Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Methodist Hosps. of Dall., CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15–CV–3104–G
| Citation | 218 F.Supp.3d 495 |
| Decision Date | 04 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15–CV–3104–G |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. METHODIST HOSPITALS OF DALLAS d/b/a Methodist Health System, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Robert A. Canino, Jr., Devika Rani Seth, Toby W. Costas, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.
Simon D. Whiting, Nicole L. Tong, Burford & Ryburn, L.L.P., Dallas, TX, for Defendant.
Before the court is the defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket entry 27). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is granted.
The plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("the EEOC"), commenced this action on September 24, 2015, against the defendant, Methodist Hospitals of Dallas ("Methodist"). The EEOC's Complaint Against Methodist Health System and Methodist Charlton Medical Center (docket entry 1). On October 16, 2015, the EEOC amended its complaint. EEOC's Amended Complaint with Jury Demand ("Amended Complaint") (docket entry 11).
In its amended complaint, the EEOC contends that former Methodist employee Adrianna Cook ("Cook") filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that Methodist violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Amended Complaint ¶ 7; Methodist's Appendix in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Methodist App.") at 12 (docket entry 29). The EEOC subsequently determined that Methodist violated the ADA. Amended Complaint ¶ 8; Methodist App. at 12. The EEOC then commenced this action after Methodist failed to informally remedy its purported discriminatory practices. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 8–12; Methodist App. at 12.
On July 29, 2016, Methodist filed this motion for summary judgment. Methodist's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry 27). The motion is now ripe for decision.
Methodist hired Cook as a patient care technician ("PCT") in December 2008.1 See The EEOC's Appendix in Support of Its Response to Methodist's Motion for Summary Judgment ("EEOC App.") at 4 (docket entry 32). On March 7, 2012, Cook injured her back while working as a PCT. EEOC App. at 109; Methodist App. at 42. She was diagnosed with an annular tear and degenerative disk condition. Amended Complaint ¶ 13; Methodist App. at 12.
For the month following her injury, Cook obtained various medical restrictions—some restricting work entirely and some permitting light work. See Methodist App. at 58–63. To accommodate Cook's "light duty" restrictions, Methodist placed Cook in the pharmacy. Methodist App. at 44; EEOC App. at 110. Finally, on April 13, 2012, Cook's doctor released her to return as a PCT. Methodist App. at 64–65. After working only 4.5 hours, April 14, 2012, was Cook's last day as a PCT. Id. at 29–30.
Cook approached her supervisor, Cherie James ("James"), in April 2012 requesting reassignment to accommodate her back injury. EEOC App. at 115–118, 190–195. The EEOC contends that Methodist's sole accommodation was directing Cook to the jobs database. See The EEOC's Brief in Response to Methodist's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Response") at 4 (docket entry 31); EEOC App. at 1, 145–146. Methodist maintains that it accommodated Cook by placing her on light duty in March and April of 2012. Methodist's Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgement ("Motion") at 3 (docket entry 28); Methodist App. at 56. Moreover, Cook was put on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") from April to July 2012. See Motion at 3; Methodist App. at 88–92.
Cook applied for eight jobs, including the scheduling coordinator position, between March 29 and July 2, 2012.2 See EEOC App. at 1–2; Methodist App. at 13. Cook testified that she did not need any accommodation to be a scheduling coordinator. EEOC App. at 2. However, as of July 2, 2012, Cook had not provided Methodist with a release stating that she could return to work. Motion at 10. Thus, Cook was not appointed to the position. Response at 5; EEOC App. at 2, 9.
Methodist contends that it continued to accommodate Cook by offering her, in an August 7, 2012 letter, an additional six months of unpaid personal leave of absence if she was still unable to work. Methodist App. at 93; EEOC App. at 15. The letter also urged Cook to contact Methodist's Human Resources officer Josie Hernandez to discuss her employment. Methodist App. at 93; EEOC App. at 15. Cook did not respond to the letter nor contact Hernandez. Methodist App. at 85–86.
When Cook failed to reply, Methodist terminated her employment on September 17, 2012. EEOC App. at 51; Methodist App. at 106. Cook appealed the decision on September 20, 2012. Methodist App. at 33. Methodist then gave Cook until October 22, 2012 to apply for personal leave. Id. However, Cook again failed to respond in any fashion. Id. at 85–86. As a result, Cook remained administratively terminated, effective as of August 21, 2012. See id.
The EEOC contends that Methodist failed to reasonably accommodate Cook by refusing to reassign her to the scheduling coordinator position in violation of Title I ADA. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 15–23; Methodist App. at 13–14.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, disclosure materials on file, and affidavits, if any, "show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a), (c)(1). A fact is material if the governing substantive law identifies it as having the potential to affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue as to a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. ; see also Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County , 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (). To demonstrate a genuine issue as to the material facts, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Company v. Zenith Radio Corporation , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party must show that the evidence is sufficient to support the resolution of the material factual issues in his favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Company , 391 U.S. 253, 288–89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ).
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company , 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). However, it is not incumbent upon the court to comb the record in search of evidence that creates a genuine issue as to a material fact. See Malacara v. Garber , 353 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2003). The nonmoving party has a duty to designate the evidence in the record that establishes the existence of genuine issues as to the material facts. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "When evidence exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court." Malacara , 353 F.3d at 405.
Before considering the merits of Methodist's motion for summary judgment, the court must address Methodist's objections to evidence cited in the EEOC's summary judgment response. The court will consider only the evidentiary objections specifically raised by Methodist. See Eguia v. Tompkins , 756 F.2d 1130, 1136 (5th Cir. 1985) ().
Methodist raises nine objections to various statements in Cook's affidavit. Methodist's Reply to the EEOC's Response to Its Motion for Summary Judgment ("Reply") at 1–4 (docket entry 33). However, "because the court did not find it necessary to rely on this evidence in support of its decision, these objections are overruled as moot." Detgen ex rel. Detgen v. Janek , 945 F.Supp.2d 746, 753 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (Fish, J.), aff'd , 752 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 2014).
Methodist objects to a letter from the social security administration. See EEOC App. at 43–46. Methodist contends that the letter has not been authenticated, is hearsay, and is not relevant. Reply at 4. The court sustains Methodist's objection. See FED. R. EVID . 902.
Methodist's objection to the EEOC's enforcement guidelines is overruled. Courts are permitted to give deference to the EEOC's guidelines. See Griggs v. Duke Power Company , 401 U.S. 424, 433–34, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971) (); Batterton v. Francis , 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977) ( ).
Methodist contends that the EEOC failed to provide change and signature pages for various depositions and should be excluded under FED. R. CIV. PROC . 32(a)(6). However, again, the court did not rely on these changes and overrules Methodist's objection as moot. See Detgen ex rel. Detgen , 945 F.Supp.2d at 753.
The EEOC has three specific ADA claims: (1) Methodist...
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