Equal Employment Opportunity v. Crst Van Expedited

• Decision Date: 11 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07-CV-95-LRR.,07-CV-95-LRR.
• Citation: 615 F.Supp.2d 867
• Parties: EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, and Janet Boot, Barbara Grant, Cindy Moffett, Remcey Jeunenne Peeples, Monika Starke, Latesha Thomas and Nicole Ann Cinquemano, Plaintiffs-Interveners, v. CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

615 F.Supp.2d 867

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff, and Janet Boot, Barbara Grant, Cindy Moffett, Remcey Jeunenne Peeples, Monika Starke, Latesha Thomas and Nicole Ann Cinquemano, Plaintiffs-Interveners, v. CRST VAN EXPEDITED, INC., Defendant.

No. 07-CV-95-LRR.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Cedar Rapids Division.

May 11, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ann Marie Henry, Jean P. Kamp, Jeanne Bowman Szromba, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Chicago, IL, Brian C. Tyndall, Eeoc Milwaukee District Office, Milwaukee, WI, Nicholas J. Pladson, EEOC, Minneapolis, MN, for Plaintiff.

Jeffrey R. Tronvold, Eells & Tronvold Law Offices, PLC, Matthew James Reilly, Eells & Tronvold, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Plaintiffs-Interveners.

Carla J. Rozycki, Emma J. Sullivan, J. Andrew Hirth, John H. Mathias, Jr., John P. Wolfsmith, Robert T. Markowski, Sally K. Sears Coder, Jenner and Block LLP, Chicago, IL, Kevin J. Visser, Simmons Perrine Moyer Bergman PLC, Thomas D. Wolle, Moyer & Bergman, PLC, Cedar Rapids, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER

LINDA R. READE, Chief District Judge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

                I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 870
                  II. RELEVANT PRIOR PROCEEDINGS .......................................... 870
                      A. Administrative Proceedings ....................................... 870
                         1. Ms. Starke's Charge of Discrimination ......................... 870
                         2. Ms. Starke's limitations period ............................... 871
                      B. The EEOC's Complaint ............................................. 872
                      C. Answer ........................................................... 872
                      D. Motion ........................................................... 872
                 III. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ....................................... 873
                

                IV. THE MERITS ........................................................... 873
                     A. Arguments ......................................................... 873
                        1. Motion ......................................................... 873
                        2. Resistance ..................................................... 874
                        3. Reply .......................................................... 875
                        4. Surreply ....................................................... 875
                     B. Analysis .......................................................... 876
                        1. Holding ........................................................ 876
                        2. Alternate holding .............................................. 877
                           a. The EEOC generally may not resurrect dead claims ............ 877
                           b. The continuing violation doctrine is largely inapplicable ... 879
                               i. Ms. Carney .............................................. 880
                              ii. Ms. Shadden ............................................. 881
                             iii. Ms. Skaggs .............................................. 881
                     C. Disposition as to the Twelve Women ................................ 882
                  V. MS. BEDFORD .......................................................... 882
                     A. Arguments ......................................................... 882
                     B. Analysis .......................................................... 883
                  VI. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 884
                

I. INTRODUCTION

The matter before the court is Defendant CRST Van Expedited, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Statute of Limitations and Other Grounds ("Motion") (docket no. 147).

II. RELEVANT PRIOR PROCEEDINGS¹

A. Administrative Proceedings

1. Ms. Starke's Charge of Discrimination

On December 1, 2005, Plaintiff-Intervener Monika Starke ("Ms.Starke") presented a Charge of Discrimination ("Charge") to Plaintiff Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Ms. Starke alleged that her employer, Defendant CRST Van Expedited, Inc. ("CRST"), "discriminated against [her] on the basis of ... sex ..., in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, [42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,] as amended" ("Title VII"). Def.'s App'x at 2998. Ms. Starke alleged the following "particulars" in her Charge:

I was hired by [CRST] on June 22, 2005 in the position of Truck Driver. Since my employment began with [CRST,] I have been subjected to sexual harassment on two occasions by my Lead Trainers. On July 7, 2005, Bob Smith, Lead Trainer[,] began to make sexual remarks to me whenever he gave me instructions. .... On July 14, 2005, I contacted the dispatcher and was told that I could not get off the truck until the next day. On July 18, 2005 through August 3, 2005, David Goodman, Lead Trainer, forced me to have unwanted sex with him on several occasions while we were traveling in order to get a passing grade.

Id. Further, Ms. Starke alleged that CRST "did not state why I was subjected to sexual harassment[,] which created a hostile work environment." Id.

Ms. Starke asked the EEOC to file her Charge and cross-file it with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC"). Pursuant to a work-sharing agreement,² the EEOC formally received the Charge on behalf of both agencies and deemed the Charge to be "initially instituted" with the ICRC. (In the work-sharing agreement, the EEOC and ICRC reciprocally designated each other as agents for receiving charges of unlawful employment practices.) The EEOC sent a copy of the Charge to the ICRC, notified the ICRC that the Charge "is to be initially investigated by the EEOC," id. at 3000, and began its investigation. The ICRC had waived its right to exclusive jurisdiction over charges initially instituted with it. Here, the ICRC filed the Charge on December 5, 2005 but apparently stayed its own investigation pending the EEOC proceedings.

2. Ms. Starke's limitations period

Because the EEOC deemed the Charge to be "initially instituted" with the ICRC, Ms. Starke's Charge was timely filed as to any alleged unlawful employment practice occurring on or after February 4, 2005, i.e., any such practice occurring within 300 days of the filing of the Charge. In relevant part, Title VII's statute of limitations provides:

A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ..., except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State ... with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice ..., such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359-60 n. 8, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977) ("If a charge has been initially filed with or referred to a state ... agency, it must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days after the practice occurred...."). An influential treatise explains

there is a dual aspect to the Title VII limitations periods; they have a retrospective, as well as a prospective, aspect. In other words, not only must charges be filed within 180 (or 300) days after a discriminatory event, but also, as a general rule, the aggrieved party can only achieve redress for discriminatory acts which occurred 180 (or 300) days prior to the filing of charges.

4 Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 72.02, at 72-5 (2d ed. July 2008); see, e.g., Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) ("An individual must file a charge within the statutory time period and serve notice upon the person against whom the charge is made. In a State that has an entity with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the alleged unlawful practice, an employee who initially filed a grievance with that agency must file the charge with the EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice."); Millage v. City of Sioux City, 258 F.Supp.2d 976, 984-86 (N.D.Iowa 2003) (Bennett, C.J.) (discussing the ICRC and concluding that in Iowa an administrative charge is timely so long as it is filed within 300 days).

B. The EEOC's Complaint

On September 27, 2007, the EEOC filed the instant lawsuit on behalf of Ms. Starke "and a class of similarly situated female employees of [CRST]...." Complaint (docket no. 2), at 1. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and (3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the EEOC brings suit in its own name "to correct [CRST's] unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, and to provide appropriate relief to [Ms.] Starke and a class of similarly situated female employees of [CRST] who were adversely affected by such practices." First Amended Complaint ("EEOC's Complaint") (docket no. 8), at 1.³ The EEOC generally alleges that Ms. Starke and the other similarly situated women "were adversely affected ... when their lead drivers or team drivers subjected them to sexual harassment and to a sexually hostile working environment based on their gender, and CRST failed to prevent, correct, and protect them...." Id. Notably, the EEOC did not allege that CRST was engaged in "a pattern or practice" of illegal sex-based discrimination or otherwise plead a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6.

At present, the EEOC seeks monetary and equitable relief on behalf of approximately 150 allegedly aggrieved persons at the trial of this matter. The court refers to the "similarly situated female employees" who are referenced in the EEOC's Complaint as "allegedly aggrieved persons" and not as "class members." See Order (docket no. 197), at 9-10 (citing in part 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (referring to "[t]he person or persons aggrieved" and "the person aggrieved")). The phrase "allegedly aggrieved persons" comports with the language of § 2000e-5 and reflects the fact that the EEOC "may seek specific relief for a group of aggrieved individuals without first obtaining class certification...