Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. LHC Grp., Inc.
| Decision Date | 11 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–60703.,13–60703. |
| Citation | 30 A.D. Cases 1798,773 F.3d 688 |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff–Appellant v. LHC GROUP, INCORPORATED, doing business as Gulf Coast Homecare, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Paul D. Ramshaw, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, DC, C. Emanuel Smith, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Jon Randall Patterson, Esq., Zachary B. Busey, Jennifer Graham Hall, Esq., Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Jackson, MS, for Defendant–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Before BENAVIDES, PRADO and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff–Appellant the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought an enforcement action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on behalf of Kristy Sones against her employer, Defendant–Appellant LHC Group, Inc., (LHC). Sones worked as a nurse for the home-health company until she was fired shortly after she had an epileptic seizure in May 2009. The district court granted summary judgment for LHC. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
LHC hired Kristy Sones, a registered nurse, to work as a Field Nurse in Picayune, Mississippi in 2006. Field Nurses provide home health care to patients: Sones estimated that she spent “probably a couple hours” traveling to see six to eight patients every day.
In March of 2009, Jennifer Taggard, then-Branch Manager at LHC's Picayune facility and Sones's immediate supervisor, decided to promote Sones to a Team Leader position. The parties dispute whether Sones had been promoted or merely was being cross-trained at the time of her termination. Team Leaders manage patient care, schedule field nurses, fill in when nurses are absent, and communicate with patients' doctors and pharmacists.
On May 26, 2009, Sones had a grand mal seizure at work. An ambulance took her to a local hospital and she was released to return to work two days later by her treating physician.
Five days later, on June 1, Sones stopped by LHC's office to discuss her medical condition with Taggard and Thressa Guchereau, Director of Nursing for LHC's Picayune facility. Taggard and Guchereau gave Sones a copy of LHC's Team Leader job description and requested a release from Sones's neurologist. Dr. Michael Mitchell reviewed the description, marked it with “... no driving x 1 year, no working on ladder,” and released Sones for work. Sones discussed her limitations with Taggard and Guchereau, and the three established that Sones would get rides to work from her coworker and next-door neighbor.
When Sones returned to work the following week, she asked Taggard for “extra help” with the computer-related requirements of her job, including remembering her passwords and using the scheduling software. Sones's new antiseizure medications left her feeling “very tired” and struggling with memory. Sones testified that Taggard responded to her request for help by simply walking away. On Sunday, June 7, Sones worked a shift as a Field Nurse. With Guchereau's approval, Sones's mother drove Sones to several patient homes.
Testimony suggests that over the following week Sones continued to struggle with several of her duties as Team Leader. Taggard conducted weekly meetings with Sones to “give her some feedback and allow her to ask questions” regarding her Team Leader duties. The record contains conflicting evidence as to the degree of Sones's difficulties and whether Sones was aware of her shortcomings.
On Friday, June 19, Taggard and Guchereau met with Sones to discuss her performance. Management brought several problems to Sones's attention including her subpar computer skills, errors she made while working with patients in the field, and communication and scheduling problems. Taggard and Guchereau set a “target date” of July 31 for Sones to “master” these Team Leader duties. According to Sones's EEOC charge, that same Friday Taggard told Sones that “if [her] disability manifested again while [Sones] was on the job, [LHC] would be in trouble.”
The following Monday, Sones missed work without prior approval to take her child to a doctor's appointment. LHC also received a complaint from a patient who requested that Sones not be sent back to her home. LHC decided to terminate Sones.
On Wednesday, June 24, LHC's Human Resources Representative, Lolanda Brown, terminated Sones over the telephone. According to Sones's deposition testimony, Brown said nothing about Sones's performance problems or driving restriction but rather stated: “We're going [to] have to let you go, because you're a liability to our company.”
The EEOC filed an enforcement action under Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 –12213, in September 2011. The EEOC alleged that LHC failed to accommodate Sones and discriminated against her on the basis of her disability.
LHC moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the district court granted its motion. The district court concluded that the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge because it could not show that Sones was qualified to serve as a Field Nurse or a Team Leader. Next, it found that even if Sones had made a prima facie case of disability discrimination, LHC offered a legitimate reason for terminating Sones that the EEOC could not prove was pretextual. Finally, the district court concluded that, because Sones could not prove she was qualified for either position, the EEOC failed to make a prima facie case of failure to accommodate. This appeal follows.
This case is a public enforcement action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), and 1345. This Court has jurisdiction to review the district court's grant of summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing “all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d 431, 433 (5th Cir.2013). We apply the same standard as the district court in the first instance. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir.2007).
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the “ ‘evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir.2013) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ). “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party succeeds, the onus shifts to “the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” and “refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Turner, 476 F.3d at 343 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a “qualified individual with a disability on the basis of that disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
In a discriminatory-termination action under the ADA, the employee may either present direct evidence that she was discriminated against because of her disability or alternatively proceed under the burden-shifting analysis first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), a Title VII case. Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P'ship, 735 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir.2013). This analysis first requires the EEOC to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See E.E.O.C. v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir.2009). If the EEOC is successful, then LHC must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Sones. See id. Finally, the burden shifts back to the EEOC to show that LHC's proffered reason is pretextual. See id.
In the Rule 56 context, a prima facie case of discrimination plus a showing that the proffered reason is pretextual is typically enough to survive summary judgment. Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146–48, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ().
The parties to this action disagree over the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Their disagreement identifies a discrepancy in the Fifth Circuit's cases evaluating the requisite nexus between an employee's disability and her termination.1
Our case law consistently requires the claimant to prove (1) she has a disability and (2) she is qualified for the job she held. Compare Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir.1999), with Burch v. Coca–Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 320 (5th Cir.1997). The cases then splinter into three distinct lines regarding causal nexus. One line of cases requires the employee to prove “(3) that he was subject to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.” Zenor, 176 F.3d at 853 (...
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