Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Rock-Tenn Servs. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 August 2012
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:10–CV–1960–B.
• Citation: 901 F.Supp.2d 810
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. ROCK–TENN SERVICES COMPANY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

901 F.Supp.2d 810

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff,
v.
ROCK–TENN SERVICES COMPANY, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:10–CV–1960–B.

United States District Court,
N.D. Texas,
Dallas Division.

Aug. 22, 2012.

[901 F.Supp.2d 813]

Joel Philip Clark, Meaghan Leigh Shepard, EEOC-Dallas District Office, Robert A. Canino, Jr., Suzanne M. Anderson, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Ryan Griffitts, Edward F. Berbarie, Frederick J. Barrow, Kevin S. Mullen, Littler Mendelson, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
JANE J. BOYLE, District Judge.

Plaintiff, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed this suit against Defendant Rock–Tenn Services Company, Inc. (“Rock–Tenn”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–5(f)(1) and (3), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. 1981a. Generally, in its Amended Complaint (doc. 3) the EEOC alleges that RockTenn discriminated against former employee Michael Scott and similarly situated employees by subjecting them to harassment thereby creating a racially hostile work environment.

Each party has filed a motion for summary judgment. The EEOC, in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 91), argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on a variety of RockTenn's affirmative defenses. Rock–Tenn, in its Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 95), moves for summary judgment maintaining that the EEOC failed to properly conciliate its claims prior to suit, and that the EEOC's cannot prove its harassment claim on the merits. Rock–Tenn also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff Michael Scott's claims individually under the doctrine of judicial estoppel because of Scott's previous position in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. For the following reasons the Court finds the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be, and hereby is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court also finds Rock–Tenn's Motion for Summary Judgment should be, and hereby is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

[901 F.Supp.2d 814]

I. BACKGROUND¹

Defendant Rock–Tenn is a paperboard and packaging manufacturer, and operates a mill in south Dallas. On September 9, 2008, then-employee Michael Scott (“Scott”) filed a Charge of Discrimination (the “Charge”) with the EEOC, alleging Rock–Tenn discriminated and retaliated against him based on his race, African–American.² Def.'s App. 870, ECF No. 97 (“Def.'s App.”). Scott's Charge outlined the relevant alleged discriminatory conduct as the use of a racial epithet by his supervisor, the presence of racist graffiti in the workplace, and the discovery of a noose at his work station. Id.

Over the next year and a half, the EEOC investigated Scott's Charge of Discrimination and concluded that fifteen other similarly situated individuals working at Rock–Tenn had also been subjected to harassment and discrimination based on their African–American race. Pl.'s Mot. Partial Summ. J. 6, ECF No. 91 (“Pl.'s Br.”). The EEOC's investigation culminated in a finding that RockTenn had discriminated against Scott and other similarly situated individuals by subjecting them to unwelcome racial harassment. Id. Accordingly, on April 29, 2010, the EEOC issued its findings in a Letter of Determination, accompanied by a Proposed Conciliation Agreement. Id.; see also Def.'s App. 836–50. The Proposed Conciliation Agreement sought a variety of remedial, and monetary relief. Def.'s App. 839–50.

During the next several months, the parties remained in communication and exchanged correspondence in an attempt to achieve early conciliation of this dispute. Ultimately, however, conciliation efforts failed. As a result, the EEOC filed the instant suit on September 30, 2010, alleging that Rock–Tenn unlawfully discriminated against Scott and thirteen of the original fifteen similarly situated individuals (collectively “Plaintiffs”) based on their race, by fostering a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On May 29, 2012, the EEOC filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. On May 30, 2012, Rock–Tenn filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. Both motions have been fully briefed by the parties and are now ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and record evidence show no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994). Only disputes about material facts preclude a grant of summary judgment, and “the substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The movant bears the burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact exists.

[901 F.Supp.2d 815]

Latimer v. Smithkline & French Lab., 919 F.2d 301, 303 (5th Cir.1990). Where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant need not support its motion with evidence negating the nonmovant's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Instead, the movant may satisfy its burden by pointing to the absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant's case. Id.;Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

Once the movant has met its burden, the nonmovant must show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548). “This burden is not satisfied with ‘some metaphysical doubt as to material facts,’ by ‘conclusory allegations,’ by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence.” Id. (citations omitted). Instead, the nonmoving party must go beyond the mere pleadings and “come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e)); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The evidence presented by the nonmovant must “support each essential element of its claims on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 302 (5th Cir.2000). In determining whether a genuine issue exists for trial, the court will view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id.

Where, however, a party seeks summary judgment with respect to an affirmative defense where it will have the burden at trial on that affirmative defense, the summary judgment burdens are different. Rivers v. Graybill, No. 3:06–CV–1128–D, 2008 WL 2548118, at *3 (N.D.Tex. June 24, 2008). When a party “who will have the burden of proof at trial concerning an affirmative defense seeks summary judgment based on that defense, he ‘must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the ... defense.’ ” Id. (quoting Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 878 F.Supp. 943, 962 (N.D.Tex.1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. ROCK–TENN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Court begins its analysis by addressing the issues raised in Defendant Rock–Tenn's Motion for Summary Judgment. Rock–Tenn moves for summary judgment on three grounds. First, the company argues that the EEOC failed to satisfy its statutory obligation to conciliate in good faith prior to bringing suit. Second, Rock–Tenn asserts the EEOC's hostile work environment claim fails on its merits. Third, Rock–Tenn argues Plaintiff Scott is judicially estopped from recovery in the present action. The EEOC's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment will be addressed infra, Part IV.

A. Conciliation

Rock–Tenn first moves for summary judgment on the ground that the EEOC failed to conciliate its claims in good faith, and thus failed to satisfy all of its statutory obligations before filing suit. Rock–Tenn's assertion regarding the EEOC's failure to conciliate in good faith is two-fold. First, Rock–Tenn argues the totality of the EEOC's correspondence and lack of cooperation with RockTenn are indicative of a general effort to “stonewall” the conciliation process. Def.'s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 12–16, ECF No. 96 (“Def.'s Br.”). Second, Rock–Tenn argues specific acts by the EEOC constituted overt misrepresentations, in direct contravention of

[901 F.Supp.2d 816]

the agency's duty to act in good faith. Id. at 15. To address Rock–Tenn's failure to conciliate argument, the Court will first summarize the relevant summary judgment evidence, and then apply the appropriate legal standards to the undisputed facts.

The conciliation process began on, or around, April 27, 2010 when Rock–Tenn sent the EEOC a letter requesting a brief meeting to discuss the charge of discrimination. Def.'s App. 852. Two days later, on April 29, 2010, Rock–Tenn sent the EEOC a second letter requesting additional information regarding the other similarly situated individuals.³Id. at 853–54.On that same day, the EEOC sent Rock–Tenn a letter of Determination (“Letter of Determination”) along with an attached proposed Conciliation Agreement (“Proposed Conciliation Agreement”). Def.'s App. 836–50.

The Letter of Determination outlined the EEOC's reasons for determining that there was reasonable cause to believe that Title VII violations had occurred during Scott's employment with Rock–Tenn. In relevant part, the Letter of Determination states:

[T]he evidence shows that Charging Party [Scott] was subjected to unwelcome racial comments by a supervisor. The evidence also shows that he was subjected to discrimination including racist graffiti and a noose at his workstation. Charging Party complained about the harassment, but the Respondent [Rock–Tenn] failed to prevent the discriminatory conduct by taking prompt, effective remedial action to correct it.

Id. at 837. The Letter of Determination goes on to state that the EEOC “determined that similarly...