Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. SDI of Mineola, LLC
| Decision Date | 17 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 6:21-CV-00226-JCB-KNM |
| Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, v. SDI OF MINEOLA, L.L.C., d/b/a SONIC-DRIVE IN & SDI OF WHITEHOUSE, L.L.C., d/b/a SONIC DRIVE-IN Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 51), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition (Doc No. 60), Defendants' Reply (Doc. No. 61), and Plaintiff's Sur-Reply (Doc. No. 62). Having considered the motion, the Parties' submissions, and the relevant law, the Court RECOMMENDS DENYING Defendants' motion.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Plaintiff”) initiated this sexual harassment and hostile work environment action on behalf of Vanessa Spurgeon, Krystin McElya, Trinity Hollingsworth, Ashleigh Stein, Shelby Henson,[1] Lauren Crump, Gabrielle Jerome, Sage Mizer, and other aggrieved female employees (“Claimants”).[2] Plaintiff alleges Defendants SDI of Mineola, L.L.C. d/b/a Sonic Drive-In (“SDI ”) & SDI of Whitehouse L.L.C. d/b/a Sonic Drive-In (“SDI Whitehouse”) violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.[3] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that SDI Mineola discriminated against Hollingsworth, Crump, Jerome, Mizer, and other aggrieved female employees by subjecting them to sexual harassment, ultimately leading to Spurgeon's constructive discharge. Plaintiff also alleges that SDI Whitehouse discriminated against Stein by subjecting her to sexual harassment, ultimately leading to her constructive discharge, and alleges that SDI Whitehouse subjected other aggrieved female employees to a hostile work environment based on sex.[4] The EEOC asserts that Leston Juarez (“LJ”), the former co-manager of SDI Mineola and former general manager of SDI-Whitehouse, sexually harassed all claimants.[5] Plaintiff seeks monetary relief for all claimants, as well as injunctive relief and punitive damages.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) EEOC cannot establish a prima facie case for hostile work environment based on sexual harassment for all claimants; (2) EEOC cannot prove constructive discharge for Spurgeon and/or Stein; (3) Defendants assert they are entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense; (4) EEOC cannot prove that Defendants and other McQuilliams-owned entities are an integrated enterprise under Title VII; (4) Plaintiffs cannot prove that any Plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages under Title VII; and (5) EEOC cannot prove that certain claimants suffered noneconomic damages.[6]
Specifically, as to Plaintiff's prima facie claim for hostile work environment, Defendants argue that LJ's behavior was not severe or pervasive and that the complained of conduct was not based on sex. Defendants also assert that Spurgeon and Stein cannot prove constructive discharge because the evidence shows that they resigned for non-harassment reasons, and further, that LJ's behavior does not meet the required level of severity. As to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense, Defendants contend that they maintained a reasonable and appropriate written harassment policy and that each claimant failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities provided by Defendants, and otherwise failed to avoid harm by neglecting to report LJ's behavior while he was still their manager. Defendants further state that they (along with any other McQuilliams-owned SDI entity) are not an integrated enterprise single employer for Title VII purposes, and assert that the only Trevino factor present in this case is common ownership. As to punitive damages, Defendants state that the EEOC cannot prove that they acted with malice or reckless indifference as required, when no owner or member of upper management had knowledge of the conduct at issue. Finally, Defendants assert that Spurgeon, McElyea, Crump, and Mizer fail to state a specific discernable injury as to their emotional state that is supported with competent evidence regarding the nature, extent, and duration of the alleged harm they claim to have sustained as a result of the alleged sexual harassment.
In its Response, the EEOC asserts that it has stated a prima facie claim for sexual harassment for all claimants.[7] The EEOC states that LJ's harassment was based on the claimants' sex (female) because he primarily targeted women, and further asserts that LJ's conduct was frequent, severe, threatening, and altered the work environment. Plaintiff next asserts that Spurgeon and Stein's claims for constructive discharge require only that they felt compelled to resign due to LJ's harassment. Plaintiff further responds that Defendants are not entitled to the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense because there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the dissemination of Defendants' policy against sexual harassment and conflicting evidence as to whether claimants reported LJ's behavior. As to the EEOC's integrated enterprise claim, Plaintiff states that there is a question of material fact as to whether the McQuilliams' franchise operations were highly interrelated, centrally controlled, commonly managed, and commonly owned. Finally, the EEOC asserts that each claimant adequately alleged an injury as required to establish non-economic damages, and that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the EEOC's claim for punitive damages because there is a question of material fact regarding whether Defendants made a good faith effort to protect claimants' federally protected rights.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party has the burden of showing there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “material fact” is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id. Issues of material fact are “genuine” only if they require resolution by a trier of fact and if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must make all inferences from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The moving party may meet its burden by pointing to the absence of evidence supporting any claim. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
If the movant meets its burden, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts in the record sufficient to support his claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by argument, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the factors, or a mere scintilla of evidence. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585; Wallace v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant must submit competent summary judgment evidence sufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). “The nonmovant is also required to articulate the precise manner in which the submitted or identified evidence supports his or her claim.” Smith v. United States, 392 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004).
Summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence before the court, viewed as a whole, could lead to different factual findings and conclusions. Honore v. Douglas, 833 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1987). The district court must look to the full record, including the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions. Williams v. Adams, 836 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1988). Under this standard, fact questions are considered with deference to the nonmovant. Reid v. State Farm Mutl. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1986). The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed and all inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The Court resolves factual controversies for purposes of summary judgment in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. The Court does not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts. Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1048 (citing Little, 37 F.3d at 1075).
Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment on the EEOC's sexual harassment hostile work environment claims on behalf of Spurgeon, McElyea, Crump, Jerome, Mizner, and Stein. Specifically, Defendants move for summary judgment on two elements: whether harassment was based on the claimants' sex (female) and whether LJ's harassment was so severe or pervasive that it affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.[8]
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's. . . sex.” A hostile work environment due to sexual...
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