364 F.Supp. 405 (E.D.Tenn.1973); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bartenders International Union, Local No. 41, 369 F.Supp. 827 (N.D.Cal.1973); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mobil Oil Corporation, 362 F.Supp. 786 (W.D.Mo.1973).
On the other hand, the following decisions hold that the EEOC is barred from bringing suit 180 days after a charge is filed: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Griffin Wheel Co., No. 73-4295 (N.D.Ala. Feb. 5, 1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 368 F.Supp. 633 (N.D.Ala. 1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Union Oil Co. of California, 369 F.Supp. 579 (N.D.Ala.1974); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cleveland Mills, 364 F.Supp. 1235 (W.D.N.C.1973).
Although as noted in the Union Oil Company case, supra, persuasive arguments can be made in favor of either construction of the statute, upon consideration of the above cases this court finds itself in agreement with the line of authorities holding that the 180 day period was not intended as a time bar on the power of the EEOC to bring suit. Particularly persuasive is the discussion of the statute by Judge Peckam in Bartenders International Union, supra. As noted in that case, if the statute is construed as imposing a 180 day time limit on the EEOC's power to bring suit, beginning with the filing of a charge by an aggrieved party, numerous charges pending before the EEOC on March 24, 1972 (when the EEOC's power to bring suit became effective) could not be litigated. This in turn would render § 14 of the 1972 amendments virtually nugatory since this section provides that the EEOC's new powers would apply "with respect to charges pending with the Commission on the date of enactment of this Act. . . ." Pub.L.No.92-261, § 14 (March 24, 1972). Defendant apparently recognizes this inconsistency and seeks to overcome it by arguing that the 180 day period may begin to run either from the date the charges were filed or March 24, 1972. If the 180 days referred to in § 706(f)(1) were clearly intended to be a time limitation on the EEOC's new power to bring suit, the court would have to accept defendant's position in an attempt to harmonize § 14 with § 706(f)(1). But the very fact that these sections would have to be harmonized in this manner raises doubts as to whether the 180 period was meant as a time bar on the EEOC's power to sue.
These doubts are reinforced from a consideration of legislative history. The Section-By-Section Analysis of H.R.1746 as agreed to by the Conference Committee of the Senate and House and subsequently adopted by both houses states with respect to § 706(f)(1):
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 92d Cong.2d Sess. 1844, 1847 (1972) (hereinafter Legislative History).
But at the time Congress was anticipating that the EEOC would play a primary role in judicially enforcing the Act, it was aware of the lengthy delays involved in processing charges. Thus the House Report accompanying the 1972 amendments, in discussing the need to retain the private right of action, stated:
H.R.Rep.No.92-238, 92d Cong.2d Sess. 12, 1972; U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News p. 2147.
The court thus finds it especially difficult to accept defendant's somewhat tortured construction of § 706(f)(1) in light of this history. As stated in Bartenders International Union, supra:
"Mindful of two and three year delays, this court cannot accept defendant's contention that when Congress gave the Commission the...
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