Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Labor Solutions of AL LLC

• Decision Date: 17 March 2017
• Docket Number: Case No.: 4:16–CV–1848–VEH
• Citation: 242 F.Supp.3d 1267
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. LABOR SOLUTIONS OF AL LLC, f/k/a East Coast Labor Solutions, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

242 F.Supp.3d 1267

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,

v.LABOR SOLUTIONS OF AL LLC, f/k/a East Coast Labor Solutions, LLC, Defendant.

Case No.: 4:16–CV–1848–VEH

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Middle Division.

Signed March 17, 2017

C. Emanuel Smith, Gerald L. Miller, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Marsha Lynn Rucker, Birmingham District Office, Kurt S. Fischer, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Birmingham District Office, Birmingham, AL, James L. Lee, Washington, DC, Harriett F. Oppenheim, Jackson, MS, Maneesh Varma, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Christopher DeGroff, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL, Gregory L. Smith, Jr., Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Atlanta, GA, Kathryn Christine Palamountain, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Houston, TX, Kimberly W. Geisler, Scott Dukes & Geisler PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS, United States District Judge

This is a civil action filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC") against Labor Solutions of Alabama, LLC ("LSA") which the EEOC contends "was formed to assume the business operations previously performed by" a company named East Coast Labor Solutions, LLC ("East Coast"). (Doc. 1 at 2). The EEOC brings the action "on behalf of Oscar Corzo, Jorge Mercado, and a class of at least eight other Charging Parties and aggrieved individuals" (the "Claimants"), and claims that East Coast "subjected Claimants to discriminatory treatment based on their national origin," in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e–17 ("Title VII"). (Doc. 1 at 1). The EEOC also claims that East Coast "failed to accommodate [the Claimant's] disabilities" in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 – 12213(the "ADA"). (Doc. 1 at 1).¹

The case comes before the Court on the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Complaint "pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, alternatively, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." (Doc. 14 at 1). For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be GRANTED, but the Plaintiff will be given the opportunity to amend to correct the deficiencies noted herein.

I. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

This Court has previously noted:

Generally, jurisdictional challenges are addressed under Rule 12(b)(1), whereas Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal for failure of a party to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that where "a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits.") (citing Hitt v. City of Pasadena , 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977) ).

Harris v. Bd. of Trustees Univ. of Alabama , 846 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1229–30 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (Hopkins, J.).

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to assert the defense of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. A motion to dismiss based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should be granted "only if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief." Ramming , 281 F.3d at 161. Lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be found through an examination of: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts and the court's resolution of disputed facts. Id. Because the burden of proof on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction, the plaintiff "constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist." Id. at 161 (citing McDaniel v. United States , 899 F.Supp. 305, 307 (E.D. Tex. 1995) and Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp , 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980) ).

Attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction take two forms: (1) facial attacks, and (2) factual attacks. Scarfo v. Ginsberg , 175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Lawrence v. Dunbar , 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) ). Facial attacks on a complaint "require the court merely to look and see if the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject matter jurisdiction, and the allegations in [plaintiff's] complaint are taken as true for the purposes of the motion." Lawrence , 919 F.2d at 1529 (quoting Menchaca , 613 F.2d at 511 ). Factual attacks challenge "the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings, such as testimony and affidavits, are considered." Id. (same).

If a defendant makes a factual attack upon the court's subject matter jurisdiction, submitting evidentiary materials, the plaintiff is "also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction." Paterson v. Weinberger , 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).

"[A] plaintiff must have ample opportunity to present evidence bearing on the existence of jurisdiction." Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Collins , 921 F.2d 1237, 1243 (11th Cir. 1991) ). "Although the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to discover facts that would support his allegations of jurisdiction." Morrison , 228 F.3d at 1273 (quoting Majd–Pour v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc. , 724 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1984) ).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint provide "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). However, to survive a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (" Twombly ").

A claim has facial plausibility "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ) (" Iqbal "). That is, the complaint must include enough facts "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation and footnote omitted). Pleadings that contain nothing more than "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" do not meet Rule 8 standards, nor do pleadings suffice that are based merely upon "labels or conclusions" or "naked assertion[s]" without supporting factual allegations. Id. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted).

Once a claim has been stated adequately, however, "it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). Further, when ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must "take the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Pielage v. McConnell , 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc. , 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) ).

II. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT

A. The "Employer(s)"

According to the Complaint,² East Coast, a temporary staffing firm, incorporated in West Virginia in 2010, never registered to do business in Alabama, and "terminated in November [of] 2013." (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 12). East Coast "conducted business in the State of Alabama through its partnership and agreement with Pilgrim's Pride Corporation (‘Pilgrim’) at its Guntersville, [Alabama] poultry processing facility." (Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 3). The EEOC alleges that "[i]n 2008, Pilgrim entered into a temporary staffing agreement with East Coast ," wherein "East Coast was to provide ongoing temporary staffing services and workers." (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 16) (emphasis supplied). The contract provided that "each employee recruited and staffed for temporary work at Pilgrim would be an employee of East Coast ." (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 16) (emphasis supplied).

The Complaint states that "[u]pon information and belief [,] East Coast partnered with its owner, Labor Solutions[,] LLC [ ] ("Labor Solutions") to accomplish its mission." (Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 4) (emphasis supplied). The Complaint notes that "if [it is] confirmed" that Labor Solutions partnered with East Coast, "Labor Solutions may be joined as a real party in interest." (Doc. 1 at 2, ¶ 4).

"Labor Solutions of Alabama, LLC ," ("LSA"), the only Defendant in this case, is a different entity from "Labor Solutions." LSA is also a temporary staffing agency, incorporated in West Virginia in October of 2014, nearly a year after East Coast ceased operations. LSA has never been registered to do business in Alabama, and "remains active." (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 13). According to the Complaint, "East Coast, Labor Solutions, and [LSA] share the same managing officers, principal office address, and company email accounts." (Doc. 1 at 4, ¶ 14).³ It is alleged that "[LSA] was formed to assume the business operations previously performed by East Coast, and has continuously conducted business in the State of Alabama since 2014." (Doc. 1 at 2). The Complaint alleges that "Defendant [LSA] ... formerly known as East Coast ... subjected Claimants to discriminatory treatment based on their national origin [and] failed to accommodate their disabilities." (Doc. 1 at 1) (emphasis supplied).

Because they are not relevant to the instant motion, the Court need not, and will not, set out the Complaint's specific allegations of discrimination and failure to accommodate. However, since all such actions...