Equal Rights Ctr. v. Props. Int'l

• Decision Date: 26 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–CV–999.,13–CV–999.
• Parties: EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER, Appellant, v. PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, and Ernest Banks, Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

110 A.3d 599

EQUAL RIGHTS CENTER, Appellant

v.PROPERTIES INTERNATIONAL, and Ernest Banks, Appellees.

No. 13–CV–999.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued May 8, 2014.

Decided Feb. 26, 2015.

Peter D. Isakoff, with whom Gary A. Coad, Washington, DC, and Adam B. Banks were on the brief, for appellant. Megan K. Whyte de Vasquez and Robert M. Bruskin, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, were also on the brief for appellant.

Deborah Murrell Whelihan, Washington, DC, for appellees.

Before FISHER and McLEESE, Associate Judges, and PRYOR, Senior Judge.

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Equal Rights Center (ERC), a non-profit advocacy organization, filed a complaint against appellees Ernest Banks and Properties International, alleging a violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C.Code §§ 2–1401.01 to 2–1404.04 (2012 Repl.). The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that appellant lacked standing to bring the claim. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Factual Background

Appellant ERC describes itself as “a national non-profit civil rights organization ... [which] works nationally to promote equal opportunity in housing, employment, and access to public accommodations and government services for all protected classes under federal, state, and local laws.” It provides “guidance, information, and assistance” to protect individuals seeking housing in the Washington, D.C., area, and offers training for the real estate industry on fair housing law.

Appellant also investigates alleged housing discrimination, in part by tracking real estate listings, which led it to a listing appellees placed on the Metropolitan Regional Information Systems (MRIS) website. The listing advertised an apartment for $934.00 in monthly rent and contained the following language: “Section 8 and other vouchers or certificates [will require] additional cost.” This language, as the trial court explained, violates the DCHRA's prohibition against discrimination based on source of income.

Properties International is a property management, maintenance, and real-estate leasing firm, and Ernest Banks is the owner of, and a broker for, Properties International. Appellees “admit that as a business, they currently manage, care for[,] and offer for lease the property referenced in” the complaint.

ERC alleged that, after discovering the listing, it sent two certified letters; one to appellee Banks and another to appellee Properties International. Its intent in sending the letters was “to inform [appellees] of their unlawful conduct, to educate them on their responsibilities under the DCHRA, and to seek their cooperation in collaborating with the ERC to address their discriminatory conduct.” In an attempt to negotiate a settlement, appellant prepared a draft agreement in which appellant demanded that all employees of Properties International “be required to complete a fair housing training course ... [for a sum of money] to be invoiced by the ERC and paid by Properties International.” The parties failed to reach an agreement, and on February 15, 2013, appellant filed suit in the Superior Court under the DCHRA.

ERC's complaint alleged that appellees had injured it by “interfering with its mission, efforts, and programs that are intended to bring about equality of opportunity in housing.” To counteract appellees' unlawful action, ERC asserted, it had “committed scarce resources, including substantial staff time, to identify complainants, investigate the extent of defendants' discriminatory actions, engage in an education and outreach campaign, and develop and disseminate educational materials.” Appellees' actions “have frustrated and continue to frustrate the ERC's mission and purpose,” and required ERC “to divert resources from other planned anti-discrimination programs involving education, outreach, and testing” to respond to appellees' listing. ERC further alleged appellees' actions would continue to injure it in numerous ways.

Appellant sought the following relief: (1) a declaration that appellees violated D.C.Code § 2–1402.21 (2012) by engaging in discrimination based on source of income, (2) an injunction preventing appellees from charging discriminatory rates or advertising that they do so and ordering appellees to undertake “such remedial actions as are necessary to ameliorate [their] past illegal discriminatory conduct,” (3) monetary damages, (4) attorneys' fees, and (5) punitive damages.

On April 17, 2013, appellees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(c). About a month later, they filed a “Motion for Consolidation,” asking that their Rule 12(c) motion be treated as a motion for summary judgment. In doing so, appellees noted that they relied on various documents attached to their answer and to the motion for judgment on the pleadings.¹

The trial court heard oral arguments on the pending motions, but the record is bereft of any indication that it was treating appellees' motion as one for summary judgment. Nor did it conduct an evidentiary hearing. During a July 26, 2013, scheduling conference, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, concluding that appellant had failed to plead sufficient injury in fact. The trial court reasoned that under Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 97 S.Ct. 555, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977), ERC had not been injured in any substantial way. We discuss the court's ruling in more detail below.

Appellant ERC contends the trial court erred in dismissing its complaint for want of standing, arguing that the trial judge “impermissibly made factual findings at odds with the allegations in the Complaint” and improperly grounded its analysis on the Village of Arlington Heights decision.

II. Pleading Requirements Under Rule 8(a)

Our jurisdiction requires that a complaint contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the Court's jurisdiction depends ..., (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a). Historically, we have identified ourselves as a notice pleading jurisdiction, see Taylor v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 957 A.2d 45, 50 (D.C.2008), but we have adopted the pleading standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). See Potomac Dev. Corp. v. District of Columbia, 28 A.3d 531, 544 (D.C.2011). “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Grimes v. District of Columbia, 89 A.3d 107, 112 (D.C.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the pleading stage, plaintiff's burden in pleading injury is not onerous. Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219, 245–46 (D.C.2011) (en banc); Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 633 F.3d 1136, 1141 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.2011). We have held that “a complaint that contains ‘general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice[.]’ ” Grayson, 15 A.3d at 245 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) ). The sufficiency of such allegations of injury must be tested against the case law defining injury in fact. Grayson, 15 A.3d at 246.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of standing. Padou v. District of Columbia, 77 A.3d 383, 388 (D.C.2013). Like the trial court, we accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences from those factual allegations in the plaintiff's favor. Grayson, 15 A.3d at 228. The court may not consider matters outside the pleadings unless it treats the motion as one for summary judgment. Grimes, 89 A.3d at 111.

III. Standing for Individuals and Organizations

“ ‘Standing is a threshold jurisdictional question which must be addressed prior to and independent[ly] of the merits of any party's claim.’ ” W.H. v. D.W., 78 A.3d 327, 337 (D.C.2013) (quoting Grayson, 15 A.3d at 229). It is generally required that a party seeking to bring a claim must allege “... a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy” as to “justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf.” W.H., 78 A.3d at 337 (quoting Grayson, 15 A.3d at 229 n. 19 (quotation marks omitted)). A party has such a “personal stake” only if: (1) he or she has suffered “injury in fact”—an actual or imminent, concrete and particularized, invasion of a legally protected interest; (2) the injury is “fairly ... trace[able]” to defendant's challenged actions; and (3) it is “likely ... the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quotation marks omitted); see also Padou, 77 A.3d at 389. The redressability condition implies that plaintiff's injuries may give it standing to seek certain types of relief but not others. For example, allegations of past injury may give a plaintiff standing to seek damages, but a plaintiff seeking forward-looking relief, such as an injunction, must allege facts showing that the injunction is necessary to prevent injury otherwise likely to happen in the future. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ; see also Fair Emp't Council of Greater Washington v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1272 (D.C.Cir.1994).

Appellant is an organization, and organizations, like individuals, have legally protected interests. An organization may file suit in its own right “so long as it satisfies the constitutional requirements and prudential prerequisites of traditional standing analysis.” D.C. Appleseed Ctr. for Law & Justice v. District of Columbia Dep't of Ins., Sec., &...