Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Faps, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 10-3095 (JAP)(DEA) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. FAPS, INC., Defendant. |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought this suit against FAPS, Inc. ("FAPS"), pursuant to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), to secure relief against allegedly discriminatory employment practices occurring at FAPS. Before the Court is the EEOC's motion for summary judgment on its ADA claim, arguing that there is no disputed issues of material fact on its claim that FAPS's pre-offer medical inquiry constitutes a per se violation of the ADA. The Court decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the EEOC's motion.
FAPS has revised the format of its employment application over the years. It is undisputed that, during the relevant time period, the following question was included in FAPS's pre-offer employment application:
DO YOU HAVE ANY IMPAIRMENT, PHYSICAL, MENTAL OR MEDICAL, WHICH WILL PREVENT YOU FROM SATISFACTORILY PERFORMING THE JOB WHICH YOU HAVE APPLYING [sic] ALLOWING FOR REASONABLE ACCOMODATION? YES ___ NO ___ IF YES PLEASE EXPLAIN __________.
See Declaration of Rosemary DiSavino ("DiSavino Decl.") ¶ 4. Gary LoBue, one of the two owners of FAPS, admits that it was his idea to place the pre-offer medial inquiry on FAPS's employment application, and that he "messed up" by doing so. See Deposition of Gary LoBue ("LoBue Dep.") 101:6-21. Julie Lynch, FAPS's sole Human Resources Administrator, has stated that the pre-offer medical inquiry used in FAPS's employment application was not a permissible question under federal and state law as it was worded. See Deposition of Julie Lynch ("Lynch Dep.") 106. According to Lynch, FAPS removed the medical inquiry from its application in early 2009 prior to the filing of this lawsuit; LoBue, however, thought it was removed when the EEOC actually filed the lawsuit. The EEOC has found two applications that include the medical inquiry in the summer of 2009, the latest of which is dated August 31, 2009.
FAPS has submitted evidence indicating that the medical inquiry was placed on the employment application so that FAPS would know where to place the applicant, because the employees engage in routine tasks that involve the operation of dangerous machinery and in tasks that involve the use of and being around noxious chemical. FAPS asserts that responses to the medical inquiry from an applicant have kept the employee from inhaling noxious chemicals. It also asserts that it has employed many applicants with identifiable medical conditions, and has never rejected an applicant because a "yes" was given to the question. It also asserts that it has placed employed persons with disabilities in the appropriate position based upon the applicant's response to the medical inquiry.
On October 18, 2007, the EEOC filed a Commissioner's Charge that alleged FAPS engaged in an on-going, pattern or practice of race and sex discrimination against African Americans and female applicants and employees from at least 2007 until 2007. By notice dated August 11, 2009, the EEOC issued a Determination relative to the Charge. As relevant here, the Determination states:
Arising out of the investigation, the Commission has found that Respondent, in its employment applications, asks applicants whether they have a disability. This is a clear violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
See Declaration of Avis Bishop-Thompson ("Bishop-Thompson Decl.") Ex. 2. The Determination thereafter "invited" FAPS to join with it in reaching a joint resolution through conciliation. During the conciliation process, FAPS has asserted that the EEOC was advised that FAPS removed the medical inquiry from its employment application, and that the EEOC never conciliated any claims related to the per se violation of the ADA claim during the course of conciliation. On December 1, 2009, the EEOC issued a Notice of Conciliation Failure, which states that the EEOC "has determined that its efforts to conciliate this charge filed under Title VII have been unsuccessful." DiSavino Decl. Ex. A.
On June 17, 2010, the EEOC filed this lawsuit, claiming that FAPS has violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by its alleged discrimination of African Americans in its hiring and recruiting practices and that it has committed a per se violation of the ADA by its medical inquiry contained within the pre-offer job application. The EEOC has now moved for summary judgment on this ADA claim.
A court shall grant summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party has the initial burden of establishing that that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may meet its burden by showing that the admissible evidence contained in the record would be insufficient to carry the nonmoving party's burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. If the moving party makes this showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to present evidence that a genuine fact issue compels a trial. Id. at 324. The non-moving party must then offer admissible evidence that establishes a genuine issue of material fact, id., not just "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "To be material, a fact must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case" under governing law. N.A.A.C.P v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011).
The Court must consider all facts and their logical inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Pollock v. American Tel. & Tel. Long Lines, 794 F.2d 860, 864 (3d Cir. 1986). The Court shall not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter," but need determine only whether a genuine issue necessitates a trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. For an issue to be genuine, "all that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." In re Lemington Home for Aged, 659 F.3d 282, 290 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986)). If the non-moving party fails to demonstrate proof beyond a "mere scintilla" of evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists, then the Court must grant summary judgment. Big Apple BMW v. BMW of North America, 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).IV. Discussion
As a threshold matter, Defendant FAPS argues that summary judgment should not be entered on the ADA claim because the EEOC failed to comply with Title VII's multistep enforcement procedure before it filed the present suit. On the merits, FAPS defends the use of the medical inquiry as being job-related and a business necessity, and alternatively argues that the EEOC has failed to establish that an injunction can properly be entered by the Court.
A. Compliance with Title VII Multistep Enforcement Procedures
Because FAPS argues that the EEOC has failed to satisfy its conciliation requirements, a mandatory prerequisite to filing suit, the Court addresses this issue first. Congress has charged the EEOC with the power to eliminate impermissible practices under the ADA and has provided the EEOC with the ability to seek injunctions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117; see also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 358-59 (1977) (). The ADA incorporates, by reference, Title VII's procedural requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117.
When a charge of discrimination is filed by a member of the EEOC, the EEOC must notice the employer of the charge, investigate the allegations, and make a determination as to whether there is "reasonable cause" to believe the allegations took place. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC "determines after such investigation that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id. The EEOC must give an employer a chance to conciliate as a prerequisite of filing suit. Id. In other words, "[o]nly after the EEOC is unable to obtain an acceptable conciliation agreement from the employer may the agency file suit in court." E.E.O.C. v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1101(6th Cir. 1984); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (); E.E.O.C. v. Agro Distrib., LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 2009) (); E.E.O.C. v. U.S. Steel Corp., CIV.A. 10-1284, 2013 WL 625315, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2013) () (quoting EEOC v. E. Hills Ford Sales, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 985, 987 (W.D.Pa.1978)).
Accordingly, the EEOC's "duty to attempt conciliation is one of its most essential functions." EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir.1979). It represents "the preferred means of achieving the objectives of Title VII." Agro Distribution, ...
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